

Chronicles

October 1995

A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE

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U.N. BLUES

The Surrender
of American
Sovereignty



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
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Jeffrey Tucker, and Michael Hill.

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A MAGAZINE OF AMERICAN CULTURE

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On Serbia

Sitting comfortably in my suburban apartment, far from the trenches and shellfire where Momcilo Selic is witnessing the desperate combat between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims, I don't know whether I can claim greater objectivity or simply greater ignorance. I am certainly grateful for Mr. Selic's glimpse ("Letter From Bosnia," April) into the lives of ordinary Serbs, hard hit by the blockade and fearing massacre from enemy militias. It is a tale that can doubtless be told by participants on all sides. In any case, it reminds us that we are ultimately dealing not just with political agendas or military objectives but human beings.

Unfortunately, Mr. Selic speaks disdainfully of "Croatland" and implies that all Croat soldiers are the descendants of the infamous *Ustase*. I wonder why he does not say anything like this about the Slovenes. This, I imagine, is because, as far as I know, there are no sizable Serb enclaves in Slovenia, and so the northernmost former Yugoslav republic could make a clean break. Not so in the case of Croatia. I may seem gullible for sympathizing with the Croat desire for independence. At the same time, my support for Croatia has been tempered by a realization that this conflict, like so many in European history, belies simplistic distinctions between "good" and "bad."

Mr. Selic admits that his fellow Serbs have no scruples about committing the same sort of atrocities attributed to the enemy. Of course, we have no way of knowing who started the latest round of brutal massacres. Serbs say they are retaliating for Croat atrocities. The Croats are getting revenge for the slaughter of tens of thousands of their countrymen by the Chetniks in World War II. The latter, in turn, sought retribution for the excesses committed by the *Ustase*. It's a never-ending cycle of viciousness which Mr. Selic seems to accept with a certain fatalistic resignation.

While innocent Serbs are undeniably suffering a great deal from the current NATO-imposed blockade, one recalls that just four years ago, it was the Serb fighters who had the big guns, and planes, on their side. They were busy besieging and starving out the inhabitants

of Zadar and Vukovar.

Thankfully, there is one figure to look to as standing above the ancient hatreds—the famous Archbishop Stepinac. An ardent Croat patriot, Stepinac was at first a supporter of Anton Pavelic, leader of the *Ustase*. Yet he quickly became one of Pavelic's greatest opponents and condemned excesses committed by both sides. He denounced the mass executions and forced "conversions" by the Croat fascists. He saw that such actions were not only immoral and inhuman, but were driving people into the arms of Tito's communists.

Pavelic's government tried to remove Stepinac, but the Vatican would have none of it. Stepinac likewise irked Nazi officials by resisting their attempts to round up Croatia's Jewish community. As a result of his "meddling," 75,000 Jews were spared the one-way trip to the camps in Poland (a fact frequently overlooked by critics of Catholic Croatia).

This venerable and aged cleric, later imprisoned by Tito, was perhaps unique among wartime Balkan leaders in that he took the tenets of his religion seriously. He was a nationalist, but he was also, first and foremost, a Christian.

I may be naive in thinking that my assessment would remain the same if I were in Mr. Selic's shoes. Yet his article seems to offer no solution that rises above the interminable slaughter. I prefer the example of Stepinac.

—Matthew M. Anger
Alexandria, VA

Mr. Selic Replies:

Mr. Anger's letter, well-intentioned as it might be, does offer some insights into the Yugoslav problems (and some other problems as well) that stem less from a presentation of facts than from inference. As for the facts, I might remind Mr. Anger that Croatian Cardinal Stepinac did not save 75,000 Croatian, Bosnian, Herzegovinian, and Voivodina Jews from being sent to "camps in Poland," because most of them were sent to the Croatian death camp, Jasenovac (not far from Zagreb) instead. There, more than 30,000 of them were murdered (often by being butchered or clubbed to death). In fact, existing

testimonies from Jasenovac come largely from the Jewish survivors who were spared as valuable professionals and craftsmen. Between 500,000 and 600,000 Jasenovac Serb inmates did not have such luck.

Also, Cardinal Stepinac has been recorded by Nazi newsreels as the prelate who blessed the *Ustase* troops (dressed in their best SS-type uniforms), and he is on record as the man of God who saw no reason to oppose the mass forced conversion of Serb Orthodox Christians to Roman Catholicism. Some 300,000 Serbs were so converted between 1941 and 1945, and many of them subsequently murdered, for all their docility and loyalty to Ante Pavelic's National Socialist government.

But, Cardinal Stepinac's record—controversial as it may be (many Serbs consider him a war criminal)—is not what is most disturbing in Mr. Anger's missive. Far more disturbing to me—as a Christian (of the Serb Orthodox kind) and a conservative (of the European and Western bent)—is Mr. Anger's belief that evil can be legislated, organized, or ignored away—by policies, techniques, or attitudes correct and well-meaning enough. Of course, this view of Creation—and human affairs in general—is a widespread one, and has even seeped into what many still consider the conservative movement—in the United States, among other places.

Unfortunately for this worldview, nothing we so far know of history supports its tenets, nor does anything contradict the fact that precisely this type of idealistic “well-wishing” has produced more actual evil than any other human attitude. After all, communists were eminently well-intentioned, their rage and homicidal frenzy whipped up time and time again by the failure of the human animal to accept solutions that would, purportedly, raise all mankind above its own, God-imposed condition. Even were Cardinal Stepinac (for instance) a veritable saint (there are persistent attempts by the Catholic Church to canonize him), he would—like all saints recorded so far—have failed to alter (much less end) “the interminable slaughter” of Mr. Anger's perception, and anguish.

Human (and all other) life on this planet, however, has, since the Genesis, been nothing but “interminable slaughter” all along. The *Iliad*, among other works of human (and divine) spirit, is

nothing but a paean to this “slaughter,” as are many other works of human (but divinely inspired) genius. Whether we like it or not, “interminable slaughter” is here with us to stay, at least until the Atonement. God, it seems, has some reasons of His Own to keep it up, and if we (Mr. Anger included) cannot recognize them, so much the worse for us.

What, mercifully, mitigates death in our lives is chivalry and heroism. In Serb tradition, elucidated best by the Montenegrin warrior-turned-writer of the last century Marko Milyanov Drekalovitch, there is a definite—and preeminent—place for both, and that is why murder, massacre, and torture are regarded with horror, and loathing, by most Serbs I know (including the “Old Man” I wrote about, judging by his wounded, half-insane, pale blue, subdued eyes, immersed in remorse, guilt, and suffering). For, despite Mr. Anger's attempts to relativize everything about the “desperate combat between Serbs, Croats, and Muslims” (in the best liberal, humanist tradition), what is *not* relative—and *can never be relative*—is the God-created relationship between the cause and its effect.

It may be true that in some other universes (God's foremost) there is no time and, therefore, no consequentiality (in Eternity, for instance, everything is—so to say—simultaneous), yet, in this vale of tears, who started what, why, and how has all the import that our Creator has assigned it. Evil causes are supposed to be punished, and good ones rewarded in kind, and there is no way anyone can equate Serb effects with Muslim or Croat causes, for all the sophistry and “moral” philosophy in the world. Whether we want to or not, we exist—it seems—above all to choose sides, as we choose our lives, mates, and friends (exactly as God has chosen us, to live and die as we see—or can—best).

The problem with the Serbs seems simple enough—they are rocking the boat of the New World Order by not letting any *human* agency take from them their freedom to choose, and to act on their choice. Maybe an international police (in the form of UNPROFOR, NATO, or whatever) *could* enforce the decisions of an international judiciary (World Court, or a new Nuremberg Tribunal, etc.), reached by adhering to the laws enacted by a World Parliament (the U.N., for instance), but, so far, the record of such institutions has been dismal and offers little hope of improving, as long as

there is a Supreme Legislator, Judge, and Enforcer.

No one has recompensed the Serbs for close to (or over) one million dead in World War II (one-eighth of the population—compared to the one-tenth of, say, the German population, or less than one-twelfth of all the Croats of World War II). Moreover, these losses—caused by Croats, Muslims, and Germans (in that order)—have never even been recognized by the “International Community.” (Just as this “community” has chosen, so far, to ignore the Armenians' three million dead—one half of all the Armenians living in 1915—or the more than two million Greeks expelled from their native Turkey by Ataturk in 1922.) Genocides, or holocausts, seem to have their own monopolists—both among the victims and the perpetrators—and the Serbs, it seems, have no reason to trust anyone but themselves and no recourse but to “take justice into their own hands” (the abomination of all abominations to a liberal, “well-meaning” mind). But, if justice cannot be dispensed by others, we—as individuals, and as people—are responsible for it on this Earth. So, when the massacres of Serbs started once again, in 1991 (in Croatia), and in 1992 (in Bosnia and Herzegovina: the first massacre of any kind in Bosnia was committed in the Serb village of Sijekovac, on March 27, 1992, when regular Croatian troops from Croatia—just over the Save River from Sijekovac—murdered and dismembered over 50 Serb villagers, obliterating whole families), Bosnian Serbs could do nothing but prepare for the war that came a week later, with the Muslim-Croat proclamation of “independence” (supported by Germany and the United States), against the Serbs' wishes. Characteristically, the Croatian rebellion against Yugoslavia came exactly 50 years after the *Ustase* rebellion against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia; the Sijekovac massacre occurred on the anniversary of March 27, 1941, when Serbs demonstrated against the Nazis in Belgrade; and the outbreak of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, uncannily, coincided with April 6, the date when Nazi warplanes bombed undefended Belgrade in 1941, killing several thousand civilians. Like many Americans, therefore, in today's New World Order, the Serbs have the choice of perennial victimization or of striking back.

As for the “Croatland” of Mr. Anger's disapproval, I used that name to signify

an ordinary Serb's emotional relationship to his, so far, twice genocidal neighbors. We do not want a single piece of Croatia, but neither will we give a single piece of "Serbland" (i.e., the Kraina, where Serbs have lived since day one and—as a predominant majority—since the 15th century).

So, the "issues" are straightforward—on one side are the Serbs—vigilantes, outlaws, and pariahs of the "International Community," with their little, inconsequential, unknown genocides (in World War I, Serbs lost one quarter of their population to the Austro-Hungarians and the Germans), and, on the other side, is everyone else: all the "opinion leaders," pundits, newscasters, commentators, gurus, literati, experts, bureaucrats, humanists, well-wishers, etc., etc., Mr. Anger included. But, I guess, those are the breaks—at one time, the Jews were also alone, but have since done fairly well by themselves, with some of their

own God's help.

The most we as men can do, therefore, is defend ourselves, our loved ones, our kin and friends, our nation and our God, and, as Marko Milyanov said, "others from ourselves" (when asked what the Serb *choystvo*—chivalry—meant to him). Perhaps, one day, this will not be found criminal, even by a tribunal set up by a liberal, lethally humanist, gainfully compassionate, issue-oriented, shortsighted, historically amnesic, blundering, incompetent, criminally sentimentalized, money-money-money-motivated, nonexistent, *satanic* "International Community." Maybe, Mr. Anger, saints reside among the Serbs as well, but they don't have the global resources of a Catholic Church, Ted Turner's media, or Elie Wiesel's supporters; the last I know, some Serbs were allowed to fly—from Budapest—to New York to the U.N. to plead their case to the Jihad warriors, mass murderers, chauvinists, warmon-

gers, cultural and other imperialists, schemers and plotters of that august body, as they sit preparing their Final Solution for all of us.

And, by the way, Serbs could have taken—and still can take—both Zagreb and Sarajevo, except that "their" army (the Communist Yugoslav People's Army then, and the Belgrade-controlled Serb Army of Kraina and Republic of Srpska, as well as the communist-dominated army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia now) had—and still has—standing orders *not to advance beyond Serb territory*. This situation must be painfully familiar to all Vietnam veterans, who also fought a limited war against a totally committed enemy. Croats and Muslims have no compunctions against entering Serb territory. For Serbs, winning the war means staying put and surviving; for their enemies it means getting rid of the Serbs in "their" lands.

CULTURAL REVOLUTIONS

NAFTA will fail a thousand times before its advocates beg forgiveness. Not that an apology should be accepted, but justice requires, at least, that they admit their complicity in the century's biggest intergovernmental financial scam.

NAFTA led (thanks to the Republican leadership) to a \$50 billion American bailout of Mexico, the loss of the dollar's value on international exchange (and the ruin of many European vacations), the wrecking of small traders who had informal trading relations with counterparts in Mexico, the violation of American and Mexican sovereignty, and general fiscal and financial chaos. At the height of the NAFTA debate, recall, the right split into two camps. Siding with the Clinton administration and neoliberals were the usual suspects. They were internationalist pundits of the left-libertarian and neoconservative variety, backed by their allied think tanks in Washington, Manhattan, Mexico City, and Victoria. In the media, the *Wall Street Journal's* editorial page was their echo chamber. Their official line was fatuous and counterfactual: NAFTA will someday lead to lower tariffs and therefore it's great. Every other concern—sovereignty, cost, multinational regulations, Mexico's financial shakiness, the drug trade—was deemed irrelevant. They called opponents protectionist bigots.

But should "free trade" be legislated in books the size of Will Durant's *Story of Civilization*? Sure, they said, NAFTA's imperfect, but still a great thing "in the balance." If the scheme goes wrong, they assured us, they would be its harshest critics. But, of course, that did not happen.

This side "won" the debate because of the support of the banking, corporate, government, and media establishments in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. But their disinformation never convinced real conservatives. Evidence: their think tanks' annual reports, seen by regular contributors, downplay NAFTA, if they mention the treaty at all.

The opposition on the right was a grand coalition of paleoconservatives, a revival of the old "isolationist" pre-Buckley movement. It consisted of American nationalists, constitutionalists, old-fashioned free traders of the Austrian school, Southern agrarians, and populists. The coalition had no media "access" and very little money. Some groups even lost corporate donors because of their principled stand against NAFTA. But they had good political instincts and a willingness to speak truth to power.

NAFTA is not what its boosters claimed, they said. It is a convoluted government-to-government plan to guarantee corporate, banking, and gov-

ernmental profits at the expense of the savers, taxpayers, and small traders. The Ricardian free trade rhetoric trotted out to defend NAFTA was a smoke screen to hide what was essentially an insider racket. The proof came in a whirlwind of studies ranging from the general to the highly detailed. But the NAFTA fix was in, and the Establishment bought the necessary margin of victory.

Hardly a day passes that does not confirm the views of the paleo-right. Thanks to a stopgap bailout fund, NAFTA made the United States the lender-of-last-resort for the Mexican economy. The Clinton administration responded to mass outrage at the bailout by creating a "debt restructuring" function within the IMF to pay for future bailouts. The logical result of this policy is a world central bank capable of monetizing debt from anywhere in the world. NAFTA, let's remember, was the catalyst.

NAFTA opponents also said the treaty would violate the sovereignty of signatory countries. It has. Bill Clinton told an audience in Quebec he would cut off trade if it seceded from Canada and thus from NAFTA. New York banking interests are dictating Mexican government policy. Meanwhile, the United States cannot deregulate our economy without activist left-wing groups filing suit with a NAFTA commission.

NAFTA's side agreements make this possible. They forbid regulatory policy from giving an "unfair" economic advantage. This leads to "upward harmonization": Mexico's economy has become strictly regulated while the United States cannot deregulate. Congress, for example, enacted a moratorium on expansions of the Endangered Species Act. But green groups in the United States and Mexico have appealed to NAFTA's Commission for Environmental Cooperation to stop it.

If this detestable Commission intervenes, the United States will have to pay fines and suffer trade penalties. Politicians will do whatever is necessary to prevent that. This is one more reason—among hundreds—why the United States should immediately withdraw from NAFTA. It is also why, in a just world, NAFTA's supporters should be dragged before a people's tribunal, where they might finally recant.

—Jeffrey Tucker

THE CONTRACT with America is clearly expanding the power of the federal government, and if you don't believe it, take a look at yet another piece of legislation that will supersede local statutes and ordinances across the 50 states. It's called the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, and it's part of the GOP plan to eliminate barriers to entry into the burgeoning industry in cellular phones and other electronic gadgetry that are paving the information superhighway. The problem is, the bill is the equivalent of a legislative blunderbuss that will blow to smithereens niggling obstacles such as zoning laws. Consider the main clauses: "No state or local statute, regulation or other legal requirement shall effectively prohibit any carrier or other person from entering" the telecommunications business. Moreover, counties may not pass an ordinance that would "effectively prohibit any person or carrier from providing any interstate or intrastate telecommunications or information service." Lastly, a state or locality is barred from charging fees that would increase the cost of providing service. The Federal Communications Commission will wield this mailed fist of the federal black knight.

The legal consequences of the bill's language will soon become clear to small towns near big cities everywhere, as the use of cellular telephones increases. In-

deed, a summertime fight in McLean, Virginia, about 12 miles away from Washington, D.C., illustrated the scope of the bill and its impact even before it passed. As reported in the *McLean Providence Journal*, the furious residents of McLean were trying to stop the construction of a "monopole," which is Toflerese for cellular telephone pole. Cell phones require antennae attached to anything high enough to make the antennae accessible to the signals, and McLeanites readily approved a telecommunications company's request to attach its antennae to buildings of the right height, or as in one case, to one of the lights at the high school football stadium. In those cases, no one objected because they do no violence to the landscape. However, what no one realized was that cell phones require antennae about every two miles, which limits the preexisting sites suitable for an antenna. Eventually, a monopole had to be built, and the telecommunications company decided to plant one of its Information Age totems at a prominent intersection, where it would be visible to those who do not want to worship it. That, naturally enough, ruffled the feathers of McLean's feisty residents, who take the appearance of their small burg very seriously. One-hundred-fifty feet might not seem very tall until you give that height a perspective that most folks can understand: 150 feet is 15 stories.

No wonder McLeanites were so upset. McLean has never been home to Randian skyscrapers and other shrines to capitalism, and residents there want to keep it that way. Indeed, more than one developer has left McLean, which ironically enough is second home to many of the senators and congressmen who voted for the legislation, bruised and bloodied. But not this time, as residents learned at a few meetings where they got the latest news on their monopole. The telecommunications industry had a little legislative something up its sleeve: the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995.

The bill's language is very clear. Telecommunication rules. It isn't hard to imagine a crafty lawyer's arguments: a zoning law has "barred" a firm from exercising its right to enter the industry because it cannot build a monopole at a particular location; a state or county is charging a fee, which is a "barrier to entry" into the telecommunications business, because it requires the firm to make

a "proffer," a frequently used device that might require, for instance, a developer to maintain roads to his complex in return for a zoning concession. As for constitutionality, you can expect the industry to rely on the commerce clause of the Constitution. Because cell-phone calls cross state lines, they are no doubt considered "interstate commerce," which Congress, not the states, may regulate.

The particulars of this bill, which awaits final passage, aren't as important as the two truths that have been revalidated and the principle under attack. First, don't expect politicians, whatever party they represent, to relinquish power once they have tasted it. Second, never trust a politician who says he speaks for the people. It's more likely he is a dictator than a democrat.

The principle, once again brazenly repudiated by Mr. Gingrich and his pals, is the one they used, with the decisive help of radio talk-show hosts, to get elected. It is the Contract's central theme: the federal citadel from which the bureaucrat crusaders gallop on their regulatory steeds must be dismantled brick by brick. Laws like this one pull up the visor on the Republican Calahads and expose the most heralded political document of the last 30 years for what it isn't. The Contract is no Magna Carta, Capitol Hill no Runnymede.

—R. Cort Kirkwood

OBITER DICTA: The next meeting of the John Randolph Club will be held in San Mateo, California, on November 17 and 18. Speakers who will address this meeting are Thomas Fleming, Llewellyn Rockwell, and Samuel Francis, among others. For more information, see the ad inside the front cover. On October 25, Thomas Fleming will speak at the University of Georgia Law School in Athens on the issue of federalism. Admission is free. For more information, contact William Cawthon at (706) 549-5653.

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Principalities & Powers

by Samuel Francis

Where the Buck Really Stops

"The question is," Humpty Dumpty tells Alice in *Through the Looking Glass*, "which is to be master—that's all." As overused as the quotation may be, it nevertheless communicates a perennial truth that most people forget when it comes to understanding not only the answer but also the question itself, a truth that explains much of the unpleasantness that speckles human history. In the discussion of national sovereignty, the question is in fact the only relevant question to ask at all.

Sovereignty, by definition, concerns the issue of who is to be master in a society, whether it has to do either with internal autonomy or with its external independence. The two senses of sovereignty, of course, are closely related, since an internal sovereign—king, people, parliament, the states, the federal government—cannot claim to be the final arbiter of affairs if an external force in the form of another power is able to back up its own claim to that position. Much of American history has revolved around the question of who was to be master within the union, a dispute ostensibly settled by military power in the 1860's, and more recently, with which head of the federal master that emerged from the Civil War was to dominate the others. In the mid-20th century and since, the presidency has made a pretty strong claim to sovereignty, and the cute little sign that Harry Truman kept on his desk that read "The buck stops here" was in fact little more than a not-very-subtle pretense that the Chief Executive is really the monarch of the United States. Some, but by no means all, bucks stop at the President's desk, and it is a claim that has not the slightest shadow of constitutional or historical validity, but it is in part because Mr. Truman really believed it and tried to act on it and in part because of the coarseness of his personality that today is celebrated as his most endearing trait, that he was perhaps about as close an imitation of *Il Duce* as this country has ever produced.

In the 1990's, the question of who is to be master in the American house is reviving, with presidential candidates and

governors invoking the 10th Amendment and a healthy antigovernment popular resistance bubbling merrily in the boondocks. It is probably not an accident that the resurrection of the sovereignty debate within the nation is occurring at the very same time that the question of external sovereignty is also emerging. The appearance of both issues ought to tell us that at the present time, no one can provide a clear answer. There is no clear answer simply because no one today holds enough power to sustain an answer against rivals. Power relations, both within American society and between the United States and the external forces that are causing its national sovereignty to dwindle, are in flux, and only when those relations are stabilized by the rise of a master force on whose desk the buck really does stop will there be a clear answer to the question.

Internally, the conflict over sovereignty is clearly linked to the continuing struggle for political and cultural power between Middle American populism and the incumbent elites that currently have a grip on power. The elites are deeply entrenched in and aligned with the federal leviathan and make use of it to stay in power and to define the public order to reflect their interests. Hence, the popular rebellion against the leviathan, manifested in the 10th Amendment movement, the anti-immigration movement, the tax rebellion, the resistance to the economic destruction of the middle class through free trade and economic globalization, the militia movement and Second Amendment coalition, etc., can be understood as a rebellion of the American middle class against the elites. Although the rebellion remains so far undefined and spontaneous and lacks a coherent strategy or leadership, the obvious goal emerging within it is the dismantlement of the leviathan and the restoration of state and local sovereignty, coupled with the social and cultural preeminence of Middle America as the publicly defining core of the national order. The elites, whether directly lodged in the central state or merely affiliated with and dependent on it through subsidies, tax policies, legal privileges, and ideological identification with the tendencies of the megastate, are

right to perceive the rebellion as their enemy.

But the same social division between the elites and Middle America underlies the conflict over the issue of external sovereignty as well. While multinational business, the national/global security bureaucracy and its academic and think-tank allies, and transnational institutions like the IMF, the United Nations, NAFTA and GATT, etc., have developed a common interest in the erosion of sovereignty and the effective though gradual transfer of power to agencies beyond the control of the United States government or the American people, the defense of national sovereignty remains rooted in the American middle class. The conspiratorial mythology of "black helicopters" and U.N. troops occupying the country that circulates among the militias, themselves largely middle class, is direct evidence of this, though the incoherence and banality of much of the mythology suggests that those who are attracted by it possess only the most opaque comprehension of the attack on national sovereignty. Nevertheless, however dim the perception of the real threat to national identity or coherence, the very existence and widespread popularity of the mythology suggests that Middle Americans increasingly recognize that the national canopy under which they have lived and worked since the founding of the nation is beginning to vanish and that its disappearance is not merely the product of irresistible and anonymous "historical forces" but rather the result of deliberate efforts. The sinister goals that the mythology assigns to the conspiracy against sovereignty betray the profound alienation from the dominant elites that Middle Americans are beginning to feel.

The correlation of the Middle American rebellion with resistance to the contrived destruction of American nationhood should hardly be surprising. The late Christopher Lasch noted the long historical connection between nationalism and the middle class, dating from the 16th century.

A large part of the appeal of nationalism [to the middle class] lay in the state's ability to establish a

common market within its boundaries, to enforce a uniform system of justice, and to extend citizenship both to petty proprietors and to rich merchants, alike excluded from power under the old regime. The middle class understandably became the most patriotic, not to say jingoistic and militaristic, element in society. . . . Whatever its faults, middle-class nationalism provided a common ground, common standards, a common frame of reference without which society dissolves into nothing more than contending factions, as the Founding Fathers of America understood so well—a war of all against all.

Though Lasch was writing of a middle class that is now fairly remote in history, the same fundamental interests explain the persisting attachment of Middle America to nationality. It is only through the protective shield that the institutions of nationhood and national sovereignty provide that men and women of the middle rank of human society can expect to receive any protection at all. Lacking the wealth, power, educational skills, and social connections to protect themselves against dominant internal elites or aggressive foreign enemies, the middle class must depend on nationhood and its affiliated institutions—constitutionalism, the political institutions of republican government that allow for the representation of middle-class interests, the legally enforceable defense of private property, the national defense of both the territory and the economic interests of the nation (which are identified with the interests of the middle class itself)—for its very existence. Any dilution of the national identity, any fracturing of the shield of sovereignty or of nationhood, then, will always be perceived, and correctly so, as a threat to the middle class, in ways that neither aristocrats nor bureaucrats, neither proletarians nor praetorians, will comprehend. Aristocracies can expect to get along even if the nation vanishes completely, and for an underclass, life will remain much the same regardless of where the buck stops.


Moreover, in the 1990's, as Lasch also noted, the decline of the nation-state is closely connected to the decline of the middle class. Free trade and economic globalization are in part intended to flatten middle-class incomes and reduce

middle-class bargaining power with businesses that can produce their goods in Mexico and Thailand. The importation of an immigrant proletariat with no historical or emotional bonds to the nation helps drive the multiculturalist and anti-white assault on middle-class institutions and cultural hegemony, and immigration is itself, as Peter Brimelow notes in his recent book on the subject, part of the "war against the nation-state." The construction of transnational authorities in the United Nations, NATO, NAFTA, GATT, and their sisters contributes to the political subordination of the middle class to goals and policies favored by the elites that manage and benefit from the new structures.

The struggle over sovereignty, then, is not merely a verbal and academic battle over an abstraction of political theory but rather over who and what will run the country and even whether the country will continue to exist. Partisans of globalism, on both the left and the pseudo-right, may sneer at those who see threats to sovereignty in every U.N.-authorized military mission abroad and every transnational convention to manage the global environment, protect global women and children from their husbands and parents, and put global criminals on trial in global courtrooms. But the truth is that all of these and many other efforts concocted by the globalist elites in this and other countries are concerted attacks on national sovereignty, the nation-state, and the social groups that rely on sovereignty as a framework for their own existence and identity. Having disengaged, materially and psychically, from the underlying body of their national societies, these elites no longer perceive a need for nations to satisfy their economic, political, or cultural purposes. Their needs, in the form of the command of the populations, natural resources, and territories of nations, can now best be met through extranational modes of organization, and indeed, the continued existence of sovereign nations, populated by particular peoples with particular cultures, acts as a brake on and an obstacle to the satisfaction of the needs of the elites.

That, at least, is how the elites and their partisans see it. The truth may be somewhat different, as suggested by the outcome of most international gatherings that are supposed to "manage" and "reconstruct" the global economy. Such gatherings rarely produce any results that


are not dictated by the perceived national economic interests of their participants, and for all the rosy rhetoric about "one world," a "borderless economy," and a "New World Order," the persistent truth is that nations continue to exist. They continue to exist simply because the people inside them live and work together in ways that are different from the ways other peoples in other nations live and work, and their political leaders, democratic or not, understand this and reflect it in what they demand for themselves and their peoples at the fancy conclaves where they are supposed to be transcending petty interests and thinking about the welfare of all mankind.



But "mankind," as Spengler said, is a zoological expression. It has no meaning apart from its specific cultural and political incarnations, and within those incarnations there must be a controlling power somewhere, and that power is sovereignty, the place where the buck really does stop. In the epoch in which Americans now live, there is no such place for the simple reason that no social force, neither the Middle Americans who seek to decentralize power and preserve the sovereignty of the nation, nor the incumbent elites who want to keep power in the megastate and fuse it with institutions outside and beyond national control, is able to mobilize sufficient power to institutionalize its vision of what the nation should be and how it should be governed.

This is not really a bad situation, because it suggests that the power of the elites has slipped a bit while that of the Middle American resistance has prospered, at least to the point that it can sometimes restrain its adversaries. But it is not a situation that can or will last. Sooner or later, one force or another will gather sufficient power to answer the question of who is to be master, and if the nation and its defining social core are going to survive, Middle Americans need to make sure the buck stops with them.

©



Anna Mycek-Wodecki

John Bull Turns Johnny Reb

by Thomas Fleming

Since the 1940's, Americans have been slowly introduced to the idea that national sovereignty is a dangerously outmoded concept that must give place to a broader and more generous understanding of our place in the world: national defense became bound up with the principle of collective security; national welfare tied to foreign markets (and foreign aid); and the narrow and selfish principle embodied in the slogan "Don't Tread on Me" was replaced with a series of ever more vague appeals to our common European identity (Lend Lease, the Marshall Plan), our commitment to democratic progress (Korea, Vietnam), our faith in the brotherhood of man. We are the children, we are the world.

But as we extend our identity around the world, our sense of self inevitably thins out. The proliferation of acronyms is a dead giveaway. Like a cheap Hollywood cap job, everyday reality is being rotted out at the core and coated on the surface with a hard and lifeless abstraction. Once upon a time we were Virginians or Iowans, Americans living in a union known as the United States; now the best we can do is to boast of being "born in the USA" (no periods), a set of letters that suggests nothing more concrete than the IRS or MTV, and there may be little else to our common Americanness than can be found on a tax return or a Michael Jackson video.

Increasingly our eponymous acronyms are international, rather than national, and whatever the particular merits of the activities and policies spelled out by GATT, NAFTA, NATO, UN, no honest man can doubt that they represent a transfer, not merely of authority but of identity, from the nation to something supranational. This is no merely American phenomenon. All the nations of the West are being drained of their nationhood, but in some of them, at least, there are significant reactions, which may presage a wider counterrevolu-

tion against the international order that has seemed, for so long, the inevitable destination of every political road—the conclusion of every war, the object of every peace.

America has always been a province of Europe, and like most provincials we usually are a generation or so behind the capitals in the way we live and think and work. This has its good side; in the early 19th century, while the rest of the world was kicking over the traces and yelling for the rights of man, the United States was stuck in its Whig republican rut; and in the 20th century, Franklin Roosevelt was only a pale imitation of the dictators he aped and admired, Mussolini and Stalin. Being conservative is a good idea so long as there is something worth conserving, but once the forest has been burnt down, conservation in its literal sense is counterproductive. At some point it is time to clean up and replant.

So-called conservatives today are like the crazy old ladies who refuse to leave a condemned building, even as the wrecking ball is crashing into their apartments. Still fighting the Cold War, they call for defense buildups and an aggressive foreign policy; they think that ours is an imperial nation simply because we have nuclear weapons and a population of 250 million consumers, and the readers of the *Wall Street Journal* cannot disabuse themselves of the idea that in every international *chicane*, it will be Americans calling the shots. The French, who have actually been an imperial people, seem to be, by fits and starts, withdrawing into nationalism; the Germans are internationalists, of course, because they are—for the third time this century—rebuilding their empire; but it is in the United Kingdom where the contest between nationalism and supranationalism seems to have the greatest relevance for the United States.

I say the United Kingdom, rather than England or Britain,

because the UK is the remnant of the old empire. It is, as one Conservative journalist suggested to me, "the empire of the English over the Celts," by which he meant the Scots, the Welsh, and the Irish. This fact—so rarely mentioned in England—turns British politics upside down: it explains, for example, why Scots nationalists are warmly attached to European Union, and why English Tory nationalists oppose both European Union and any plan that would give the Scots some control over their own affairs.

Some Tory nationalists see Eurofederalism as a kind of plot to subvert the loyalties of England's Celtic subjects. Their fears were exacerbated when the German Christian Democrats put out a paper in 1994, arguing that no single nation should be able to block further European integration and describing sovereignty as now an "empty shell." More ominously, the Germans called for a "quasi-constitutional document" to "set out the division of powers between the union, the nation states and the regions." Norman Tebbit, at a Bournemouth rally (on October 11, 1994), described the German proposal as a plan to break the British nation into German-style *Länder*: "Now your breath may be taken away by that touch of arrogance of Germans seeking to define the relationship between Westminster and Edinburgh or Belfast and Cardiff—perhaps even Newcastle or Birmingham." In a telephone interview, Ferdinand Mount (the editor of the TLS) pleasantly observed that "the Norman Tebbits are the last reactionaries, and history will wash quietly over them."

American conservatives of nearly every stripe are used to thinking of "federalism" as, at least in principle, a good thing, and it seems paradoxical that in the Tory nationalist lexicon, federalism and devolution are synonyms for treason, while devolution has become the rallying cry for the revived Labour Party under Tony Blair. Short of a miracle—it is not every day that the English get an invitation to go headhunting for Argentines—it will be Mr. Blair and not Mr. Major who will decide the question of Britain's future in the European Community, and it is this sense of impending disaster that has egged on John Major's nationalist critics within his own party.

The case against Europe is complex. For some it is little more than John Bull's sentimental reaction against the loss of his identity, and hardly distinguishable from Middle American paranoia over the United Nations. More typically, the arguments are pragmatic and economic. The European Union has proved to be a costly bureaucracy, whose commercial and agricultural regulations seem to favor every state but England. Mr. Mount, who is decidedly pro-Europe, concedes that the fear of the new bureaucracy is justified up to a point, especially if the extreme Eurofederalists were to have their way. But, he adds, "What would unite three-fourths of the Conservatives—and everyone—is if European Union stopped here, where it is. There is, however, fear of going on to create a full-scale federation of the American type."

The opposition does not entirely agree on the relative benignity of the Union as it is today. Christopher Booker and Richard North had been writing a series of articles in the London *Telegraph*, revealing the criminal follies of the Brussels bureaucrats, until the paper's editors balked on a column about cattle disease. Historically, stringent British controls have guaranteed a disease-free cattle population in Britain. However, the Common Market resulted in the abandonment of some controls, since movement of animals between EC countries is now unrestricted, so long as they have a veterinarian's certificate say-

ing they are healthy. One prize-winning breeder took delivery of supposedly German but probably East European cows that not only came down with cattle AIDS but also infected other cows. Unable to sell his milk, the farmer now collects £5,500 a month. To some, the case illustrates the stupidity of European regulations; to others it is the greedy farmer who is at fault; but what strikes me as really ominous is the evil synergism between supranational regulation and the national government's responsibility for welfare. Between Brussels and London, bureaucrats succeeded in introducing a disease and gouging the taxpayers.

Immigration has been not emphasized by Euroskeptics, but it represents a more serious threat than cattle diseases. Charles Wardle, the immigration minister, resigned over the government's failure to maintain controls. According to official figures, in the five years up to 1993, 264,500 immigrants settled in the UK; but Peter Tompkins, head of immigration service for ten years, says the figure is more like 625,000.

The immigration crisis is complicated by European Union, which aims at a Europe without frontiers. Once a North African arrives illegally in Italy or Spain, it is fairly easy for him to go to France or Britain. There is already a problem of immigrants using false EC identity cards—particularly Algerian gangs involved in massive welfare fraud. If, as has been threatened, Brussels forces the United Kingdom to give up passport checks, Britain—as Wardle says—"would be powerless to stop a flood of immigrants entering the country."

Uncontrolled borders always make the work of the police more difficult, and in Britain (as in the United States) the knee-jerk response is not to stop the criminal immigrants but to threaten the liberty of the citizens. The frontierless zone introduced under the Single European Act (1986) and developed under Maastricht makes it easier for criminals to enter the UK. The police, who are now responsible for apprehending fugitives identified at ports and airports, will have to trace them and their money throughout the country. Not coincidentally, it was announced in 1994 that London police would carry Smith & Wesson .38's, while in the city bankers and other financial agents are now required to disclose their clients' financial dealings over £11,600. British police are increasingly required to collaborate with other countries of the EU where, as Charlotte Horsfield writes in *The European Journal* (September/October 1994), the police are not so tender in their treatment of civil liberties. Inevitably, she suggests, "the state authorities will depend more and more upon the police forces and other local agencies to monitor and control the activities of the ordinary citizen of its expanding empire."

The leading "Euroskeptics" are the whipless members, that is, Conservatives from whom the whip was withdrawn when they refused to vote as they were told. If there can be a leader in a group of mavericks, that title belongs to Bill Cash, whipless MP and founder of the European Foundation, which publishes *The European Journal*, an invaluable source of information and opinion on both European Union and the British response (61 Pall Mall, London SW1Y 5HZ). His speeches are hard-edged and to the point: "Let us say the unspoken word: 'We will not be subjected to a German Europe.'"

Before meeting Mr. Cash in April, I had imagined the sort of two-dimensional speech-reader who occupies all positions of power in both American political parties, but he turned out to be disappointingly likable: determined in his opinions but

more than willing to listen to other points of view—a good listener and an even better questioner. There is something almost North American in his frankness, and I was not surprised to learn that he admired Ronald Reagan and Newt Gingrich. Like so many American conservatives, Mr. Cash is interested in questions of money, and his opposition to a single currency stems as much from practical concerns as it does from the symbolic humiliation implied by a surrender of national currency. “No nation Tories”—as he calls conservative MPs committed to single currency—do not appear to be disturbed by his allegation that monetary union would mean an irrevocable transfer of £36 billion from the Bank of England to the European Central Bank, any more than our own Republicans were disturbed by the Mexican bailout. Cash says he is in favor of Britain remaining in the EC, but not if it proves “incompatible with our national interests.”

Americans have been slowly introduced to the idea that national sovereignty is a dangerously outmoded concept that must give place to a broader and more generous understanding of our place in the world.

For some Englishmen, at least, the choice is not between British sovereignty and European Union so much as it is a conflict between their dislike of Frogs and Dagoes and their fear of Yankees. John Gray, who has now explicitly aligned himself with Labour, apparently thinks that if European monetary union were subject to a referendum, it would pass, not so much on its own merits as that it could be made a referendum on England's continued participation in the EC. Some people are afraid of being isolated from the great events taking place on the continent, while others object to the Conservative Party's Atlanticism as a continuing invitation to increased domination by the United States.

Bill Cash suggests (in the May 1995 *European Journal*) that Britain is slowly being squeezed out of the transatlantic equation during a period when the relationship with the United States has become ever more important and as Europe moves in the direction of federal union, but if the choice is whether Britain is to be part of Europe or a province of the United States, there are many good reasons for picking Europe. This apparently simple dichotomy, however, is complicated by the enthusiasm for European Union expressed by so many American economic and political leaders. Last year in Bonn, President Clinton declared: “The United States does strongly support the movement towards a more united Europe, and un-

derstands that Germany's leadership towards a truly united Europe is critical.” Some in Britain think Clinton has fallen under the evil spell of Helmut Kohl, but like all transnational elites the American ruling class is strongly committed to an international economic and political order of which the European Union represents a small but nonetheless significant part. Is it an accident that Jean Monnet, the godfather of European Union, was a French businessman with very close ties with American tycoons? I am not suggesting that the advocates of European Union are mere shills of American business—although many of them may be just that—but, what is worse, that national borders and nation-states themselves are seen as an obstacle to the achievement of the goal for which all the Western elites are striving: a world of peaceful consumers run by transnational business leaders. Britain has faced this problem before. For centuries her royal family and leading aristocratic houses were closely allied to their counterparts on the continent. While these connections might occasionally be useful in preventing or concluding hostilities, the interests of the British nation and their international rulers did not always coincide. The divergence of interest was dramatically obvious in the reign of William and Mary, when the Dutch king used his British subjects as cannon fodder in his wars against Louis XIV, and his Hanoverian successors repeatedly showed more concern for their German principality than their island kingdom. Once the members of the royal family began marrying within the realm, it was clear that their power had become negligible, but Britain's rulers today have more in common with their partners and rivals abroad than with their fellow subjects.

Is there still a British “nation” in any sense that is richer than our own Disney-America? If food is a test of nationality, the island might just as well be attached to the continent—or rather to the subcontinent, since Indian food predominates. Only tourist restaurants advertise English cooking—or rather genuine English fayre—the rest are Italian or Indian or Lebanese. One Sunday, I go off to the National Gallery—the Bronzinos are good, but the Bellinis and Giorgiones seem over-restored. In Piccadilly Circus, I am held up by a Kurdish demonstration. No one seems to contest the right of Kurds to stage their protests in London, rather than Ankara or Baghdad (and no one recalls the Kurds' role in the Armenian genocide).

Kurdish demonstrations, Lebanese restaurants, Italian art—I might as well be in New York or Chicago. I think that it is this fear, that there really will not be an England some day, that lies behind the largely pragmatic criticisms of European union. Even the most pro-American of John Major's critics are aware of it; even his mentor, Lady Thatcher, belatedly began to drag her high heels on the question, and the Bruges Group takes its name from an anti-European speech she delivered in that city. John Major's response to the Euroskeptics' offensive was to resign as Conservative Party leader and stand for reelection. His opponent, John Redwood, was never taken very seriously, although Margaret Thatcher—preserving a rather vengeful neutrality—described the former Welsh Secretary as a “heavyweight person.” While Mr. Redwood based his challenge on the charge that the Prime Minister had “jeopardized the whole position [i.e., of the Tories] by resigning the leadership,” his candidacy was supported by Norman Lamont and other Euroskeptics whose opposition to European Union had driven Mr. Major to this desperate gambit. In the event Mr. Major survived the threat without substantially enhancing his stature or

unifying the party.

"A conservative government is an organized hypocrisy." Disraeli's definition was directed originally against Sir Robert Peel's repeal of the Corn Laws. A few weeks earlier he had remarked that Peel had "caught the Whigs bathing, and walked away with their clothes," meaning that Sir Robert was determined to hold power at the expense of his party's principles, just as Disraeli was to do later, when he reformed the franchise; as Churchill and Macmillan and Heath were to do, when they allowed Britain to turn socialist; and as Ronald Reagan and George Bush were to do in abandoning the white middle class.

Peel's "accomplishment" was a self-inflicted wound on a party whose great principles were its defense of the Crown, the church, and the land. One by one the Tories, in becoming "conservative," abandoned their principles (although I discover with pleasure that Charles Moore, a Catholic convert, opposes disestablishment on good Tory grounds). Over the years the Conservatives stole the clothes of the Whigs, the imperialists, the Liberals, and the socialists. In returning the party to its liberal phase, Mrs. Thatcher did her party and her country a great service, but classical liberalism, perhaps even more than socialism, is an internationalist ideology, and the Tories—if they are to be anything—must be the national party, the party that stands for the real England, the historic England, the England

for its own sake. Even if European Union were the best thing for everyone in the world, it should not be the achievement of a Tory government.

Unwilling as I am to admit it, Mr. Major has many fine points. He has a shrewd mind, and he is willing to stick to his guns, but—speaking with the recklessness of an outsider who does not have a right to an opinion—I really hope that his government falls and leaves it to Mr. Blair to tie the knot with Europe. The Conservatives have grown too fat in their years of plenty, and it will be a good thing for them to go out into the wilderness of opposition. (American conservatives, too, need to be disciplined by at least four more years of Democratic misrule until they can learn not to get in bed with the gentiles.) If the Conservative Party is to belong to Mr. Major and Mr. Heseltine, then it is of no more use to Britain than the Republican Party is to the United States.

Whether any of my English friends will agree with me, I do not know, but the conservative embrace of Europe has done nothing to endear the party to the voters. While I was there in the spring, the Tories lost control of all the local councils in Scotland. Hearing that I am on my way to Scotland, Bill Cash jokes over dinner: "Tell me if you see any conservatives in Scotland." I did, and he told me he was voting for the Scottish National Party, but that is another story. c

Lie Down and Die

by Peter Russell

I never visited my Father's grave,
I never visited my Mother's.
I thought it better (time's to save)—
And left it to the others.

Well, you may say that I was right—
What's in a dusty grave
But clay-stopped ears, eyes without sight
Back to the soil they gave?

The putrid flesh, the dried out bone,
Features once loved, but not enough;
Loveless, unloved and housed alone
The soul grows taciturn and gruff.


Larval appearances, forgotten voice,
Stage entrances, oneiric scenes—
Life goes on, a buzzing noise,
A crass idolatry of means

World without end, in *saeculorum*
Saecula,—life without ends,
Ask of the sacred quorum,—
What ends? And what amends?

Amens, Amens, Amens!

Cobden's Pyrrhic Victory

by Alfred E. Eckes



Bill Clinton and Richard Cobden, a 19th-century English anti-Corn Law crusader, have more in common than consonants in their surnames. As economic internationalists, both trumpeted commerce as the panacea for attaining world peace and prosperity. In their own ways, both bear responsibility for the new international economic order which rests on the twin foundations of universal free trade and world economic government.

"Democracy and free trade go hand in hand," Bill Clinton asserted at the Miami Summit of the Americas in December 1994. He promised that "free trade will yield dramatic benefits in terms of growth and jobs and higher incomes." In the use of free-trade hyperbole, few other than Cobden surpassed Clinton's rhetorical excesses. In 1835, the Manchester cotton manufacturer praised commerce as "the *grand panacea*, which, like a beneficent medical discovery, will serve to inoculate with the healthy and saving taste for civilization all the nations of the world." An evangelical free-trader, Cobden envisaged free trade "drawing men together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race and creed, and language, and uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace."

Not until Clinton's presidency did Cobdenism finally triumph in America. It took 150 years—and along the way free-trade crusaders experienced a number of defeats. One occurred at the end of World War I, when President Woodrow Wilson submitted his grandiose plan for the League of Na-

tions. That design, involving free trade and the surrender of some sovereignty to the league, failed to overcome congressional resistance.

Cobdenism began to make gains after the Great Depression and Roosevelt's 1932 landslide removed the last Republican obstacles. During the New Deal, Secretary of State Cordell Hull, a monomaniacal tariff-cutter, successfully planted the seeds for the free-trade revolution. In 1934, he persuaded a Democrat-controlled Congress to authorize a reciprocal trade program. In practice, reciprocal trade proved a misnomer. It succeeded primarily in opening the American market to imports. After World War II Hull's initiative metamorphosed into a multilateral tariff-cutting effort, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Bipartisan support emerged when both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower touted tariff liberalization as a substitute for foreign aid.

During Ronald Reagan's presidency the Cobdenites pursued the bilateral path. Reagan concluded free-trade agreements with Israel and Canada, both relatively high-income countries. These pacts had little adverse impact on high-paid, unskilled American workers. In particular, the pact with Canada demonstrated that removing trade barriers between advanced industrial nations with similar legal and business systems could prove mutually beneficial.

In George Herbert Walker Bush, the Utopian free-traders found a friend. Bush launched negotiations for NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the first such pact with a low middle-income country, Mexico. Eager to help his friend President Carlos Salinas de Gortari of Mexico, Bush rushed ahead, pursuing free trade with a religious zeal that resembled

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that of the anti-Corn Law crusaders.

When Bill Clinton entered the White House in 1993, he had the opportunity to change policy directions. Instead, he made the fateful decision to submit the NAFTA scheme for congressional approval. When grass-roots opposition emerged, the usually indecisive Clinton plunged onward. To sell NAFTA, he opened the federal purse and indulged in presidential vote-buying on a scale unprecedented in American history. Later, when a plummeting peso jeopardized Mexico's economic and political stability, Bill Clinton diverted some \$20 billion in Treasury funds to bail out the Mexican currency and rescue American speculators.

Clinton and his aides also bear final responsibility for the Uruguay Round GATT agreement, establishing the World Trade Organization, and further exposing the United States to cheap-labor imports. While multinational corporations hope to benefit from binding dispute-resolution procedures and improved access to emerging markets, some 800,000 textile and apparel workers are expected to lose their jobs over the next decade.

Undaunted by his "successes," the President accelerated his quixotic quest for free trade with developing nations. At the Miami Summit he proposed a Western Hemisphere bloc extending from Alaska to Argentina; in Jakarta, Indonesia, he espoused a pact with ASEAN countries. In June 1995, his aides began negotiations to extend NAFTA to Chile before Congress enacted fast-track negotiating authorities. They also asked Congress to extend NAFTA tariff benefits to the Caribbean Basin countries. And the administration explored a free-trade pact with Western European nations. For Clinton, like Cobden, free trade had become a magical potion for transforming the world in the post-Cold War era, and for promoting prosperity and democracy.

The President and other architects of the new economic order proudly construed their actions as necessary and pragmatic responses to the global technological revolution. But it would be wrong to attribute the "triumph" of market internationalism solely to inexorable change and impersonal forces. Also influencing both timing and outcome was a seismic shift in American policies, the result of Cobdenite ideas gaining influence among the governing and corporate elite.

Backing for Clinton's free-trade agenda comes from a cosmopolitan group of professionals and speculators lured by glittering business opportunities in the new international economic order. For these well-educated stakeholders the neo-Cobdenite world of deregulated borders offers exciting short-term possibilities, including access to low-cost labor in developing countries. Eager to harvest riches, modern-day Mammon worshipers exhibit little concern for the long-term interests of the American nation or the health of communities.

"Segment, Concentrate and Dominate" is the strategy of Arkansas' Tyson Foods. According to its annual report, Clinton patron Don Tyson envisages chicken on every Chinese, Mexican, and Russian plate. So, in similar ways, do other well-heeled patrons in Hollywood, Wall Street, Silicon Valley, academic ivory towers, and in globally mobile law and consulting firms look outward for profits.

Neo-Cobdenism also enjoys noisy support from importers and retailers eager to help greedy consumers stretch their dollars at checkout counters. At shopping malls everywhere price-conscious customers can load up on the world's most affordable products, cheap imports. They can fill shopping carts with ap-

parel from Sri Lanka, toys and shoes from China, fresh-cut flowers from Colombia and Kenya, and so forth. But it is myopic to evaluate the new international economic order merely from the vantage point of consumers and other trade-winners.

For many Americans—the trade losers—Bill Clinton's dream world has a dark dimension. The unpleasant reality is that millions of ordinary Americans cannot expect net benefits from Cobdenism. For them the "dramatic" effects of free-trade pacts with low-income countries involve job dislocations and falling incomes. As much as half the American work force—the half without any college education—has reason to fear the downward escalator. Without border controls to insulate workers in high-income countries from cheap-labor imports, America's low-skilled workers seem destined to compete, as Thomas Carlyle once said in an English context, with developing nations for production of the "cheap and the nasty."

The triumph of Cobdenism in America may prove a Pyrrhic victory. It corrodes the social compact, disrupts the bonds of community life, and it punctures the American dream that average Americans can through hard work still achieve a middle-class life. When the dust settles, and historians view events in perspective, they may cite Clinton's trade leadership as another example of the "McNamara syndrome." In his memoirs, former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara acknowledges that the "best and brightest" prosecuted Lyndon Johnson's war in Vietnam without knowing what they were doing. America's elite ignored historical lessons and placed blind faith in unproven theories and flawed data. In this context, Senator Fritz Hollings of South Carolina may have expressed the real meaning of Clinton's trade policy: "Free trade [is] the new Vietnam policy. . . . You destroy your economy to save the world."

Has the triumph of Cobdenism produced an unstable and anxious world in which unskilled workers in high-income countries face declining incomes and the downward harmonization of wages and working conditions with developing countries? Many unskilled workers, as well as middle-level managers and professionals, seem to associate their economic plight with increased international competition. Pundits have observed that the widespread political alienation found in Northern Hemisphere nations from Japan to North America and Western Europe during the mid-1990's reflects widespread popular fear of free markets and globalization. Even the London *Economist*, a journal founded by Cobdenites, concedes that "low-skilled workers . . . are right to be worried." It also warned that "some occupations higher up the earnings ladder will also feel the force" of Third World competition.

Among academic economists, the profession most unwavering in its support for Cobdenism, an important new book associates free trade with increased poverty, alienation, and social instability. Adrian Wood's path-breaking analysis, *North-South Trade, Employment and Inequality*, notes that the removal of trade barriers in Northern Hemisphere countries has reduced demand for unskilled labor and aggravated "social corrosion." Crime, drug abuse, and racial tension he attributes to the surge in imports from low labor-cost countries.

Of course, Bill Clinton and his subordinates claim that free trade will generate many high-paying jobs for ordinary Americans. But evidence to support their faith appears to rest largely on theoretical proofs, rosy thinking, and inspired political advocacy, not empirical data. Manufacturing jobs in America, which typically pay about 30 percent more than service-sector

jobs, have stagnated since 1980. Indeed, in sectors exposed to international trade, business analyst Charles McMillion observes that the United States has generated no jobs net in the last 20 years. Pay has also stagnated, and real weekly earnings in manufacturing and services have declined.

This trend has been apparent since the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations effectively removed tariffs as an obstacle to most American imports in the early 1970's. Since then, the United States trade imbalance has soared, averaging \$120 billion over the last decade. Because each \$1 billion in exports or imports affects 17,000 to 20,000 jobs on the average, the data suggest the United States has been exporting some two million job opportunities annually as manufacturing moves abroad in search of lower labor costs. Thus, in the open world economy that America created after World War II, the American dream of rising wages and opportunities for unskilled workers disintegrates in the face of reality. In a single global market, the price of unskilled labor reflects world supply-and-demand conditions. Forced to compete with cheap labor in developing countries using state-of-the-art production technologies, low-skilled workers in high-income countries face declining real incomes.

NAFTA is a good example of what happens when developed nations enter free-trade agreements with low-income nations. President Clinton sold NAFTA as a device to create thousands of export jobs. Instead, it may cost 500,000 job opportunities in the next two years. Imports from Mexico and Canada are surging. Based on first quarter trade data, America's merchandise deficit with NAFTA partners is likely to approach \$35 billion in 1995—second only to the bilateral deficit with Japan.

What about retraining the dislocated for jobs in emerging industries? This has been a goal of American trade policy for over a generation. The reality is that government programs have worked poorly for middle-aged workers. In their zeal to open the domestic market, the Cobdenites have romanticized the ease with which poorly educated people can be retrained as high-tech workers.

Thus, President Clinton's proudest achievements—free-trade pacts opening the American market to competition from developing countries—are proving costly victories. In the absence of effective educational programs to facilitate retraining, they seem likely to exacerbate class conflict, to corrode the American nation and its commitment to community, and to jeopardize domestic support for mutually beneficial international economic arrangements.

Had American leaders—particularly George Bush and Bill Clinton—studied more history, they might have discovered that a diverse group of influential thinkers and public figures—from Abraham Lincoln to Karl Marx—foresaw these dire consequences more than a century ago. Lincoln predicted that the removal of tariffs would demonstrate the necessity of them. As a Henry Clay Whig, Lincoln warned that “abandonment of the protective policy by the American Government must result in the increase of both useless labor, and idleness; and so, in [proportion], must produce want and ruin among our people.”

William McKinley of Ohio warned that free trade “will bring widespread discontent. It will revolutionize values. It will take away more than one half of the earning capacity of brain and brawn.” McKinley added: “Free trade results in giving our money, our manufactures, and our markets to other nations.” Protection, the policy of the Republican Party, McKinley said, “has made the lives of the masses of our countrymen sweeter

and brighter, and has entered the homes of America carrying comfort and cheer and courage.” And Senator Reed Smoot, a politician applauded in the *New York Times* as a “statesman of the highest type,” offered similar comments. In 1932, he predicted that repeal of the protective tariff barrier would force Americans “to slide back down to the economic level of the rest of the world.”

In an 1848 speech, Karl Marx, hardly a defender of the capitalist system, also endorsed global free trade, believing that it would hasten the global social revolution: “The protective system of our day is conservative, while the free trade system is destructive. It breaks up old nationalities and pushes the antagonism of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the extreme point. In a word, the free trade system hastens the social revolution. It is in this revolutionary sense alone . . . that I vote in favor of free trade.”

Bill Clinton's Cobdenite design for the post-Cold War world contains another fatal flaw. The World Trade Organization is not simply a forum for gabby government officials, it represents a giant step toward world economic government. Article 16 stipulates that “each member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations, and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.” This mandate extends to a wide variety of nontariff issues—services, investments, agriculture, intellectual property. With each nation having one vote, developing nations will hold a voting majority and enjoy the freedom to interpret WTO rules as they desire.

For America's negotiators, a principal objective in the Uruguay Round was mandatory dispute settlement procedures. In order to lock-in the deregulatory agenda globally, the United States pushed proposals to subordinate national authority to a new type of trade Supreme Court operating in Geneva. Dispute settlement panels composed of trade experts, not independent jurists, will issue binding decisions on trade-related matters that affect a range of legitimate local activities: tax and regulatory policies, health and safety, and environmental issues, among others. Because the WTO gives priority to trade issues, dispute settlement panels may soon intrude on matters of state sovereignty. And the Clinton administration has pledged to accept panel decisions.


What have Bill Clinton and the neo-Cobdenites done? Without either a constitutional amendment or a treaty ratification vote in the Senate, they have circumvented lawful procedures for modifying the Constitution. Mesmerized by the siren song of free trade and insensitive to the requirements of national independence, the governing elite has seemingly compromised American sovereignty. In his 1796 “Farewell Address,” President George Washington foresaw such “usurpation,” and he warned that this “is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed.”

Paradoxically, Bill Clinton, the yuppie internationalist who chose to fulfill Cobden's economic agenda and to lock it in with commitments to the WTO, may prove free trade's mortal enemy. As speculators and corporate high-rollers move money and plants abroad to take advantage of lucrative opportunities outside the United States, more Americans are voicing discontent with economic circumstances at home. In the next cyclical downturn, millions of trade losers may vent their rage at the ballot box. The politicians who have been “shooting Niagara” with an elitist faith in Cobdenism and world economic government may encounter the rage of grass-roots democracy.

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The Surrender of Political and Military Sovereignty

by William R. Hawkins



Anna Mycek-Wodicka

Sovereignty is a people's ability to govern its internal affairs and protect its independence against outside interference. Military power has always been the most obvious pillar of sovereignty. Clausewitz' dictum that the object of war is "to compel your opponent to do your will" means that the victor substitutes his sovereignty for that of the loser. This conflict of wills is not limited to questions of territorial integrity. Nations are driven by a combination of fear and opportunity to mold the outside world in ways favorable to their interests (however defined) as far as their strength will reach.

Military power has also been an indispensable tool for nation-building. There are few states that did not emerge from some caldron of international, civil, or revolutionary war. In the words of Charles Tilly, "War made the state, and the state made war." This is as true of the great democracies of the West as of any dictatorship. The United States owe their independence to a revolutionary war, their continued union and constitutional system to a civil war, and their vast domain to a series of international wars (or threats of war) combined with the forceful pacification of the native populations in the acquired territories. American history is a confirmation of Ernst Renan's observation that "decades of violence" have "marked the origins

of all political formations, even those which have been followed by the most beneficial results."

Popular support has long been necessary to mobilize the vast resources needed for war. What leads people to tolerate conscription, rationing, and war finance, not to mention death and destruction, is the belief that their society is unique and precious and that its fate is not to be surrendered to the dictates of any outsider. It is this very concept of independent group solidarity that has been, and continues to be, the object of attack from two sources: intellectuals who object to the view of a world torn by perpetual conflict and those special interests who feel restricted by state policy. Often the latter have made use of the former's utopian arguments to mask their selfish quests for personal gain at the nation's expense. This is not as hypocritical as it may appear. Antinationalist thought has been primarily liberal in content, stressing the moral superiority of individual over social interests. Indeed, classical liberalism can be seen primarily as a reaction to the rise of the modern nation-state since the 15th century.

In the 17th century, Emeric Cruce opposed Louis XIV's policy to make France the dominant power in Europe. Cruce presented an alternate view, writing in 1623: "What a pleasure it would be to see men going freely from one place to another without thought of country." Part of this vision was the creation of an organization with representatives from Europe, Asia, and Africa that would arbitrate disputes and back their verdicts with force. He thought this feasible because "Human society is

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a single body.” His is one of the first modern calls for what has become a centerpiece in liberal thought: some form of world government that would eliminate the independence of nation-states and enforce global harmony.

In addition to world government, there are two other constant elements in all reform plans: military disarmament and free trade (meaning economic disarmament). Both of these are meant to deprive nations of the ability to act independently, either against other nations or in resistance to the proposed world government. This triplet runs through the works of the great classical liberals from David Hume to Thomas Paine and Immanuel Kant on to Jean-Baptiste Say and Richard Cobden. It was repeated as items three, four, and fourteen in President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, issued in January 1918, a plan Wilson said “rejects the standards of national selfishness that once governed the counsels of nations and demands that they shall give way to a new order of things.” Three-quarters of a century later, they form the core of President Bill Clinton’s vision of a post-Cold War “new order.”

In the name of free trade, Clinton completed the Uruguay Round GATT negotiations. Included was the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which is to serve as the ultimate legitimate authority over international trade disputes. The WTO will replace the old “power-oriented” system of negotiations and national vetoes with a new system of “rules-oriented” tribunals that can declare national practices “illegal” and impose sanctions.

Clinton’s desire for global economic integration and the rule of supranational law is set within a strategy the administration calls “engagement and enlargement.” This seeks to move beyond the security concerns of the Cold War era. The United Nations would play the central role in this process, with the United States making its military increasingly available to the United Nations for “peacekeeping” operations in remote areas. The Clinton administration’s 1994 paper entitled *Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* contained the following assertions:

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars (many of which could spill across international borders) and the collapse of governmental authority in some states are among the current threats to peace. While many of these conflicts may not directly threaten American interests, their cumulative effect is significant. U.N. and other multilateral peace operations will at times offer the best way to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts that could otherwise be more costly and deadly. In such cases, the U.S. benefits from having to bear only a share of the burden. We also benefit by being able to invoke the voice of the community of nations on behalf of causes we support.

The paper does not explain how events that do not pose individual threats to American interests can suddenly accumulate to pose a threat. Instead, it refers to “threats to peace” as a generic, and thus open-ended, concern. With this outlook, the United States has seen its costs go up, not down, as the result of paying for military interventions through the U.N. which could not have been justified on the basis of American national security.

Clinton’s policy is that of global “collective security.” The basic premise of this notion is that there really is a community

of nations that will see all threats in the same way and be willing to respond in unison, that a “threat to one will be considered a threat to all.” Advocates of collective security who wish to substitute concepts of “justice” for “national aggrandizement” greatly underestimate the ability to win wide acceptance of what constitutes justice when vital interests clash. The same problem of subjective interpretation applies to branding one side or another as the “aggressor.” The related principle, that borders are never to be changed by force, is tantamount to proclaiming that the present divisions of the world are so perfect they should be frozen in time. This is untenable, as the world has always been a dynamic system, something of which Americans should be well aware given the role westward expansion has played in American history and mythology. The application of universal ideals (which are, in fact, not universally accepted) divorced from practical politics and concrete considerations of security, geography, resources, and aspirations is simply unsuited to the world as it is.

Even when nations express concern over violence or suffering and offer humanitarian aid, they balk at any substantial expenditure of scarce resources in parts of the world where they lack material or security interests of their own. The costs of “altruistic” intervention are always too high because there is nothing tangible to place on the other side of the ledger. Consequently, it should not be surprising that there has been no more of a consensus to use force in Bosnia or to isolate Iran economically in 1995 than there was to enforce comprehensive sanctions on Italy for its invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. If effective action is to be taken, it must be done by those nations that feel their interests are at stake. The United States could halt sea traffic to Iran any time it chose, using the kind of “gunboat diplomacy” that was once common. And if the Iranian threat is as great as Washington claims, it *should* do so, rather than hide behind the lack of U.N. approval to justify inactivity. But this is the same administration that loudly proclaimed the need to intervene in Haiti and to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia—but refused to act without first getting the U.N.’s approval. One does not have to agree with Clinton’s choices of where to commit American troops to see how paying homage to the U.N. can undermine the courage of a nation’s convictions.

Traditional alliances are much more effective and credible as multilateral groupings because they are formed by nations that have concrete interests in common that give substance to their pledge to act. Yet even strong alliances have failed to be converted into stable systems of collective security once common enemies no longer threaten. The dissolution of the victorious Allied coalitions after both world wars testify to this, with Japan and Italy after World War I and the Soviet Union and China after World War II becoming hostile to their former allies.

With the removal of the overarching Soviet threat, alliances are likely to become more flexible, ad hoc, and opportunistic—and also less predictable and reliable over time. In such an environment, collective security becomes an even less realistic concept. Instead, what is called for are the classical diplomatic skills of centuries past, in keeping with Lord Palmerston’s statement that there are “no permanent allies or permanent enemies, only permanent interests.” Unfortunately, prevailing liberal opinion in the United States (by no means limited to self-identified liberals), with its emphasis on utopian principles, makes such a return to realism nearly impossible.

Alliances are part of the old system of power politics rejected by transnationalists. In Bosnia, for example, when NATO military capabilities were needed, it was imperative to give the U.N. a veto over their use. The Bosnian experience indicates that the diplomatic cover provided by the U.N. comes at a high price. It confirmed the old adage that "councils of war never fight." As the circle of participants widens, the cohesion of any coalition weakens as interests vary and the more timid members set limits on what they will agree to do. At critical moments, when decisive leadership is required, the U.N. is most likely to be gripped by paralysis.

Many proponents of a stronger U.N. understand this inherent weakness of collective security among sovereign states. In 1992, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued his *Agenda for Peace* that called for "preventive deployment" of U.N. troops by a standing army of heavily armed "peace enforcement units." This army was to be supported by an expanded U.N. military staff, permanent bases, and weapon stockpiles. As Marrack Goulding, the U.N. Under-Secretary General in charge of political affairs and peacekeeping, stated, "The first principle of peacekeeping is that operations should be U.N. operations; formed by the U.N., commanded in the field by a U.N.-appointed officer, under the ultimate authority of the Secretary General, and financed by member states collectively."

Boutros-Ghali wanted this U.N. army to be financed by assessments levied from the national defense budgets of the largest member-states. He also suggested that the U.N. tax arms sales and international air traffic and levy interest payments on nations whose "assessments" were late. Martin Walker of the World Policy Institute argued for placing a tax on international currency transactions. This would yield sufficient revenue to fund a U.N. army independent of control by major U.N. members like the United States.

Taxation is a sovereign prerogative. For the U.N. to claim such a right, regardless of how implemented, would establish it as a superior entity. Walker sympathizes with this notion: "The power to assert one's own economic and taxation policy has long been the cardinal characteristic of the nation-state. That power is now in question. But so is the continued utility of the nation-state as the guarantor of internal order and prime actor in international affairs." Note that the jurisdiction of the U.N. is to extend to "internal order" *within* nations and not just serve as a mediator *between* nations. This would be a violation of traditional sovereignty, but then, as former U.N. Under-Secretary General Sir Brian Urquhart has said, "The unraveling of national sovereignty seems to be a feature of the post-Cold War period."

Though Clinton has said he does not favor a standing U.N. army, the administration's paper *Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations* called for the creation by the U.N. of a Plans Division, an Information and Research Division, an Operations Division, a Logistical Division, a Public Affairs Cell, a Civil Police Cell, and a Professional Peace Operations Training Program. The U.N. should also have a "rapidly deployable headquarters team" and its own "modest airlift capabilities." The paper also pledged the United States to "offer to help design a database of military forces or capabilities and to notify DPKO [Department of Peace Keeping Operations] for inclusion in the database, of specific U.S. capabilities that could be made available for the full spectrum of peacekeeping or humanitarian operations."

Republicans and conservative Democrats in Congress have done much to derail the Clinton program in the wake of U.N. debacles in Somalia and Bosnia. American troops are not to be committed under U.N. command unless the President first certifies that the arrangement protects our national security and retains our right to take independent action to protect our forces. And U.N. peacekeeping operations are not to be paid for from the Pentagon budget. The President must seek funds in advance for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, not merely raid other accounts.

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longer an option.

Advocates of expanded American involvement in U.N. operations allege that any failure to act means that our country is lapsing into isolationism. Yet the United States has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to act forcefully when its real interests are at stake. The danger comes if the United States is dragged into a series of fruitless conflicts unrelated to the country's security. This is when public opinion could become disenchanted and turn isolationist, thus undermining the ability of the country to act when its interests are actually in danger.

What liberals really mean when they talk of isolationism is that they do not approve of foreign policies that are based on power politics, traditional alliances, or national security. To them, it is collective security under the sanction of some transnational authority—or nothing. This was evident in the recent congressional debates over cuts in foreign aid and in contributions to the U.N., which showed the liberal desire to transfer money to agencies and regimes that are not tied to American interests (or are even openly hostile to our interests) while objecting to spending money on America's own defenses.

It is one thing to debate where and when the country should act; it is another to weaken the ability to act so much that it is no longer an option. Since 1990, military force levels have been cut by over a third, readiness has declined, and many vital modernization programs have been delayed or canceled. Planned force levels do not provide the credible capability to fight "two nearly simultaneous regional wars," which is the declared policy and prudent standard for safeguarding American security in a turbulent world. For example, to liberate Kuwait in 1991, the United States sent eight Army divisions, six Marine brigades, six aircraft carriers, and ten tactical fighter wings to the Persian Gulf. These units represented about *half* of the nation's conventional war-fighting capability at the time. This commitment involved roughly the same number of troops as the Kore-

an War and the average deployment over the course of the Vietnam War. It has thus become the standard for a "regional conflict." By the end of 1995, the United States will only have ten Army divisions, five Marine brigades, 11 aircraft carriers, and 13 tactical wings on active duty. This is barely enough to fight one regional conflict, let alone retain a reserve to deter others from exploiting the situation by mounting a challenge elsewhere.

The United States Armed Forces are being reduced to their lowest level since 1949. The cuts reflect the various liberal proposals made during the 1980's for reallocating resources away from President Reagan's rearmament program. Though the objective of such plans was primarily to find more money for social programs, sometimes the authors would let slip their disdain for the military as an arm of an independent American foreign policy. For example, a plan of massive defense cuts drawn up under the auspices of the World Policy Institute in 1988 proclaimed, "Our new strategy emphasizes defensive missions and common security . . . and precluding U.S. intervention in regional conflicts except for humanitarian purposes and U.N.-sanctioned peacekeeping efforts." Among the authors was Clinton's longtime friend and future Labor Secretary, Robert Reich.

Clinton scrapped the Bush administration's plan to deploy an antimissile defense system to protect the United States. Instead, Clinton has favored protecting the integrity of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He has even accepted some Russian demands that the ABM Treaty be expanded to restrict the development of theater defense systems that could protect American forces overseas. A bilateral agreement is ill-suited to a world with multilateral threats. Why should the United States make an agreement with Russia to "dumb down" its antimissile technology? This would not only limit America's defenses against Russia, but also against Iran, North Korea, China, and every other threat. One answer is that the administration has an ideological commitment to arms control that supersedes any practical considerations. Another is that by keeping the United States vulnerable to attack, a significant constraint is placed on America's freedom of action. This is clearly in the minds of those Third World militants who are busily expending their people's meager resources on ballistic missiles and warheads of "mass destruction." But there are also some in the United States who still think that threats of "mutual destruction" support global stability, another principle they are willing to place above their nation's interests—even the interest in survival.

United Nations Ambassador Madeleine Albright likes to charge that the Republican Congress is taking the United States back to the isolationism of the 1920's. This is a reference to the country's refusal to join the League of Nations. Yet the United States assumed a leadership role in talks to limit war and armaments throughout the interwar period. The most important arms control measure of this period was the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, later expanded in the London Treaties of 1930 and 1935. These agreements set severe limits on the navies of the world powers; scores of warships were scrapped. But the strategic result of this system was that militant but economically weak powers like Japan and Italy were able to build within striking distance of richer democracies, like the United States, who were prohibited from converting their superior resources into superior strength. The league proved useless, but the arms control treaties proved disastrous. It is thus the Clinton administration that is repeating the mistakes of the 1920's.

House Republicans are pushing for the elimination of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as an independent organization. The ACDA has been pushing expansion of the ABM Treaty. The agency and its defenders in Congress and the media have argued that there is a need for an independent voice for arms control as an end in itself. As an editorial circulated by the ACDA put it, the agency's autonomy is needed "to protect them from the myopic Cold Warriors at the State Department."

These debates have revealed the real threat to sovereignty. It is not "world government," because such an institution is inherently unworkable. Every attempt made in its behalf has quickly collapsed in acrimony and incompetence. In most parts of the world, popular nationalism is on the rise. The real threat to the United States is the continued belief of key segments of the American political elite in the liberal-universalist philosophy that makes world government seem attractive.

In the futile pursuit of this ideal, the American government has been surrendering the levers of power upon which its capacity for independent action and effective sovereignty depends. Indeed, the United States seems determined to surrender even the principle that it has a right to independent action. The real beneficiaries of this surrender will not be the "globalist" bureaucrats in New York or Geneva, though they will revel in the thought. And various special interests will line their pockets during the interregnum. But such unrooted nonentities can only thrive if national governments abdicate their vastly superior powers to make law, mobilize resources, and deploy coercive force in the name of a coherent society. That is why any power vacuum created by the retreat of American power will ultimately be filled by other nation-states that have maintained their military and economic strength and have, more importantly, kept the will to use their strength in support of their own strategic interests.

It is then that America's considerable investment in the creation of multilateral organizations will prove to be the greatest blunder ever committed by a modern power. As the "last superpower," America's primary aim must be to prevent the rise of any rival power or coalition of powers that can match its strength. The very kind of anarchy deplored by globalists is thus to America's advantage. The United States must avoid being submerged into larger bodies where it can be overwhelmed, and it must ensure that multilateral organizations, be they "regional" or "worldwide" in scope, do not become vehicles for the creation of hostile coalitions that could not only damage America's prosperity but also its security.

The belief that America can "lead" movements that encompass hemispheres or regions as large as Asia is pure hubris. Advocates of this policy forget that the envy other societies feel for American material success is a dark emotion, made more explosive when combined with a revulsion for the degenerate side of American culture. The United States needs to be actively engaged in world affairs, but in the tradition of balance-of-power diplomacy—keeping potential rivals apart, not trying to bring them together. Like the spokes of a wheel, the United States should place itself at the center of a series of advantageous bilateral relationships that would obstruct the formation of competing coalitions. But to consider devising a new Grand Strategy for the nation first requires that the principle of sovereignty be returned to the center of American foreign policy.

Our Blessed Plot

The Case for the Bricker Amendment

by Theodore Pappas



As if we needed more proof of the threat to national sovereignty, there comes John Gardner's latest "James Bond novel," *SeaFire*. Gone is Ian Fleming's wonderful cast of characters. The drab but lovable Q has been replaced by a woman nicknamed Q'ute; the admiral M has been replaced by a committee of bureaucrats; a primping tart called Chastity Vain has taken the place of Bond's faithful and dignified secretary Moncypenny; and Bond, with knee bent before the altar of the pink ribbon, has stopped philandering and is about to settle down and marry again, which I suppose is preferable to seeing Bond wait anxiously for the results of his latest blood test.

This is not the Bond of Ian Fleming, the cultivated hero whose courage, self-reliance, and resourcefulness saved Britain, protected its security and sovereignty, and defended the institutions of the free and civilized Western world. No, this new Bond has a different purpose. The famed 007 section has been disbanded, and Bond now heads a department called the Two Zeros, which in turn reports to a committee called MicroGlobe One, whose purpose is not to defend Britain's borders and protect its liberties but instead to fight breaches of international law and treaties. Forget that signature line of identification: "Bond, James Bond." For it is now: "Bond, Boutros Boutros-Bond." If this means that the classic Bond films are to be remade as well, to conform with the transnational New World

Order, we can only hope that Janet Reno will be cast as Rosa Klebb.

Most telling, however, is this novel's portrayal of the so-called villains of today and rogues of tomorrow: namely, men of the right. In *SeaFire*, the villain is one Max Tarn, an English philanthropist who is secretly a German seeking to become—what else?—a new Hitler. Tarn, we are told, "deals in death," meaning he sells guns; he is against foreigners overrunning Germany; and he has a growing and devout following, some of whom are hairless. When Bond witnesses a rally in Germany for Max Tarn, he reports: "Thugs, toughs, young men and women, many of the men with their heads shaved, all of them in various kinds of disreputable dress. The kind of louts [who] have made German cities unsafe," "attacking foreigners," "parading in the streets," "marching in antigovernment protests." In the 1960's, hellions with long hair and disreputable clothes who took to the streets in antigovernment protests were frequently called "engaged," and fawned upon for their activism and idealism; today, youngsters with no hair and disreputable clothes who take to the streets in antigovernment protests are called threats to humanity. It must be the hair.

But even more disturbing to Bond and Gardner than the sight of an active populace defending its home and native culture is Max Tarn's speech, in which Tarn embraces the absurd notion of "a Germany for the Germans." This, trembles Bond, is Nazism "plain and simple," because the next step is a Germany for only "purebred Germans." Bond could almost "hear the jackboots stomping" and see a "Europe a ruin," as "a mon-

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tage of terror . . . filled his head: the walking dead of Auschwitz, Belsen," etc., etc. Never mind that this right-wing rally that Bond witnessed had yet to seize power, had shown no sign of organizing a coup, had built no camps and exterminated no one—never mind, in other words, that this gathering had thus far committed no crime. For Gardner's and the new Bond's message is clear: scratch the patriotic veneer of national security, go beneath the surface rhetoric of sovereignty and historic culture, and a scientific racist will emerge.

Why should we worry about a penny dreadful? The obvious answer is that most people are more likely to read John Gardner than Jefferson, more ready to listen to Madonna than Mozart, and more moved by the message on a Greenpeace T-shirt than a principled argument on the dangers of international treaties that would supersede American law for the ostensible purpose of protecting the cute and cuddly. In other words, it is the seemingly innocuous, apparently harmless, often in the guise of humanitarianism, that is frequently the most dangerous to our liberties.

If ever conscientious objectors
were needed in this country,
it would be each and every time
the Stars and Stripes flies in
the shadow of the blue flag of
transnationalism.

While in Spain last year, I struck up a conversation with a lady visiting from Sussex. She was outraged by Maastricht and European unity. Her husband works in a port that deals in exports of British livestock, a trade which animal rights activists have confounded with numerous (and sometimes violent) demonstrations in recent years, and to what do these activists turn in their attempt to override British law and block her husband's trade? European law and the World Court. The woman had also, like my wife and I, just returned from bullfights on the Costa del Sol, and we all agreed: Spaniards may believe their national pastime is safe in the short run from the Continent's organized animal rights movement, but considering the homogenizing force of European consolidation and the New Puritanism sweeping through the West, bullfighting will face the sword in the next century.

Nor did this woman have much faith in John Major's hard-won "opt-out" option on certain EC policies, such as open immigration as part of the Single European Act. Britain can erect all kinds of barriers to Third World *fakirs*, she argued, but what is to prevent an Ethiopian or Algerian from entering an EC country with a less stringent entrance policy for non-EC residents and then relocating to Piccadilly for Albion's more generous social services? Nothing, she answered. "You can forget

'this blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,'" she fumed. "*The Camp of the Saints* is our future."

When my wife and I visited museums in Madrid we once again encountered issues of national rights and international law: mass confusion reigned over who should and should not be charged admission to the state museums. Spain had long waived admission fees for all Spanish citizens, all legal foreign residents in Spain, and everyone under the age of 21. All other visitors were charged a fee, that is, until the European Court of Justice ruled that this ethnocentric law that discriminates against aliens runs counter to the spirit of Maastricht and violates Article 59 that mandates equal access to facilities for all EC members. Maastricht supporters hailed the decision as a victory for equal rights and for European harmony. But if free men and women lose even the right to control entrance to their own museums of their own culture and accomplishments, to preserve and enjoy their historic national pastimes, what possible say can they hope to maintain on the more important questions of life and living, of war and peace, of family and faith?

An unsung American hero who realized the dangers to national sovereignty often posed by the seemingly harmless and benevolent was Frank E. Holman, president of the American Bar Association in 1948 and 1949. Holman was born in Sandy City, Utah, in 1886, graduated from the University of Utah, won a Rhodes Scholarship, and, in contrast to those Oxonians who forsake the scholastic for the inhalational arts, actually earned a law degree at Oxford. He worked in private practice in the 1930's, opposed Franklin Roosevelt—whom he called early on "a great fake, perhaps one of the greatest in American politics"—and fought against the New Deal and entrance into World War II. After the war, as president of the ABA, and in light of the formation of the United Nations, he fought tirelessly against the dangers posed by "socialist encroachments at home and international encroachments from abroad." He called for an alliance of the Southern and Western states against the Northeastern internationalists and their allies in the larger Midwestern states, for only this alliance, he believed, could "save us from becoming" a "completely Socialized State at home and a puppet state in a world-wide hegemony."

The seemingly innocuous ruling that Holman saw as critical to the future of our national sovereignty was the Supreme Court ruling of 1920, *Missouri v. Holland*. In 1914, a U.S. District Court had found unconstitutional a federal law protecting migratory birds, ruling that it was an invasion of the powers reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment, for the states had always regulated such matters in the past. The federal government, however, then signed a treaty with Great Britain to protect the birds and enacted statutes to carry out terms of the treaty, which in 1920, in *Missouri v. Holland*, the Supreme Court upheld because of Congress's authority to pass all "necessary and proper" laws in order to enact the provisions of a signed international agreement.

It did not take social activists long to understand that the true meaning of this ruling had little to do with the sovereignty of nature and everything to do with the nature of national sovereignty. For unhappy with a law in your particular state, and without the votes and support needed at the state level to overturn it? No problem, simply lobby the federal government to enter into a foreign treaty or executive agreement with an international entity that outlaws the activity you disapprove of, and then the Supreme Court will uphold any and all laws

Congress may pass that overturn the activity currently banned in your state. It was exactly this end-around the democratic process that child labor law activists and civil rights workers relied on to fight against state laws they opposed earlier this century, and it is U.N. treaties and the acronymic “trade” pacts on which open-border activists rely today for the supposed “right” of Haitians to invade our shores; to which the ACLU appeals in its attempts to abolish capital punishment at the state level; and to which environmentalists turn to hinder Americans’ right to control their own conservation laws.

What Holman found especially dangerous was the U.N.’s Declaration of Human Rights, which he called a “strange document” that could eventually dictate what does and does not constitute “adequate employment, adequate wages, adequate housing and clothing, and adequate rest and leisure,” if not also authorize “some agency . . . like the World Court to nullify our immigration laws.” He also fought against the signing of the U.N. Genocide Treaty—especially its vague ban on “serious mental harm,” which as we know today could be anything from an argument with your wife to the rolling of your eyes at a rude black man at a Denny’s restaurant—and he fought against the treaty not because he was secretly a Max Tarn in favor of genocide, but because it would give the federal government at the prodding of social activists the means to trample state laws and the democratic process as established by the Constitution. So doggedly did Holman fight Eleanor Roosevelt’s push in the 1950’s for legally binding U.N. resolutions that President Eisenhower derided his crusade as one “to save the United States from Eleanor Roosevelt.”

It was Frank Holman’s activism of the late 1940’s that was the driving force behind Ohio Senator John Bricker’s attempts in the 1950’s to pass a constitutional amendment that would prohibit this method of superseding American law. And though there were many versions of the so-called Bricker Amendment throughout the 50’s, all of them generally sought three things: to confine treaties to foreign affairs issues, to ensure that international agreements made by Presidents were not self-executing in terms of domestic law (meaning the judiciary could not overturn state law on the basis of an international agreement alone, without the passage of subsequent legislation), and to protect the constitutional rights and liberties of Americans by ensuring that treaties and executive agreements could not supersede or abrogate provisions of the Constitution that reserved rights to the states.

As we all know, Eisenhower and fellow Republicans succeeded in killing the amendment with *ad hominem* attacks on its proponents and by distorting the issue to a debate whether the public should be allowed to interfere with the governing of the country’s foreign policy, something the Bricker Amendment and its supporters never advocated. All of the versions of the Bricker Amendment made it perfectly clear that the states would only become involved in foreign policy that dealt with matters historically and constitutionally under their jurisdiction and never in such areas as national defense, military alliances, and control of nuclear weapons, all of which would remain under the exclusive authority of the federal government.

In a 1956 article, James Burnham addressed two important questions that were often posed at the height of the debate over the Bricker Amendment. The first one concerned what our Founding Fathers had to say on this matter. “They understood,” wrote Burnham, that “treaties must be given the force of domestic law. . . . But they never considered the entirely dif-

ferent question of giving the force of domestic law to unspecified actions that would be taken by continuing international bodies [such as the mandatory dispute settlement panels whose decisions America agreed to accept as part of the WTO]. The latter is equivalent to the surrender . . . of national sovereignty in favor of world government. Our Constitution as it now reads does not make the relevant distinction.”

The second question Burnham addressed was whether all of this was much ado about nothing. “Up until a generation ago,” he wrote, “the danger of constitutional subversion via the treaty power . . . could be considered academic. But it is either naive or disingenuous to continue to brush it off.” If Burnham thought in light of the formation of the United Nations, the proposed Genocide Treaty, and the U.N.-sponsored “police action” in Korea that the usurpation of national sovereignty was a real enough possibility to warrant an amendment to the Constitution in the mid-1950’s, one can only imagine what Burnham would have to say today about the future of a people that opens its arms to NAFTA, GATT, and the WTO and that courts such tyrannies as a U.N. standing army and international agreements that would strip them of their control over abortion, immigration, wages, child care, adoption, education, parental rights, firearms, and capital punishment.

But if there are still some among us who believe all of this is indeed much ado about nothing—that this is not the time to demand the passage of a new Bricker Amendment—then please remember what President Clinton surreptitiously proposed in Presidential Decision Directive 25 early last year. Following on the heels of P.D.D. 13 in late 1993, this directive outlined the placing of American soldiers under the exclusive command and control of the United Nations; the sharing of classified information with other countries of the United Nations (the vast majority of whose members queue up annually for American largess and then spend the rest of the year denouncing us as evil incarnate); the repealing of the law that limits the number of troops the United States can commit to United Nations command *without* congressional approval; and the establishing of a special financial account for U.N. missions that would not need congressional approval. When Congressman Dick Zimmer of New Jersey requested a copy of the executive order, a Clinton aide replied, “We’re not going to release it. We don’t want to be hassled by adverse public reaction.” A President of the United States tries to surrender our country’s sovereignty and to relinquish his authority as Commander-in-Chief, and he does not regard this as an issue for public debate.

Seven days later, servicemen at the Twentynine Palms Marine base in California were given a “Combat Arms Survey” that originated as a result of P.D.D. 13 and 25. When news of the survey’s contents leaked out to the public, the Marine Corps played down its significance by explaining that it was only an academic exercise conducted by a researcher at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey. The survey’s author, however, admitted that he wrote the questions as a direct result of Clinton’s directives and that the administering of the survey was approved by the military and supervised by civilian faculty, including a former Assistant Secretary of Defense. Clearly, from the perspective of officials in government, the military, and academia, none of the ideas in the survey was too offensive or treasonous not to air.

Part One of the survey answered the question of what the

best and the brightest might have our military do to justify the billions of dollars it continues to receive in the post-Cold War era, some of which are: security at Olympic and Super Bowl games, fire fighting and flood control, security at state and federal prisons, animal control and clean-up, road repair, landscaping, and substitute teaching. That's right, "Be All You Can Be" could possibly soon mean guarding O.J. on his NordicTrack and slinging squirrel skins for the state.

This first section of the survey, however, merely softens the blow of the truly terrifying matter in the second part. Here the marines were asked to check off in the appropriate box the extent of their agreement or disagreement with such propositions as:

—"U.S. combat troops should participate in U.N. missions under U.N. command and control."

—"It would make no difference to me to take orders from a U.N. company commander."

—"I feel there is no conflict between my oath of office and serving as a U.N. soldier."

—"I would swear to the following code: 'I am a United Nations fighting person. I serve in the forces which maintain world peace and every nation's way of life. I am prepared to give my life in *their* defense.'" (Emphasis added.)

—"I feel the President of the United States has the authority to pass his responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief to the U.N. Secretary General."

—And lastly: "If the U.S. government declared a ban on the possession, sale, transportation, and transfer of all non sporting firearms, and if after a 30-day amnesty period, a number of citizens had still refused to surrender

their firearms, 'I would fire upon U.S. citizens who refuse or resist confiscation of firearms banned by the U.S. government.'"

None of the above should really surprise us. After all, Vice President Gore has publicly stated that Americans killed in the Persian Gulf War died not for their country but "for the United Nations," which is true.

When this combat arms survey became public, I phoned a young marine to get his response. He had not taken the survey, but agreed to give his opinion on the above propositions. When I asked him if he would swear an oath not to his corps and to his country but to the United Nations, if he would support a President of the United States who willingly surrendered his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to a Third World disciple of Babalou, if he would storm a private residency and murder an American citizen who refused to register or surrender his legally purchased firearm, he replied calmly and confidently: "I would do as I'm told."

Though a country certainly needs young men who follow orders, blind devotion and discipline can be as evil as divine, and when I heard the young soldier answer my question with nary a second of reflection, I could not help wondering how John Randolph, Teddy Roosevelt, or Alvin York might have replied. Alvin York overcame his pacifist beliefs when he convinced himself that by killing abroad he would help to bring the bloodshed to a halt. But killing distant Germans during wartime, this is one thing; killing neighboring kin in times of peace, this is quite another. If ever conscientious objectors were needed in this country, it would be each and every time the Stars and Stripes flies in the shadow of the blue flag of transnationalism. 



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Our Global Parents

The Convention on the Rights of the Child

by Christopher Check



Americans who hoped that the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child would be stuffed in a drawer with its predecessor, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, got a jolt in February when Mrs. Clinton announced (at the funeral of UNICEF director James Grant) that the Convention would be signed and forwarded to the Senate for ratification. If step one came easily (Madelaine Albright signed the document on February 16), step two faces greater odds: a Foreign Relations Committee headed by Jesse Helms.

Many defenders of the family are more worried about world government than the terrific power their own local child savers wield, which is surprising. After all, the agents of such programs as Parents as Teachers (PAT) in Missouri or the Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) in Illinois do not have to wait, unlike UNICEF, for the power to snatch children: they already have it. The Convention on the Rights of the Child demands scrutiny not because its decrees are about to become the law of the land, but because its aspirations are already embedded in the child protection laws of the 50 states.

Specifically, the Convention seeks to extend "the mantle of human rights protection" to "one of the most vulnerable groups in society—children." If some people find this rhetoric appealing, it is because they have not considered at what cost it will be realized, and I do not mean the 25 percent of the U.N.'s

operating budget that American taxpayers bankroll. Similar expressions are found in the U.N. Charter, which calls for "the economic and social advancement of all peoples." Such terms are difficult to define, impossible to quantify. If one man's "economic advancement" is another man's bankruptcy, consensus on "social advancement" would seem even further beyond reach. People who suffer this life with an eye on their eternal reward see "advancement" as something different from those whose goal is perfecting life on earth. Changing the slogan from "social advancement" to "development," the word currently in vogue, makes little difference. As one U.N. critic mused in Cairo last year: "Who is more 'developed'? The adolescent African virgin who walks five miles to school? Or her peer in the neighboring village fitted with a diaphragm courtesy of the World Health Organization?"

"Human rights," however, seem to be something everyone can agree on, as America's own infatuation with rights will testify. "Fetal rights" activists have this in common with their "gay rights" adversaries: both look to government to enforce their claim and turn the Bill of Rights on its head. Instead of defining a sphere of human society into which the federal government may not intrude, the Bill of Rights today functions as little more than a list of individual privileges granted and enforced by government. The very rights which were to hobble the federal government in fact now empower it.

The *reductio ad absurdum* of this obsession with individual rights can be seen in a recent issue of the *American Journal of International Law*: "the right to sleep," "the right not to be

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killed in a war,” “the right not to be exposed to excessively and unnecessarily heavy, degrading, dirty and boring work.” What constitutes a “right” is very simple: “a claim is an international human right if the United Nation’s General Assembly says it is.”

The *modus operandi* of “children’s rights” advocates is not much different. As Hillary Clinton conceded in 1979, the “difference between a legal right and other claims of right” is that the former is “enforceable under our laws,” the latter a mere “description of our needs and interests.” Not surprisingly, she therefore argued that “in the field of children’s rights,” the trick is to “transform children’s needs and interests into enforceable rights,” these needs and interests including “everything from compulsory school attendance to driving privileges to nurturing requirements.”

The question is, who will run the families of the future? Fathers or the state?

Whereas parents used to be expected to look after the “needs and interests” of children, government now has the power to enforce the “rights” of children even against the parents’ wishes. Each new right requires a new government arm: “The right to a worry-free retirement”—Social Security; “the right to decent housing”—Housing and Urban Development; “the right to good health”—Health and Human Services. And when it comes to enforcing the child’s right to “grow up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love, and understanding,” we will perhaps see Jack Westman’s scheme (borrowed from Hugh La Follette) of licensing parents.

If La Follette and Westman are careful to withhold the details on the machinery of their plan, it is not because they have failed to realize that a government with arbitrary duties is one of limitless powers. A parental licensure that permits only citizens of the age of majority to marry is hardly the same as one that restricts marriage only to citizens who will sufficiently “nurture” their children. The more vague the right, the more power the state can seize in enforcing it. Mrs. Clinton, herself, admits that the “guiding principle” of the Convention on the Rights of the Child—“the best interests of the child”—grants “extraordinary flexibility . . . to any decision-maker authorized to enforce it.”

Clues to how those in power might enforce certain rights granted by the Convention lie in its four principal—but veiled—objectives. First, limiting parental authority. The argument goes back to John Locke. Parental authority exists over children only because children’s natural state of weakness makes them dependent. As children grow stronger and more self-sufficient, their autonomy increases while parental authority decreases in proportion. Thus, according to the Convention, parents may provide “appropriate direction and guidance” to their child only insofar as such guidance is “consistent with the evolving capacities of the child.”

When a child’s capacities have evolved sufficiently, he may avail himself, for example, of the “family-planning education and services” demanded by the Convention. Here the U.N. reinforces the handiwork of Western jurisprudence. A decade ago in Great Britain, Mrs. Victoria Gillick, mother of ten, saw her effort to block England’s doctors from dispensing contraceptives to girls under 16 quashed by the House of Lords. The judges’ decision, reported *The Economist*, has since enabled activist lawyers in England to argue that “there is no fixed age up to which parents have complete control over their children; parental rights dwindle as the child matures. Parental powers are not a reward for parenthood, but exist to enable parents to carry out their duties to protect their offspring”—duties which apparently exclude shielding minors from state-run sex training. Little is different in the United States: in Winnebago County, Illinois, where even consensual intercourse between minors constitutes statutory rape, 12-year-old girls can receive contraceptives from the Health Department without their parents’ consent.

Ultimately, all rights granted by the Convention follow the Lockean line. A “child capable of forming his or her own views,” it reads, shall have “the right to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight *in accordance with the age and maturity of the child*” (emphasis added). A seven-year-old weary of his multiplication tables may be too young to appeal to his “right to rest and leisure,” but what of an unruly adolescent who no longer wishes to worship with his parents? Surely his “evolving capacities” warrant his exercising his “right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.” And herein lies objective number two (which is already at work in our public schools): replacing organized religion with state-run therapy.

“The child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include the freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other medium of the child’s choice.” One such frontier, funded by the state, is pantheism, that is, “respect for the natural environment.” Any deficiencies in spirituality will be made up by “social programmes [designed] to provide necessary support for the child,” to protect him from possible “exploitation.” For those children already exploited, “State Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of any form of neglect, exploitation or abuse . . . in an environment that fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the child.”

Because exploitation and abuse are associated with organized religions, the U.N. wants nations to “take all effective and appropriate measures with a view to abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.” Those on the fringe will be first. Jehovah’s Witnesses and Christian Scientists have already been prosecuted for manslaughter in Florida and Massachusetts for withholding modern medicine from their young. In Connecticut, Juliet Cheng lost her rheumatic seven-year-old daughter to the Department of Children and Youth Services for using—with some success—ancient Chinese medicine to relieve her daughter’s pain. Last March, when the knock came on the door of Emanuel Beiler’s Lancaster County farmhouse, he made a valiant dash across the field carrying his five-year-old daughter, Sylvia, in his arms. The state troopers, however, ran the Amish man down and took his little girl. His crime? Calling an end to the chemotherapy Sylvia was enduring for her

leukemia. In his judgment, the treatment was making her more miserable than the disease itself.

Though the Amish may be among the few today who understand that there is more to life than being healthy, their odd beliefs, and those of other heretics and pagans, are easy targets for our own scorn. Orthodox Christians may learn to sympathize with them when the state determines that our own bizarre practices are “prejudicial to the health of children.” Forcing children to admit their faults in a small room to an intentionally celibate man in black at least endangers self-esteem, while serving alcohol to minors from one cup corrupts youth and spreads disease.

“Abolishing traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children”—tribal rites of passage requiring feats of daring? a day of hard work in the field?—will lead to the Convention’s third objective: eliminating unique cultures. The Convention warns nations always to “respect the right of the child to preserve his . . . nationality” and never to “illegally deprive” him “of some or all of the elements of his identity.” (Requiring an immigrant child to speak and write English in school?) Any child so violated must be provided “appropriate assistance and protection, with a view to speedily re-establishing [the child’s] identity.” But by requiring nations to respect—and pay for—all cultures but their own, the U.N. ensures that no one culture will outshine another. The bizarre, primitive, and foreign are now equal to the traditions and customs of families and smaller communities, setting in motion the Convention’s fourth objective: replacing the autonomous family with the omnipotent state.

The state will ensure that “every child” will enjoy “a standard of living adequate for a child’s physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development” and will have “the right to benefit from social security, including social insurance.” In other words, the state will assume the once sacred duties of families. The poor, as always, are especially targeted: families whose “financial capacities” fall short of U.N.-determined living standards will benefit from state “assistance and support programs.” Even Mrs. Clinton acknowledges that authorities intervene “in those families that are most vulnerable to state control such as the poor or unconventional principally because of the family’s powerlessness rather than because of their needs.”

Families, never completely dispensed with, will be enlisted as functionaries of the state: “The family . . . should be afforded the necessary assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community.” James Grant’s enthusiasm for “an all out assault to slow population growth” in countries such as Angola, China, Niger, Tanzania, and the Philippines, where UNICEF dollars are tied to contraception use, suggests that such responsibilities include limiting family size to reduce the strain on “social insurance programmes.” In America, of course, state assistance to families already includes providing contraception, to say nothing of abortions, to minor daughters without parental consent.

Nor need parents worry about schooling their children. The state “shall ensure to the maximum extent possible . . . the development of the child.” “Primary education” will be “compulsory and available free to all,” and the state will “take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools and the reduction of dropout rates.” Each graduating child will possess a “fully developed personality,” as well as “a respect for human rights . . . and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.” He will champion “understanding, peace,

tolerance, equality of the sexes and friendship among all peoples.” Parents unwilling to cooperate with the new curriculum may be found guilty of creating a “family environment” in which a child for “his own best interests, cannot be allowed to remain.”

Perhaps my reading of the document represents a paranoid overreaction. But the misery that the state has recently visited upon countless parents wrongly accused of child abuse should make us all very skeptical of any children’s rights program proposed by any level of government. An international child-saver might wonder aloud: “Can no one be trusted to interpret these aspirations honestly? Has government any responsibility to see that its citizens treat their children—and indeed one another—decently?”

The answer presents a peculiar problem for citizens of the post-Christian age. Ideally, there is a legitimate role for the state—though certainly not for the international state, if such a thing can exist—to play in advancing the common good; and the restrictions which our own federal government has imposed on the states since Reconstruction in pursuit of the common good might be tolerable, save for one problem: a government that is demonstrably corrupt—one that pays to kill its own unborn, for example—is exactly the wrong instrument for dispensing charity.

Some find defense for state action in the social-justice teaching of the Roman Catholic Church. But for Pope Leo XIII, writing in *Rerum Novarum*, in order for a government to play a part in relieving poverty, that government must be “conformable in its institutions to right reason and natural law” as well as to specific “dictates of the Divine wisdom,” which he had set forth in an earlier encyclical. If today the appointment of a Supreme Court Justice can be seriously questioned on the grounds that he confesses belief in the natural law, it cannot be argued that our current ruling class meets Leo’s—or any Christian’s—standards. Necessary to his prescriptions, and to those of his successors, is the assumption that government will comprise statesmen whose interest is to serve the citizenry and not themselves.

Many Americans, nevertheless, still regard government as a source not only of order, but also of solutions to the tragedies of life. If government can help advance the common good, it can do so only as far as the vices of its representatives will allow. Not all men are evil wretches, but bureaucrats are no more virtuous than the rest of us. Even if the U.N. does recruit ten experts “of high moral standing and recognized competence in the field covered by the Convention,” they will remain men nevertheless, as will all the social workers who will do their bidding. The Convention does require that only “competent authorities” serve as representatives of the state: “Children should not be separated from their parents, unless by competent authorities for their well-being,” reads the introduction, but competent authorities seem in short supply. The U.N.’s own child-savers have fallen into scandal: Jozef Verbeek, head of the Belgian UNICEF committee, and his assistant, Michel Felu, were among 18 people ultimately convicted for running a child prostitution and pornography ring out of the Brussels UNICEF office. Introduced as evidence at the trial were 19,000 pornographic photographs and a mailing list compiled on the office computer.

If Verbeek and Felu seem to have ignored the Convention’s condemnation of “the inducement or coercion of a child to en-

gage in any unlawful sexual activity; the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other unlawful sexual practices; and the exploitative use of children in pornographic performances and materials," it is probably because their employer has been less than dedicated to these same provisions. Only recently was the North American Man Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) silenced at the U.N. when the International Lesbian and Gay Association, of which NAMBLA is a member, had its consultative roster status to the Economic and Social Council suspended.

One need not look as far as the U.N., however, to find social workers whose behavior does not reflect a heartfelt concern for the best interests of children. That many of their own families are in disarray suggests as much. Indeed, the best of them are like Mrs. Jellyby in *Bleak House*, who practiced "telescopic philanthropy" on the natives in Africa while her own children shivered and starved in an unclean and unsafe house. Agents of the Illinois DCFS seem unable to care for anyone. Thrice the DCFS seized and returned to his mother an 11-month-old baby boy whom she ultimately hanged with an electric cord. The court file suggests that if ever there was a reason for a DCFS, this case was it. The mother was clearly mentally ill: she had eaten batteries, drunk drain cleaner, and sliced her abdomen, spilling her intestines. When the DCFS does keep kids from their parents, the results are sometimes no better. Recall the infested tenement at the Keystone Apartments in Chicago, from which 19 children were removed. One of these children was later killed by the foster mother with whom he was placed, drowned under the bath tap for failing toilet training. In 1994, in Illinois alone, five children were killed in foster care, and 66 children were sexually abused. The point is not that all children are well cared for by their parents, nor is it that no parent ever abuses his child, but that the state is ill-prepared to take the place of even those parents who are neglectful. To give the state a right to intervene between parents and children is an invitation to abuse.

Even if parental affection and wholesome public opinion do

persist at the end of the 20th century, the natural solution to the hard cases—intervention by the extended family—is no longer an option. Nevertheless, the state cannot stand in for the grandparents and kinfolks from whom Americans have severed their nuclear households. Whatever government may decide to do, the hard cases will remain insoluble. No amount of money will cure the stepfather who molests a child or give the crack baby a chance for a normal life. Working instead to restore a family-based society will make far greater progress towards eliminating these cases.

The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child will simply exacerbate the ills it proposes to cure. In raising even the least doubt about parental authority, it undermines the one institution in which children are least likely to be abused, least likely to be poor, least likely to be promiscuous, most likely to be healthy, and most likely to be well educated: the traditional two-parent family. In contrast, children in the care of the state are regular victims of abuse, in daycare centers and foster homes. But are children even the point? The U.N.'s distrust of the traditional family and support of "alternate family forms" makes clear that a world of happy, healthy children is not its goal. Can an organization that approves of divorce, homosexuality, and cohabitation genuinely care about children, when each of these aberrations means increased risk, if not certain tragedy, for the children exposed to them?

The question is, who will run the families of the future? Fathers or the state? For Pope Leo XIII, drawing on St. Paul, the answer is clear: "The family is a true society . . . with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the commonwealth . . . governed by a power within itself, that is the father." This is the doctrine of all sound Christians everywhere, but it is also the common sense of all healthy societies that have ever existed. If world government ever does push its way into the private life of families, then the last obstacles that stand between free men and complete tyranny will be gone.

—C




LIBERAL ARTS



NOCTURNE IN BLACK AND BLUE

The European magazine recently featured a story on performance artist Marcelli Antunez, whose "art" was on display at a church in Murcia, Spain. Antunez's performance consists of hooking his body up to a machine connected to a computer system and "inviting the audience to inflict pain and (possibly) pleasure on the body by moving around a computer mouse." The performance is highly interactive, for "individuals have to choose which part of Antunez's body to caress or punish and the degree of force to be used: one of the most popular tortures is an orthopaedic contraption that administers a blow to the buttocks."

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The Sword in the Stone

by Pat Choate

*"The call for free trade is as unavailing as the cry of a spoiled child for the moon.
It never has existed; it never will exist."*

—Henry Clay



**Opening America's Market: U.S.
Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776**
by Alfred E. Eckes
Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press;
382 pp., \$34.95



During the closing days of the 1993 congressional debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 300 of the nation's leading economists, including two Nobel Laureates, released a joint letter that urged the pact's immediate ratification. Subsequently, a reporter for a national radio network contacted 150 of these economists and asked them two simple questions: Why do you support this agreement? Have you read the 1,000-page agreement you endorsed? All answered that they supported free trade and open markets. Only one of the nine claimed to have read the NAFTA agreement.

Pat Choate is director of the Washington-based Manufacturing Policy Project. His most recent book is *Agents of Influence* (Alfred A. Knopf).

I doubt that few, if any, equally distinguished lawyers would endorse a contract without reviewing it, or that any reputable accountant would approve a company's books without first checking them. So, why would some of America's leading economists urge ratification of an economic pact that they had not even read? The answer, of course, is that most of them are doctrinaire free traders. So too are most of America's political and opinion elite. To label a prospective international agreement as free trade, regardless of what is in the pact, virtually guarantees an influential base of political support. Cant has replaced thought.

This unthinking support for free trade was not always so. Indeed, from George Washington's first message to Congress in 1790 until the early 1930's, American policy was to build a strong, self-sufficient economy behind a wall of protections for its producers and workers. In this lucid, well-researched book, *Opening America's Market: U.S. Foreign Trade Policy Since 1776*, Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., the Eminent Ohio Research Professor at Ohio University, traces how America evolved from the world's most closed market to its most open.

Much as in a novel, Eckes, a former

chairman of the United States International Trade Commission, traces this evolution from the 1790's to the present with dozens of heretofore little-known examples and facts which he found in presidential libraries and various archives. George Washington, for instance, having fought a war in which the nation lacked the manufacturing facilities needed to supply his army, used his first annual message to Congress to warn that the safety and interests of a free people "require that they should promote such manufactories as tend to render them independent of others for essential, particularly military supplies." To set a personal example for his countrymen, Washington bought American goods first. At a time when fashionable Americans wore European clothes, for example, Washington attended his first inauguration in a suit made in America from locally produced cloth. He served only American ale and American cheese in his home, and as head of the govern-

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ment, he bought American goods at every opportunity.

His idealistic successors, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, promoted free trade in their early years in office and experimented with trade sanctions against Great Britain to remove its mercantilist discriminations. Their reward was the War of 1812. The experience turned Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and their contemporaries into economic nationalists and led to what is known as the "American System." Under this policy, protective tariffs were imposed against foreign imports, not to tax consumers for the benefit of producers, but to stimulate investment in the United States and thereby enable the country to produce its own goods and provide jobs for the American people. This system was America's policy from the early 1800's until the early 1930's.

But as Eckes points out, the system was controversial. While Republicans preached and practiced a nationalist trade policy in the period 1860 to 1930, the Democrats vacillated between approval of free trade and protection for working people. Their problem was that free trade would break the power of the protected monopolies that financed the Republicans and would provide cheap consumer goods, something they wanted. The inflow of cheaper foreign goods, however, would also devastate their working class constituents, an outcome they had to avoid at all costs. For almost three-quarters of a century, the Republican position prevailed at the polls and in Congress.

Did the American System work? At the same moment that America was protectionist, Great Britain, America's great industrial rival, championed free trade. Using comparative economic data from both countries, Eckes concludes that there is no significant relationship between high tariffs and real economic growth. One fact is clear: the United States evolved from a small colony with limited manufacturing capacity to the mightiest industrial power in the world under protectionist policies. Eckes, however, refuses to give all the credit for this transformation to trade nationalism. He identifies a host of other contributory factors such as immigration, the development of a mass market, technology transfer, high rates of domestic capital formation, foreign investment, and a legal system that protects private property. But he also points out that for Americans

of that time "who could compare relative opportunities for individuals on both sides of the Atlantic, the American protective system appeared compatible with high wages, rising living standards, and rapid economic growth." He also notes that "during the heyday of British free trade from 1871 to 1890, about 68,000 Britons emigrated annually to the United States seeking better economic opportunities."

The election of Woodrow Wilson, who ran for office in 1912 on a platform of low tariffs and free trade, spelled the beginning of the end for the American System. Only days after being inaugurated, Wilson summoned Congress into a special session to enact tariff-reduction legislation. The result was the Underwood-Simmons Tariff Act of 1913. This legislation drastically reduced American tariffs unilaterally without getting, without even requesting, any lowering of foreign barriers to American exports. The result was lower American tariffs, but also a government with little leverage to confront foreign discrimination against American exports.

As soon as Wilson was succeeded in office by Warren Harding, the new President called upon Congress to enact emergency tariff legislation. It zoomed into law. As Eckes describes in useful detail, the Harding legislation tightly constrained the capacity of the United States to negotiate effectively a reduction in foreign trade barriers. The result was twofold: a coalition of Republicans and industrialists who wanted the reestablishment of 19th-century tariff patterns of the American System, and a counter coalition, led by Congressman Cordell Hull of Tennessee, advocating a new system of reciprocal tariff cuts, emphasizing exports.

Eventually, America got both. In 1930, Reed Smoot and Willis Hawley shepherded through Congress the Tariff Act of 1930—commonly known as Smoot-Hawley. In one of his most engaging chapters, Eckes effectively demolishes most of the "lessons" three generations of Americans have been taught about the Smoot-Hawley Act. No, he points out, it did not cause the stock market crash of 1929, which occurred nine months prior to enactment of this legislation. No, Smoot-Hawley did not induce fierce retaliation and trade wars, or a spiraling decline in American trade. No, Smoot-Hawley did not cost either Smoot or Hawley their offices in the

1932 election.

No one, of course, should be surprised to learn that the myths of Smoot-Hawley are still taught in most schools of economics and political science and believed by most politicians. Just as most believers in the Shroud of Turin are unlikely to acknowledge, let alone accept, any modern proofs to the contrary, neither are most free trade ideologues likely to surrender the "lessons of Smoot-Hawley," all of which stress free trade and international multilateralism regardless of the cost to domestic industries and workers. For all others, Eckes provides a convincing response.

The American System was finally doomed with the elections of 1933 and Franklin Roosevelt's appointment of Cordell Hull to be Secretary of State. Now all but forgotten, Hull had a profound influence on 20th-century America. A long-term Democratic member of Congress, Hull, for instance, drafted the constitutional amendment that created the income tax (tariffs could never be reduced until an alternative source of federal revenues was created). Most important, Hull also authored, championed, and first administered the Reciprocal Trade Acts of the Roosevelt administration. In the process, he single-handedly changed American history. Indeed, Eckes describes by example after example how the philosophy, policies, and coalitions behind most of America's trade positions today can be traced directly to Cordell Hull. It was Hull, for instance, who realized that America's negotiation of concessions granting foreign access for a favored few industries, notably automobiles and agriculture, would result in the formation of an export coalition that could provide strong political support for his policies and large political contributions for the Democratic Party. The coalition Hull created continues to dominate American trade policy and provides much of the money going to both parties. Another example is Hull's persuading Congress to delegate to the Executive Branch, and notably the State Department, its authority to negotiate the reduction of tariffs. More than 60 years later, the Executive Branch still negotiates American trade agreements and all tariff reductions on behalf of Congress. Once Hull had the delegated negotiating authority, he created an anonymous committee of bureaucrats drawn from the State Department, Agri-

culture, Treasury, Commerce, and other departments to coordinate the country's trade strategy and negotiations—the Committee on Trade Agreements (CTA). For more than two decades, the names of these members were a tightly held secret. Eckes, who has seen the list, reveals that most of them, like many appointees of the New Deal, were free-trade economic theorists recruited from academe. During the Roosevelt administration, they were turned loose to play with their economic theories.

Here Eckes hits his stride. According to one of the internal CTA memos he cites, the “primary objective” of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program was to “reduce trade barriers rather than drive a sharp bargain . . . and permit a greater increase in imports than in exports with a view to correcting the trade balance problem of the United States.” In short, the United States was willing to give more than it gave in trade negotiations. The goal was to increase imports and reduce its trade surplus with other nations. In one negotiation after another the State Department, largely unsupervised in its trade negotiations, made maximum concessions to other nations while getting minimum concessions in return. Equally significant, in the mid-1930's, the State Department extended trade concessions to all of its major trade partners, except Germany, despite that country's flagrant discrimination against American exports. Not surprisingly, the State Department in the same period soon began to use trade as an instrument of foreign policy. Eckes documents trade concessions made to Belgium, Switzerland, Britain, Canada, Turkey,

Argentina, and Venezuela, among dozens of other nations. The goal was to buy goodwill, even though each concession damaged some domestic American industry.

Hull retired in 1944, but his policies continued in the postwar period. The result of the Reciprocal Trade Acts, Eckes explains, was to transform the United States in less than 30 years from “an impregnable commercial fortress” into “the world's largest and most inviting target of commercial opportunity for foreign producers.”

In the post-World War II era, unbalanced concessions have been the norm in American trade negotiations. Eckes uses unpublished papers from the Truman Presidential Library to describe the first negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947. He describes how the United States wanted an agreement, regardless of how “thin” it might be. This is a less-than-desirable negotiating position. By contrast, Britain wanted American concessions for its textile and manufacturing industries, and also retention of its imperial preference system. The result was that Britain got its concessions, kept the preference system, and the United States got a thin agreement. This pact established both a pattern and an expectation of concessions from the United States in future trade agreements. In essence, trade became aid.

By the 1950's, the State Department had negotiated dozens of pacts. Yet, as Eckes documents, none was being monitored or enforced. He describes how in 1958 the Chamber of Commerce asked the State Department for an accounting of which countries had given concessions for American exports and which products were eligible, as well as the tariff levels for those exports. The State Department could not supply an answer, for they had not kept a list, let alone monitored the agreements they had negotiated.

In its negotiations with Japan during this period, Eckes describes how the State Department went an extra step. Using minutes from numerous negotiations, he reveals how the State Department provided several third-party nations with concessions in the American market in exchange for their acceptance of Japanese exports. Foreign policy, of course, was the reason. Eckes documents dozens of additional examples of

domestic industries being sacrificed for foreign policy objectives.

More than a third of *Opening America's Market* describes American trade policy making from 1960 until the present. It is a sad tale. The economist-advisors invariably seem to have been free trade ideologues with little experience outside the classroom. Invariably, the negotiators are politicians with little knowledge or experience in trade matters. Most become foreign lobbyists when they leave office. Agreements go unenforced, and when there was a surge of enforcement in the late 1980's, foreign interests successfully lobbied Congress to weaken American trade laws. Foreign producers have taken aggressive advantage of the situation. So have many domestic firms that have found the cheap labor and lax regulations of other nations too attractive to resist. The result is a hollowing out of America's manufacturing base, and a decline of American wages and living standards. One measure of this is that in 1970 only 10 percent of the manufactured goods consumed in the United States were imports. Today, 50 percent are. Another measure is the fact that in 1970 almost 24 percent of the American labor force was employed in manufacturing, but today less than 14 percent is. Viewed yet another way, virtually all of the 44 million net new American jobs created since 1970 were in industries immune to international competition, such as health care. Yet, most of the American jobs lost during this same period, such as those making capital goods, were subject to international competition.

The favored solution—or at least that approved by America's opinion and political elite—to this decline is for the United States to enter into still more free trade agreements. Thus, the United States became a member of NAFTA in 1993 and the World Trade Organization in 1994. Meanwhile, President Clinton has proposed American membership in several additional regional trade blocks (including one with our Asian rivals), the inclusion of 23 Caribbean nations and Chile into NAFTA, and perhaps a trans-Atlantic free trade pact with Europe. The discordant note in all these plans is that no politician or economist has yet to offer an alternative as lucid and compelling as that provided in the 1930's by Cordell Hull. Pulling that sword from the stone is one of the central economic challenges of our time.

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The Future Belongs To Us

by E. Christian Kopff

"Reaction is the consequence of a nation waking from its illusions."

—Benjamin Disraeli

Charles de Gaulle: Futurist of the Nation

by Régis Debray. Translated
by John Howe
London-New York: Verso;
111 pp., \$49.95



Anna Mirek-Wodecki

In the 1960's, when those of us who are now "of a certain age," as the old-fashioned French expression goes, were young, we used to talk about the Revolution. I remember one excited student at little Haverford College, on the Main Line outside of Philadelphia, saying that things had gotten so bad, it would soon be time to get our rifles and set out for the mountains to fight the government. "You're going to fight in the Poconos?" I asked. "No!" he exploded, "not the Poconos. The Rocky Mountains. We'll hide by day and strike by night." Many of those putative revolutionaries went on to graduate school, or law or medical school, and are now serving the United States government as bureaucrat, professor, or some other type of skill.

We used to talk, in those days, about Régis Debray, the young Frenchman who went from school in Paris to Cuba and fought with Ché Guevara in Bolivia. He was captured when Ché was killed in 1967, and French President Charles de Gaulle telegraphed the Bolivian authorities to ask them to spare his life. The government did so and, after some unpleasant years in prison, Debray returned to France, one of the few intellectuals of his time who had actually risked his life trying to rouse indigenous peoples to revolt. The experience changed him.

"I became a 'Gaullist'—the term is incorrect but appropriate—around May 1968 [at the time of the student protests that eventually led to de Gaulle's fall]. A bit late, you might think, but better late than never. . . . It was the Guarani Indi-

ans of the Chaco who recruited me, affiliated me to that discredited brotherhood; convinced me that what is immaterial about a nation, a culture or a memory may constitute the ultimate axis for historical action. The Indians of the Bolivian Chaco did not speak Marxist, but this (although regrettable) was not unexpected: the same had been true of the Chinese peasants in Yunnan 30 years earlier. The problem with this lot was that they did not even speak Spanish. Ché made speeches, gave them the word; they understood not a word, not a single blessed word." Their culture was too different. Debray had years in a Bolivian prison to ponder the lesson the Guarani Indians taught him. *La révolution mondiale n'est pas une patrie*. I can explain that sentence more easily than I can translate it. I think I know what it means: "What does it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his country?"

The World Revolution did not work. Proponents of "Global Democracy" and "Global Free Trade" will derive little consolation from Debray's conversion, because what did work, what turned out to be real, was the nation and the religious element that structures the nation. As he made clear to Jean Ziegler, a conventional leftist, in discussions on "France Culturelle":

Marxism and free trade liberalism are in my eyes almost the same thing. They are two sides of an illusion that belongs to the first industrial revolution . . . and which I call the 'Economist Illusion.' We thought the essence of History would be decided in the economy, in the production of material goods. In this sense Marx, Adam Smith, Ricardo seem to me variants of the same postulate which I believe false. . . . The Religious element . . . is not a passing factor. It is the structural basis of every human society, no matter how secularized. I believe that History has shut the book on that kind of Economism, and what was true for Communism will be true for Capitalism as well.

The great figure in recent history who saw that the nation is realer than the global economy or the world revolution was Charles de Gaulle. In this little book, Debray pays his belated respects to the man who took time out of a busy schedule to write on behalf of a French citizen locked up in a foreign jail, and stood for reality in a world grown frantic on hallucinations.

"We always sniggered at De Gaulle," at his pompous style ("Fécamp is a seaport and intends to remain so") but, more than that, at his anachronistic views. He walked out of NATO, offending his old ally, the United States, to build an independent atomic *force de frappe*. He went to Moscow and refused to recognize the German Democratic Republic. "Artificial creation. Won't last. Prussia, living entity. Will last. . . . The old boy just could not grasp the fact that Communism had altered the European set-up. He went on stubbornly talking about 'Russia' as if we were still in the time of the Czars. Well, yes: 'Soviet Union.' Artefact, interesting but transitory, superficial. Won't last. 'Russia,' serious entity, leathery, great people. Will endure." He was always embarrassing

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responsible conservatives and progressive socialists, as when he went to Canada and in a moment of enthusiasm, or visionary transport, cried out, “*Vive le Québec libre!*” “Hurray for free Québec!” They said he was senile, but he turned out to be right.

And he will be right in the future. (The title of Debray’s book in French is *A demain De Gaulle*.) “It is not lunatic to bet on the self-determination of peoples, but it is fanciful to attempt to make a mobilizing project out of a phony subject: the European Community, for example, which is being ‘constructed’ behind the backs of the people, between the lines of real life. A likable but artificial creation which (alas!) won’t last.”

“The problem is that the legislator of the future should have been seen in his lifetime as a ‘frozen mammoth,’ an albatross, an elderly bull in a china shop, while the mechanical model maker, the Meccano enthusiast, passes for a great humanist.” (There was Jean Monnet in de Gaulle’s time, and Jacques Delors today.) “Let’s speak clearly: de Gaulle saw and predicted what the Left neither saw nor predicted. . . . When a ‘reactionary’ is always first aboard the train of the future, while a ‘progressive’ regularly turns up panting as it steams away, there is something amiss with our categories.” “From 1945 to 1975 my guild professed as a scientific fact that class struggle was the motor of history, that the collapse of capitalism was inevitable, that the eventual appearance of something resembling socialism . . . was inherent in the structure of things. On discovering their error, most of them responded by espousing a new one with the same energy, application and trenchancy they had applied to the first . . . individualism is the predominant force of our time, Human Rights the motor of history and the development of Democracy inevitable. The lads are in for another disappointment.” (Don’t think that Debray reserves all his venom for his friends on the left. *En passant* he savagely attacks the French neocons, like Jean-François Revel and André Glucksmann.)

The real divisions of our age are not between right and left but between nations and the globalist delusion, and also between the rational word and the irrational image. Debray’s appreciation of de Gaulle and the nation is, in fact, a *parergon* in his work. His most important recent books make a brilliant trilogy,

not likely to be translated soon into English, which discusses how the centralizers and globalists use the irrational image to control people, to lead them into delusion and disaster and away from the nation and from the word.

Debray himself cannot always transcend the old categories. He did break ranks with his old leader, François Mitterand, whom he served as advisor during the 1980’s, to become the “brains of NO,” in opposition to the European Union and the Maastricht Treaty. He still believes in the left, however, and devotes the last chapter of the book to ways of making it relevant again. He admits, “I do not shop at *Le Figaro*,” although it was *Figaro*’s economics editor, Yves Mes-sarovitch, who got Sir James Goldsmith to put down his thoughts in *The Trap*, the most accessible antiglobalist book in recent years. He distinguishes carefully, but not convincingly, between “De Gaulle’s nation and Le Pen’s tribe.” Such minor inconsistencies, which undoubtedly helped get the book translated, cannot disguise the key to reality he gives us. Try it yourself. The Serbian people are a lasting reality; Yugoslavia was transitory, as are NATO and the U.N., whose blue-helmeted “peacekeepers” are the catspaw of America’s interventionist elite. Québec is a nation, an enduring reality held down by Canada, which is neither; Canada is, in the German phrase, an *Unding*. Peoples are real; a people with a religion and a shared history is a nation.

Is there a lesson here for the United States? Does our future belong to global interventionism (“gunboat humanitarianism”), global free trade, and open immigration, or shall We the People reclaim our traditional religion and reclaim our history and our literature? In *The Empires versus Europe* (1985), Debray wrote prophetically that intellectuals “forget that nations hibernate, but empires grow old . . . that the American nation will outlast the Atlantic Empire as the Russian nation will outlast the Soviet Empire. . . . Most of all they forget the law of diminishing returns of hegemony which has for 6,000 years progressively shrunk the longevity of empires, and bodes ill for their contemporary imitators. These same good technocrats confuse politics with economics, values with material goods, the autonomy of what is alive in a culture with the interdependence of markets and currencies, in a word, the primary with the secondary.”

Debray’s views have carried off this review and I have not mentioned that the book is beautifully and wittily written, well translated by John Howe. A few sentences, out of context: “Let us start by setting the facts aside and concentrating on serious matters—legends, for example.” “The hardest thing in politics, the thing that distinguishes the statesman from the politician, is to want the consequences of what you want.” “De Gaulle on the subject of his lost referendum: ‘What else could we do, these days? We had to choose democracy, so we had to have popular support.’ This relativization of democracy resembles a scandalous shrug of the shoulders, on the scale of the epoch we are saddled with. *Sub specie historiae* it is rigorously logical: the French people had governments *before* the storming of the Bastille. It will probably still have them *after* what we now understand by democracy, perhaps after the storming of the Fraternity arch at La Défense, in a couple of hundred years’ time.” That last remark may be hard to follow, if you don’t know Paris, but it made me laugh till I cried. (And I do not believe for a minute that it will take 200 years for the French to march on La Défense.) Its untranslatable Frenchness is typical of Debray’s thought. “How much longer are we going to confuse the love of thought with the love of general ideas, when intellectual work consists precisely of producing concrete, singular ideas which cannot be generalized?”

They can be appreciated, however, and applied with discretion and a feeling for diversity and nuance. It is striking that, of the books Americans should read this year, two—Goldsmith’s *The Trap* and Debray’s *Charles de Gaulle*—were written in French for French audiences. Despite Goldsmith’s moony mysticism and Debray’s sentimental leftism, these works speak to American readers and may help lead us from our sentimental attachment to the imperialist Churchill toward a rational affection for the nationalist de Gaulle, who was certainly right about a lot. He saw that France was more enduring than the victorious German armies in 1940, and Germany more so than the occupying forces of the United States and the former Soviet Union. Even his gaffes may turn out to have been inspired. We live in an age when we are told that we must all learn to give up our customs and our traditional ways of making a living to respond to the va-

garies of the global market and to the world's hungry mouths and empty hands, which are willing to work so hard for so very little. In such a world, it may

turn out that what de Gaulle had to say about a little port in Normandy was not a fatuity, but the fiery challenge of a prophet and a statesman. "Fécamp is a

sea-port and intends to remain so." To that, I can think of only one thing to add, *Vive le Québec libre!*

Testament

by Paul Lake

In this, my fortieth year of age,
I wake beneath a surf of sheet,
Stone sober, my mind a crumpled page,
My life a sentence, half complete;
Still mired in the old conceit
And lust for literary fame,
I stare down darkness, death, defeat—
(But is the candle worth the game?)

I think of Baudelaire's refrain—
"Get drunk!—on wine or poetry,
On virtue, hashish, crack cocaine—
But get drunk ceaselessly, or be
In moments of sobriety
Another martyred slave of time"—
And how on such authority
For twenty years, I binged on rhyme.

But now, in more prosaic days,
I see my life's been chiefly spent
(While others won the jobs, the bays)
In silence, exile, unemployment,
And third-rate jobs; my sole enjoyment,
Arranging words in borrowed rooms,
For which, to meet demands for rent,
I've sold possessions, hocked heirlooms—

In short, behaved like any addict
Who mortgaged future time to buy
(Instead of houses) one more crack
At fame, that last infirmity. . . .
I gambled all on poetry,
That swaybacked Pegasus, whose wings
Have been clipped by modernity
To Hallmark cards and *Elvis Sings!*

Ah God, had I instead pursued,
With such ambition, more degrees
Or shown a higher aptitude
For essaying in Theorese—
"(En)Gendering the Boundaries
Of Discourse: Gay's Transgressive Plays,"
Or "(De)Constructing Patriarchy's
Cruel, Objectifying Gaze"—

I'd teach at Yale—or Kansas State;
I'd spend my summers in Milan;
I'd edit, collate, annotate,
And publish work in *Raritan*.
I'd have a house, a minivan,

A Macintosh, and two grants pending.
Returning from the Caribbean,
I'd vow to cut back on my spending.

Too late for that. At forty, who
Can overthrow a lifetime's vices?
I'll spend my life in Timbuktu
Composing verse, although the price is
A bleak old age, enduring crisis,
And thoughts embittered by the knowledge
That cash alone is what suffices.
A name won't put my kids through college.

And so, like Crusoe on his isle,
I put the State of my Affairs
In writing—not as in a Will,
Since I am like to have few Heirs—
But setting Comforts against Cares,
And weighing Bad against the Good,
As Debtors do with Creditors,
To soothe my self as best I could:

*I am cast up in Russellville,
Void of all hope of Rescue.*

—Good:

But could be teaching in Brazil,
Or in a high crime neighborhood.

*I'm separated from the World
Of Letters, banished from humane
Society; alone; exiled.*

—But have the Mail, stamps, and a phone.

I have few Clothes to cover me.

—True, but nowhere else to go.

No talk

—But book clubs wonderfully
Supply the occasional bon-mot.

And so on . . . till, upon the whole,
I'm reconciled to my condition
As well, almost, as R. Crusoe—
Except my life is not a fiction.

What use to moan and beat my breast,
Curse fate, or slander my vocation,
Counting myself among the oppressed
Because I've reached no higher station?
I give a local habitation
To airy nothing, and a name
To shapes formed in imagination—
(But is the candle worth the game?)

Embarrassing Victory

by Justus D. Doenecke

Temptations of a Superpower

by Ronald Steel

Cambridge: Harvard University Press;

144 pp., \$18.95



"The other side lost, but did we win?" So asks Ronald Steel concerning America's foreign policy. Obviously the world long familiar to us has suddenly collapsed. "Of course there is a victory," writes Steel in reference to the United States' triumph in the Cold War. "But what do we do with it?" No stranger to such questions, Steel has long been a respected historian and commentator. Some of his books—*Pax Americana* (1967), *The End of the Alliance* (1994)—were clearly tracts for the times. His 1980 study of Walter Lippmann, however, remains a truly monumental work. Now, in the Joanna Jackson Goldman lectures at the Library of Congress, Steel warns against indiscriminate global commitments. "How does a superpower bring democracy to Haiti? How does it fight terrorists it cannot find?" The Cold War, Steel believes, was a most ambiguous victory. Though certainly the West is greatly relieved by the demise of the Soviet Union and the discrediting of communism, the United States cannot now translate its military might into political power. Suppose, Steel hypothesizes, American forces bomb Serbia or blockade Haiti. Ultimately, they would still be unable to impose American policy. As Dean Acheson once commented about the British, the United States had lost an empire without finding a new role to play.

In the contest with the Soviets, every area of the globe seemed vital—indeed a potential place of crisis. But now, with the contest over, Steel observes that the fundamental challenge facing the United

States is economic in nature, involving such powerful entities as the industrial megalith of Japan, the fiercely competitive trading states of Southeast Asia, and "the giant emporium" of a uniting Europe. These areas, writes Steel, do not want to "bury" capitalism; rather they are determined to "do it better" than the United States. Technology, finance, trade, innovation—this is the current game.

Yet the United States still envisions itself bearing responsibilities more appropriate to the Cold War at its height. It plans, notes Steel, to keep 100,000 troops in Europe in addition to maintaining permanent forces in Korea, Japan, and the Persian Gulf. The military budget of \$253 billion is 85 percent of the average Cold War budget, making it as large as that of the other nations in the world combined. Over half of all discretionary federal spending is devoted to defense. Indeed, during the presidential campaign of 1992, Bill Clinton pledged himself to build weapons systems that the Bush administration had tried to cut: the Seawolf submarine and the tilt-rotor V-22 plane. Speaking from the White House, Clinton said, "We do have to lead the world," though later he more modestly added that the United States cannot solve all international problems. When he terminated the ill-fated expedition in Somalia, he disguised it as a victory. Otherwise, the President explained, "Our own credibility with friends and allies would be damaged" and "our leadership in world affairs would be undermined."

Steel concedes that the world is more violent than ever, with its fresh regional wars, balances of power, coalitions, and spheres of influence. Indeed, we see such systematic political breakdowns that in some quarters there is the war of "all against all." Fortunately for the United States, however, militarily it has never been more secure. Citing former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney as his authority, Steel writes, "We are as near to being invulnerable as a nation can get." Neither Iran nor Iraq is a major power. South Korea is covered by a nuclear guarantee from threats by its northern neighbor. Europe is more secure from aggression than it has been for 60 years. For the foreseeable future, Russia is like-

ly to be a marginal player in European statescraft.

Steel questions America's ability to halt, even confine, today's bloodshed. On its own terms, military muscle-flexing is often counterproductive. Taking sides between China and Japan, or China and Russia, can alienate the other power. "Reassuring" trading partners by punishing "malefactors" can make them more anxious, as seen by the cautious reaction of South Korea and Japan when the United States confronted North Korea over its nuclear program. Furthermore, military might is just one component of national power, and the United States is discovering this fact the hard way. It certainly is no help in lowering Japanese trade barriers or taming the deficit. Moreover, as Steel observes, America needs the Europeans and Japanese to buy the Treasury bonds that finance its persistent deficit.

When it comes to international organization, Steel is skeptical. He finds NATO outmoded, unable to identify an enemy while costing \$100 billion a year. European alliances, he believes, must now be limited to Europeans. The United Nations is ineffective, in part because there is no international consensus on the rules of a post-Cold War world. If one truly believes that peace is indivisible throughout the world and that aggression anywhere threatens peace everywhere, collective security can simply escalate minor quarrels, making them regional, even global ones.

Steel is certainly not an isolationist of the stripe of Robert Taft or William Borah, and perhaps not even of J. William Fulbright, who in 1966 attacked America's "arrogance of power." Indeed, he is far more restrained than the Ronald Steel who, in the winter of 1972, claimed that Americans had been cruelly used by "political leaders who have squandered their wealth and stolen the lives of their children to fight imperial wars." Indeed, Steel asserts that at times there is a need for American intervention, as for example when the horror "undermines the foundations of Western civilization itself," as in the "genocidal madness" of Hitler's Germany, or when the United States can act quickly, as in the contemporary cases of Rwanda and Cambodia. As far as Bosnia goes, however, a direct

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American interest is lacking, and its intervention would be misunderstood. The United States, Steel writes, has "no responsibility to defend break-away states that unilaterally declare their independence." Certainly it must not lead any "global fire brigade."

There is one sense in which Steel has something in common with many isolationists; this concerns his claim that threats to American security are now internal. Americans suffer from a host of ills, ranging from illiteracy to violent crime. Not only is the United States falling behind its trading partners, but the gap between rich and poor at home grows steadily. Whole sections of our metropolises resemble those of the Third World. Steel writes, "Our country is hobbled by debt, weakened by fears for personal safety, and increasingly divided between the skilled and the unskilled, the jobholders and the unemployable." If American leaders do not look inward, predicts Steel, the public will repudiate them.

Justus D. Doenecke is a professor of history at New College of the University of South Florida. His latest book, written with John E. Wilz, is From Isolation to War, 1931-1941.

Parochial Formalism

by Gregory J. Sullivan

Hugo Black: A Biography
by Roger K. Newman
New York: Pantheon Books;
741 pp., \$30.00

Justice Hugo Black remains something of an anomaly in the history of the Supreme Court. A textualist who was contemptuous of the arbitrary mysticism of substantive due process, he nevertheless advocated the most extreme position on the issue of incorporating the Bill of Rights against the states through the 14th Amendment, a revolutionary doctrine that conflicted with the original understanding of that amendment. In other words, there is a little something for everyone in Black's legacy, which perhaps justifies Jeffrey Rosen's oxymoronic reference to Black in the *New Republic* as

a "liberal strict constructionist."

Roger Newman's biography is thoroughly researched in the exhaustive way that biographies are these days—any person at all connected with Black has been interviewed, and every scrap of paper examined. It is, however, occasionally obtuse, failing to illuminate the intellectual contradictions that marred Black's jurisprudence. (And it is completely unfair in its relentless attacks on Justice Felix Frankfurter.) Newman is very good on Black's membership in the Ku Klux Klan. Far from a nominal involvement with that organization, Black's was in fact an enthusiastic participation. ("Hugo could make the best anti-Catholic speech you ever heard," said one Klan member.)

Black was, of course, famous for his faith in what he viewed as the plain meaning of the Constitution. This faith was often misplaced, however. For example, Black's literalist, no-law-means-no-law approach to the First Amendment is impossible to reconcile with the history of that provision and unworkable within the context of its incorporation. Black's rigid view led him expressly to reject such necessary and historically sanctioned restraints on speech as defamation laws. This position was accurately characterized by Frankfurter as "doctrinaire absolutism."

To his credit, though, Black remained steadfast in his commitment to the text of the Constitution even in the face of the outrages of the Warren and Burger Courts. He was one of the few voices of restraint on a Court that was hell-bent on reading its own egalitarian preferences into law. Black, for instance,

scoffed at the notion that the death penalty violated the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment found in the Eighth Amendment. "And he would have been," says Newman, "the most vociferous opponent of *Roe v. Wade*, the Court's 1973 decision that due process permits the right to abortion. Black flatly opposed any constitutional recognition of such a right during conference in a 1971 case."

A proper view of the Constitution does not permit the use of natural law to decide a case. This position—which may be called constitutional positivism—is wholly consistent with a belief in natural law, and it hardly represents what Hadley Arkes intemperately condemns (in *The Return of George Sutherland: Restoring a Jurisprudence of Natural Rights*) as "indolence." That Black was a thoroughgoing positivist in the sense that he repudiated any idea of natural law is an indication of nothing more than his own intellectual parochialism. One can embrace natural law reasoning and hold that the proper arena for its use is the legislature. Indeed, under our Constitution, it is entirely necessary to adopt this position inasmuch as there is no authority for a jurist to reach outside the document and its historical context for his decisions.

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LIBERAL ARTS



POETIC JUSTICE

According to an article cited in the July 27 issue of *The Wanderer*, David Gunn, Jr., son of the murdered abortionist David Gunn, faces a lawsuit filed by two women who are upset that he received the 1993 Feminist of the Year Award, which is bestowed annually by the Feminist Majority Foundation. They allege that Mr. Gunn, who has become a national spokesman for feminism and the pro-choice movement, infected the two women with herpes and genital warts in the course of unprotected sex, never bothering to inform them that he carried these diseases. "I'm just really tired of him speaking for my gender when I know who he really is," said one of the women.

Letter From England

by *Jeremy Black*

Continental Drift



Both recent and longer-term history throw light on British distinctiveness within the European Community. It is apparent that enthusiasm for the EC, let alone a federal Europe, is limited in Britain, and that much of the history of political convergence over the last 40 years is to be sought in the calculations of particular politicians and political groups, rather than in any moves reflecting a popular groundswell. Like other modern "democratic" societies, Britain has a political system and culture that is only partially democratized, and more heed is paid to popular anxieties and xenophobia by the oft-derided popular press than by supposedly democratic politicians. This was true of the Heath ministry that negotiated British entry into the EC, and it has been true of "Euro-enthusiasts" ever since. Thus, the full implications of the potential federalism to which Britain was committed were not explained to the electorate; instead, there was a pragmatic stress on the apparent advantages of membership.

Yet, these were always less for Britain than for other states. The real source of British alienation from the EC is the fact that the British did not share the interests of other states in joining a multinational body of that type. The EEC was generated by particular interpretations of national interest on the Continent. France wanted the European Coal and Steel Community and the EEC to control Germany; she wished to control German independence so much that it was worth some loss of sovereignty to achieve this vital national aim, an aim which the British did not share to the same extent. Germany and Italy wanted the EEC to safeguard their democracies, again a need Britain did not share. In a Europe suffering from devastation, political dislocation, and international divisions stemming from the traumatic events of 1940, the EEC offered a means to create space for development. Britain only

sought to join when the EEC became a threat to her, and the same might be argued of the ERM.

In this light, British alienation is unsurprising and has become stronger as the EC has developed in more ambitious directions. Furthermore, as Britain only joined after the EEC system had been developed to suit interests other than her own, it is scarcely surprising that transition to membership was not easy. Institutions and policies in the framing of which Britain had played no part had to be accepted. As a state seeking membership, Britain negotiated from weakness. A previously cheap-food importing country had to accept the Common Agricultural Policy, with its high prices to the consumer and heavy burdens on the taxpayer. Once a member, successive British governments had only limited success in modifying community policies, a situation that does not augur well for the future and that has not made the EC popular.

It is particularly clear in the British case that the EC has failed to replace the nation-states of Western Europe as a focus for popular identity and thus loyalty. If this is a measure of its failure, it is also a cause of it. The central political problem in any community is the eliciting of consent. This is not simply a question of defining acceptable policies and selecting leaders who will be judged competent, but also reflects the nature of identification between people and government, which is a question of history, symbolism, and a sense of place and purpose. These in turn combine to produce an ideology that is more potent than the more intellectual and abstract creeds usually designated by that term. Despite all the talk of the failure and redundancy of the nation-state and its need for replacement by power-sharing, supranational bodies, and "Euro-regions," it is the nation-state that is most effective at eliciting and securing consent. It is no accident that Euro-federalism is endorsed most strongly in Belgium and Italy, where the nation-states are recent and weak.

Analysts of the British state who detect, indeed sometimes welcome, signs of weakness are most prone to argue the need for a different political framework. This thesis is most relevant to those who feel frustrated and thwarted by the

British state, most obviously nationalist movements in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. This process has been accentuated recently by the congruence of these developments: first, the longevity of Conservative government, which has led some opponents to become disenchanted with the current political situation; secondly, the deepening of the recession of the late 1980's and early 90's; and thirdly, particular problems affecting the monarchy and the Church of England. However, despite growth in the 1970's and 80's, the Scottish and, in particular, Welsh National Parties both remain minority bodies. In the most populous regions—South Wales and Strathclyde—Labour is a more successful representative of popular consciousness and sense of identity and interest. Thus, in Britain, a highly self-aware cultural nationalism and a strong sense of identity on the part of the Welsh and the Scots coexists with transnational political stability. Despite repeated sightings of the demise of the British nation-state, Great Britain has proved a stable transnational political community, which has subsumed other national identities.

Although some opponents of the Maastricht treaty may be self-confessed "Little Englanders," others can quite legitimately claim that they are in no way "anti-European," but simply want to see "Europe" developing along different lines from the ones envisaged by Delors and the "Euro-federalists." This was certainly the position of Mrs. Thatcher, who prided herself on the role that Western firmness played in freeing Eastern Europe from Soviet hegemony and communism; her vision of Europe was far from restricted to the EC.

Nevertheless, the misleading identification of Europe with the EC has had much impact: British politicians talked in the 1960's and 70's of "entering Europe," and in the 1980's Mrs. Thatcher's views on the EC led to her being presented as "anti-European." This view in which the quintessential definition of Europeaness is membership in the EC, and everything else is falling away, is intellectually dishonest.

Focusing on the difficulties confronting the attempt to create a plausible European public myth helps to explain some of the problems that any attempt

to displace the nation-state from its position in popular loyalties faces. A sense of place and continuity is crucial to the harmony of individuals and societies. It is challenged by the continued process of change, a process that entails the alteration, invention, and reinvention of traditions. Except in periods when there is a stress on the value of a break with the past, change is in large part acceptable to much of the population only if it does not disrupt their sense of continuity too seriously. The impact of disrupting this, by minor changes, such as altering coins and telephone kiosks, or by more sweeping social changes, such as the collapse of traditional shopping patterns and practices, or the enforced movement of people from condemned housing into modern projects that lack much of a sense of community, can cause much anxiety and irritation, and a more insidious loss of a sense of identity and community.

At this crucial level, the notion of European community is valuable if its institutional pretensions and prerogatives do not range too widely and are restricted by the preservation of a major role for the nation-state. Telling people and their elected representatives that, as they are Europeans, they must act, indeed think, in a certain fashion is unacceptable in a democratic society. In defending the configuration and continuity of British practices, politicians are not fighting for selfish national interests but for the sense of the living past that is such a vital component of a people's understanding, acceptance, and appreciation of their own society and identity.

Jeremy Black is a professor of history at the University of Durham.

Letter From Chile

by William Mills

The Attraction Offshore



With the government seizing at least half our incomes each year and the "multi-diversity" crowd sowing seeds of anger and disunity that could well lead to civil war down the road, I hear more and

more people talking of places to relocate themselves and their capital: New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland, and Costa Rica. And Chile. Chile? Isn't that where a kinder, gentler Socialist-Communist coalition elected Salvador Allende in 1970 and a brutal military coup took place in 1973? That's the only version I knew about back then, certainly the only version being discussed on college campuses. Thus it was surprising to listen to a Chilean friend recently who was in the United States to study English for a few months say a good word about Pinochet, the army general who governed the country from 1973 to 1989. At that time Pinochet stood for election, lost, and stepped down. Felipe, my Chilean friend, described the stability that had taken hold while Pinochet was in office. Inflation holding at around nine percent and an economy that no longer depended on a single industry, mining.

He also explained how the first major disruption of Chilean democracy had taken place. After all, virtually two-thirds of the people had voted *against* Allende in 1970. Due to a peculiarity of the Chilean Constitution, when one of the candidates does not gain a simple majority, the Congress decides. The Christian Democrats (similar to our own Democrats in many ways), who had come in third, cut a deal with the radical left, and the rest is history. Much was made of the demand that Allende sign "guarantees" that he would follow the constitution, guarantees which lasted a New York minute. By 1973, with the economy and the constitution in shambles, even the Christian Democrats were calling for a coup.

After my friend suggested I come and look for myself, and after, coincidentally, the editor of an investment newsletter announced he had moved to Santiago (his words, "You know it as well as I do: the America we grew up to know and trust is no longer the land of the free. That is why I had to leave."), I decided to go south. I wanted to meet some writers and artists, and since my wife couldn't go, the trip could serve as cover for fly-fishing Chile's famous trout streams, escaping the February snows of Missouri.

I was invited to dinner my very first night in Santiago by Felipe's English conversation teacher, Charley McCarthy, an American retired from the cruise ship business, and his Chilean wife, Marta. Over Pastel de Chocla and

good local red wine, we held a wide-ranging, marvelously civilized conversation, which included the other guests, Marta's brother, a neuro-radiologist and his educator wife. I mentioned wanting to talk with José Donoso, perhaps Chile's best-known novelist—well, the good doctor knew Donoso's brother, also a physician. He would try to make contact during the week. (I was never to succeed. Donoso had fallen very ill in Spain, and was being treated in a local clinic.) We talked, of course, of Neruda, and his fellow communist, Volodia Teitelboim, author of a biography of Neruda I had read before leaving home. Teitelboim, formerly the party leader in Chile, had until recently been passing his time in Russia, ever since Pinochet came to power. Another Stateside friend had written a letter of introduction to Jorge Edwards, also a well-known writer. Someone left our table to give him a call (everyone I met in Chile seemed to know the person you mentioned, or to know his cousin who did), returning to say Edwards was currently at the embassy in Paris. I called Nicanor Parra myself since I had met him earlier in the United States, and learned he was at the beach.

What I hadn't figured on was that everyone who could leave the city was gone until school started the first week in March. Well, when in Chile, do what the Chileans do; I drove south with Felipe the next day, and while he enjoyed the air in Pucón (some eight hundred kilometers to the south), I fly-fished the Trancura River. I was told by the guide that the fishing was even better around Coyhaique in the Aisen region (2,300 kilometers from Santiago). After dallying in Puerto Montt on the way south, I fished the fabulous streams around Coyhaique, the Simpson River and the Ñirehuao, the first surrounded by the towering Andes, the second on the edge of the pampas. All in all, like Colorado or Wyoming before Barbra Streisand started visiting. After several days at the end of the country in Patagonia around Punta Arenas and Puerto Natales (there's a hotel in the Paine National Forest at \$400 a day for a single, for those who are interested; I had an Austral beer at five dollars, the only one to be had for probably 75 miles), I flew back to Santiago, hoping the locals had returned, and they had . . . in spades. El Centro was jammed.

What's on the minds of Chileans? For one thing, they were upset with Pres-

ident Eduardo Frei for having pardoned the drug smuggler involved in the largest drug seizure in Chilean history (a half ton of cocaine from Bolivia, on its way to the United States). The smuggler's family is active in the party of the president, the Christian Democrats. The pardon was especially embarrassing since it occurred just as the government was kicking off its drug abuse campaign. The president was attacked not only by the two conservative parties, National Renovation and the Independent Democratic Union, but even by some elements of the Concertacion.

"Concertacion" designates the coalition made up of Christian Democrats and everyone else on the left, the Socialist Party (PS), the Party for Democracy, and the Radical Social Democratic Party. One Chilean described the Concertacion as a sack of cats, outwardly "in concert," but snarling and clawing inside.

During one week in February, Socialist Party President Camilo Escalona and Party for Democracy President Jorge Schaulsohn (perhaps the most important politician of the left) met with Fidel Castro in Cuba. Castro is an addiction for the left, and this visit was a way for

the leftists to thumb their noses at everyone else. This was the first official visit of a Chilean delegation since consular relations were restored during the Aylwin administration, the one preceding Frei's. All this occurred near the time when our loyal French "comrades," who invented nose-thumbing of anyone who might ever have pulled their *huevos* out of the fire, wine and dined the "great liberator" in Paris.

Another big domestic story was that of retired General Manuel Contreras, formerly head of the Chilean intelligence police (DINA). He was convicted by a lower court for his role in the 1976 assassination in Washington, D.C., of Allende's Foreign and Defense Minister Orlando Letelier, and the case is now before the Chilean Supreme Court. After being exiled by the Pinochet government, Letelier ended up in Washington, working as a fellow for the Institute for Policy Studies, one of our own centers of radical thought. At the same time, Letelier was given the task of coordinating exiles in the United States and was paid a thousand dollars a month by Beatriz "Tati" Allende, treasurer of the Socialist Party, who was living in Cuba. She was married to Luis Fernandez de Oña, a senior member of the Cuban Embassy. Previously, Fernandez de Oña had been the desk officer in Havana coordinating Ché Guevara's Bolivian activities. During Allende's government, she, along with Allende's mistress, generally decided who would see Allende and who wouldn't. Sometimes her husband would sit in for her in her absence. A year after the Letelier assassination, the Cuban press agency announced she had committed suicide.

Like anywhere else in the world, but especially in tightly knit Santiago, the good citizens gossip and guess what actually took place. In the opinion of some I talked to, Letelier was not only actively attempting to overthrow the Pinochet government, which he certainly would have confirmed, but he was in the pay of the Soviet-directed Cubans. During the trial in the United States of Townley (the American who had been involved in the assassination), a fellow prisoner of one of the other conspirators said he was told that Letelier was killed because he was a "double agent who had been educated at the Espionage College . . . by the CIA." Some Chileans also believe that for some reason Tati Allende was eliminated. Her husband had abandoned her

by then. Those on the left would hotly deny this, of course.

A mysterious woman indirectly involved in the assassination effort was at first only known to be blond, and very attractive. To aid my effort to meet artists in Chile, I was put in touch with Nena Ossa, former director of the National Museum of Fine Arts for 12 years. She graciously took me to meet Benjamin Lira, one of Chile's outstanding contemporary painters. In the course of our trip to his studio, she told me that a magazine editor had erroneously speculated that she was the mysterious woman involved in the Letelier affair, and this error had cost her several friends. At the time, even the alias of the actual woman, Liliana Walker, was not known. By the time her name was known, two of Nena Ossa's former friends had died without ever learning the truth. As she reminisced about the Allende years, she remarked that she had been in London when an old school friend worked in the Allende government's press agency. Her friend permitted her to read all the incoming and outgoing cable traffic between Santiago and London. Ms. Ossa said she in turn passed on any interesting information to William Buckley and *National Review*, for which she sometimes wrote. So only the tiniest bit of espionage.

With these fragments of Chile's time of troubles as prologue, I stood before Lira's solitary, meditative nudes. The effect of these single figures is quietly to arrest the viewer's attention, whereupon he is led to meditate himself. Because of the texture of the surfaces, portions of which may have been removed to reveal an earlier surface in the way of old frescoes, one feels as if he has accidentally entered a room of a newly discovered Pompeii. And as our habit is to try to illuminate our present by looking at our past, the viewer is driven to scrutinize each of these human figures for some human essence, or if one will have no talk of essences, for some new perspective on this curious caravan through time we call man. Sniffing some narrative spore, I comment on some subject possibilities while tracking, but Lira gently dismisses any such intent. How unsettling to have the artist at hand with me champing to veer off on my own painting. Yet I confront human faces often with no mouths, faces locked in with helmet-like visors of medieval armor. Then the more recent work where the faces

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now can speak if they wish. I keep my stubborn analogy to myself, but for me there remains some subterranean part of the Chilean soul in this, an opening up, an emergence from the time of troubles.

Are Chile's troubles over? Of course not; nobody's troubles are ever going to be over. But 22 years after Allende and the Marxists departed and six years after Pinochet gave up the leadership, life seems reasonably buoyant. Obviously, most Chileans don't live like those in the suburbs of Santiago, Providencia, and Las Leonas, for example. Given that comparison, most people in the States don't live like those in Beverly Hills (and are glad of it). Yet, even in remote southern farm towns like Coyhaique, there is a bustling, healthy rhythm. Far out on the perimeter of Santiago, rampant new business construction is much in evidence.

The "underclass" of Chile is proportionally larger than in the States, but the politics of class envy are as prevalent as they are here at home. Further, the awareness of this difference in class seems to be a dominant theme or background for much of Chilean fiction and theater. Certainly this is true of Donoso's fiction; I'm thinking of *Coronation* and *This Sunday*. Carola Oyarzún, of Catholic University and a critic for *El Mercurio*, assures me this is also true in the theater. Egon Wolff is a case in point. In plays like *The Invaders*, or *Paper Flowers*, the street hustlers invade and take over the homes of the well-off, sort of like Lenny Bernstein having an "at home" for the Black Panthers. As a matter of fact, the balance is so tipped as to reduce the middle class to a stereotype: meaningless, anxious lives filled only with material things and unhappiness. The beggars and street hustlers are always very clever, witty, energetic, and self-assured.

Wolff is in his 70's, whereas Marco Antonio de la Parra is a younger playwright, at one time part of a group called the "New Generation." His theater is much different from Wolff's realism, filled instead with ghosts and grotesque fantasy. Yet, even here, as in *Every Young Woman's Desire*, the smart lower-class thief invades a middle-class woman's apartment and transforms a mousy, repressed young woman into a vamp who ultimately kills him. The dynamics of Parra's work are more complex perhaps than Wolff's, but the tumultuous, threatening social upheaval is always in

the background.

Another member of the New Generation, Pablo Huneeus, is Chile's leading social critic. Like Parra (who is trained as a psychotherapist), Huneeus has another profession besides writing, namely sociology. Trained at the Sorbonne, he was a professor at Catholic University when in 1983 he was dismissed, charged with "inappropriate research" for writing the antinuclear book *Lo Impensable* (The Unthinkable). The university was under direct control of the military. Earlier, in 1980, he was fired from his weekly column in the Santiago daily *La Tercera* for being critical of Pinochet, and a collection of his essays was temporarily banned by the government. While we sat on the deck of his beautiful mountainside home overlooking Santiago, he remarked that the role of social critic was actually clearer then than now. "Everyone knew who the enemy was then; now that 'the good guys' are in power, we are just supposed to be quiet." He was equally critical of the Allende government in the early 1970's.


On my last day, I met with Mario Arnello, a lawyer who has lived close to the main currents of Chilean political life for many years. He was a member of the former National Party, founded in 1966 of the Conservative and Liberal parties, and followers of the conservative Jorge Prat. In the last two big elections of the 60's, the Nationals had joined with the Christian Democrats to win big. As I said earlier, the trouble started in the 1970 election. The Christian Democrats nominated a candidate when the Nationals considered not much better than Allende. Mr. Arnello, teacher and also poet (he has written a book-length poem, *Pedro de Valdivia*, An Epic of the Foundation of Chile), told me that the history of the Allende debacle could be traced to its step-by-step destruction of the country's democratic institutions. Allende had never intended to live up to the "Statute of Guarantees" that he signed as the price for Christian Democrat support. Further, the Christian Democrats had never demanded that Allende agree to the right of property.

Mr. Arnello had invited Senator Francisco Prat to join us, and he came later to our little session. Senator Prat, a tall, handsome man with brilliant blue eyes, represents the IX Region of Araucania, with its capital in Temuco. His great-grandfather was Arturo Prat, the Chilean naval hero whose martyrdom

during the War of the Pacific is remembered on May 21 as Navy Day. Senator Prat claims to occupy a little "island" in the National Renovation Party. His position is, as I understand it, to come together with those of similar beliefs in the country outside the party as well as in, and not focus on strategies that will keep the RN members in the "Club," the political and business leaders who govern Chile regardless of party membership. When asked the biggest problem facing Chile today, he said it was unemployment. Unlike the United States, where many of the "unemployed" wouldn't work even if offered a chair at Harvard, the unemployed here do want work, better work, and are very industrious.

The dynamics of Chile and the States are different, but Chile is moving upward and onward. Southern Chile and the entire Pacific coast are absolutely gorgeous, giving our own Rockies and coast a run for their money; the people are vital, vivacious, friendly; and if you try out the language, you will not get a sneer as you might from the Frogs on the other side of the Channel. Go see for yourself. As the end here comes closer and you wish to move your assets "off-shore," Chile might just be an answer. Be sure to bring your fly rod.

William Mills is a novelist and poet whose latest work of fiction is Properties of Blood (University of Arkansas Press).



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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Singing the U.N. Blues

by Gary L. Bauer and
Robert L. Maginnis

The operational philosophy and military role of the United Nations have radically changed. In the U.N.'s first five years it launched only two peacekeeping missions, but since the fall of the Soviet Union the U.N. has mounted 19 operations involving more than 70,000 blue-helmeted soldiers. Last year these operations cost \$3.6 billion. The United States was assessed \$1.2 billion, and the Clinton administration spent another \$1.7 billion for American military participation in U.N. missions. Today, thousands of American soldiers wear U.N.-blue helmets in ten countries ranging from Haiti to Lebanon to the former Yugoslav republics. Indeed, the U.N. has experienced a renaissance with the unexpected fall of the Soviet Union, rising from near impotence in the early 1980's to worldwide peacemaker in 1995.

Harvard fellow Ronnie Dugger has called for the creation of a United Nations military force composed of volunteer peacekeepers financed by global citizen-members who pay dues and carry citizen cards. If that doesn't fly, Dugger told *New York Times* readers in June, perhaps nongovernmental organizations like Greenpeace could become citizen-members of their own international agency and elect a world parliament to pass and enforce laws through a voluntary military force.

Franklin D. Roosevelt envisioned the U.N. as an organization dealing with traditional interstate aggression rather than the type of internal conflicts that now dominate its agenda. But the 50-year-old organization is adapting to the "New World Order." That change is echoed by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros

Boutros-Ghali, who has issued *An Agenda for Peace* suggesting a greatly expanded U.N. peacemaking role. He endorses the principle of "universal" sovereignty: "Underlying the rights of the individual and the rights of peoples is a dimension of universal sovereignty that resides in all humanity and provides all peoples with legitimate involvement in issues affecting the world as a whole." He has used this concept to sanction U.N. efforts in Somalia: "The magnitude of the human tragedy constitutes a threat to international peace and security." This justified the world body's intervention in the sovereign affairs of a nation-state without invitation. The same happened in Iraq after the Gulf War.

The 1990 invasion of Kuwait posed a classic situation for the U.N., a case of aggression in which the armies of one state crossed international borders to invade another. Desert Shield/Storm was a successful international effort to expel the invaders and restore the sovereignty of Kuwait. The U.N.-sanctioned follow-up incursion into northern Iraq to protect the Kurds (Operation Provide Comfort) in 1991, however, was the first time the Security Council had authorized the use of force to address strictly internal affairs of a member state. Thus began a dangerous new era for U.N. "peacemaking."

"Loose constructions of the U.N. Charter believe the existence of such problems justifies expanding U.N. jurisdictions to deal with them," says former American ambassador to the U.N. Jeane Kirkpatrick, who warns, "We are slipping into practices which enhance only the power of the strongest. Is this what we want to do? Someone had better think through this question—and soon." But Boutros-Ghali awards supremacy of rights to individuals and groups within countries. He argues that "the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer stands." Outside forces, then, do have a right to trump national sovereignty.

The U.N.'s "right" to intervene in the sovereign affairs of a country leaves all member countries, including the United States, vulnerable to having their own sovereign territory compromised. For example, the next time Korean-Americans bear the brunt of a Los Angeles riot, the South Korean government could ask the

U.N. to intervene to protect its citizens' rights. It couldn't happen now because the United States would veto the move procedurally and militarily. But it could happen in the future, especially if the U.N. has a standing military governed by a liberal world community.

There is no shortage of potential Bosnia-like situations on the horizon. The conscious choices that the international community makes about these situations will decide the new order. We can only hope that the U.N. will avoid the temptation to resolve these problems with the sword.

Meanwhile, the U.N.'s military focus has been growing. The U.N. Department of Peacekeeping has expanded from a staff of 23 to more than 350 with a modern situation center, staffed 24 hours a day, linked electronically to all U.N. hot spots. It has a standby system to tap troops and equipment from 185 member nations and has established a base in Italy to stockpile equipment, such as armored personnel carriers, for rapid deployment to peacekeeping missions.

There have been calls for a standing U.N. army. Former French President François Mitterrand endorsed the creation of a "U.N. Legion." This brigade-size unit of thousands would be available for immediate deployment when the Security Council authorizes military action. The legion has been discussed at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, where representatives from various American government agencies met with U.N. representatives in 1993 and 1994. Anticipating future trends, the U.S. Army recently published a field manual entitled "Peace Operations" outlining relationships with the U.N. and including extracts from the U.N. Charter.

Last year the Clinton administration issued Presidential Decision Directive 25 on reforming multilateral peacekeeping operations. This was supposed to make them more selective and effective. The directive claims, "The U.S. does not support a standing U.N. Army, nor will we earmark specific U.S. military units for participation in U.N. operations." Despite this assurance, White House Press Secretary Michael McCurry said President Clinton supports America's contin-

ued U.N. involvement, and Madeleine K. Albright, America's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, told Congress, "The Clinton Administration believes very deeply in the potential of the U.N. system."

The Clinton administration praises the U.N.'s radical transformation, but many Americans don't share the optimism. Presidential hopeful Senator Bob Dole said, "It is high time we rein in U.N. peacekeeping, which is out of control." Senator Jesse Helms called the U.N. "the nemesis of millions of Americans."

We must heed the warning signs. History teaches that the acquisition of military power traditionally has been the first step toward establishing governance over a territory. Coupling the U.N.'s changing military strength with the new operational philosophy favoring individual over state sovereignty sends a warning flare that no liberty-loving people can afford to ignore.

Gary L. Bauer is the president of the Family Research Council and former President Reagan's domestic advisor. Robert L. Maginnis is a retired Army lieutenant colonel and a policy analyst with the Family Research Council.

Are Allies Necessary?

by Edward A. Olsen

The United States today has numerous allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East whom Americans are committed to defend. Despite the end of the Cold War, Americans are regaled at home and abroad with rationales for reinvigorating alliances that skeptics question in the new era. In essence, we are admonished by advocates of the alliances to shun "isolationism" and strengthen international ties that will preserve peace. This message seems reassuring, but on closer analysis there is a major flaw—why do Americans need allies if we have no credible enemy?

If the post-Cold War era has any defining characteristic for the United States, it is the clear lack of an adversary capable of a major, sustained assault on the country. We are not in danger of being overrun by a foreign enemy. Nor is one of that magnitude likely to emerge

any time soon. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union might have been able to inflict such an attack. Hence, it made sense for Americans to form alliances with an array of countries. They were unlikely to help defend the United States from a direct attack, but their shared vulnerability to assault by the Soviet Union, or by a proxy state, provided a sense of unity in a common mission that helped to preserve American security by diffusing the threat.

Today, however, that linkage has completely dissipated. America's current alliances with other countries are intended totally to deter attacks *on them* or to fight *their* wars should deterrence fail. The countries that might attack our allies, or militarily endanger their well-being, are not capable of inflicting such damage on the United States. This circumstance raises two possibilities for Americans. We can either choose to retain our current alliances or we can consider a form of security independent of a network of unnecessary allies. If we retain our existing alliances in Europe and Asia, we can do so using the same stale rhetoric that is anachronistic in post-Cold War circumstances or we can devise new candid rationales for helping selected countries that want the United States to subsidize their national security. This would require a profound redefinition of the notion of "ally." Of course, either choice is likely to be subjected to popular skepticism sooner or later due to the financial costs of the alliances or to Americans' unwillingness to wage war to defend an ally's interests.

For example, within NATO, the United States could create new justifications for keeping a lid on inter-European tensions, but Washington would be compelled to do so from a European vantage point that would effectively stress the quasi-European identity of the United States. In short, Americans would be defending Europeans as *de facto* Europeans. Americans also would require new justifications for expending tax dollars for the security of a continent that is not presently endangered by a potent force and—if it were again endangered—could afford to pay fully for its own defenses but which prefers to keep Americans engaged to dilute the costs and spread the risk. Clearly such a rationale could be created, but would it be plausible to already hard-pressed American taxpayers who would be asked to send their sons and daughters to help de-

fend Europe in perpetuity?

A case for Asia would be equally tenuous. Without the legacy of a regional security network like NATO, it is doubly difficult to make a case for the United States possessing an Asia-Pacific identity that it can defend on behalf of bilateral allies such as Japan and South Korea. This argument is made, but not very persuasively. These two countries do face a genuine threat from North Korea and its nuclear capabilities. In these terms, the region still echoes the Cold War. However, the handwriting is on the wall for that finite threat, and once it is resolved in the foreseeable future, this regional version of the Cold War will also pass fully into history. Barring the perception of a Chinese threat or the acceptance of perennial Japanese-Korean enmity as sufficient reason for perpetuating alliances in the Far East, the United States would have to stretch considerably the definition of "ally" to justify an indefinite commitment to Asian security without an Asian adversary that could directly threaten the United States. The most cogent argument is that the United States could be a stabilizing presence in an unstable area, because Americans are less objectionable in that role than any other Asia-Pacific power. While this may be as logical from an Asian perspective as the counterpart "lid" argument is in Europe, it will be a hard sell in this country.

Were the United States to shed its unnecessary allies, what is likely to happen? Clearly we would be in no greater danger of an attack than we are today. In fact, the United States would face a greatly reduced risk of war. Virtually all the contemporary warfare contingencies contemplated by the American military establishment are predicated on the United States meeting a commitment to any ally or a regional security pact. Furthermore, without allies the United States would be rid of peacetime pressures to maintain our strategic credibility in their eyes, which permits allies to manipulate American public opinion and policy. In post-Cold War circumstances, there is no reason to endanger American credibility in defense of other countries' interests. This has been graphically illustrated during the Bosnian crisis, where clear American interests are virtually impossible to discern. Nonetheless, great pressures have been exerted on Americans to stand by our NATO allies or our U.N. allies for an ill-defined cause.

When Americans express their doubts and reservations about engaging military forces in a highly questionable venture, they are routinely reproached at home and abroad for jeopardizing their country's credibility as a world leader and shirking global responsibilities. However, if we do not need the allies as much as they manifestly need us, why should Americans hobble their economic national interests for the sake of allies' strategic interests?

Without allies, Americans also would enjoy far more flexibility when using diplomatic tools. For example, Washington's periodic attempts to use tough-minded trade leverage on European or Asian competitors in defense of America's national interests are routinely constrained by advice not to do anything that could exacerbate tensions in our alliances, much less jeopardize their existence. This has been repeatedly demonstrated in America's relationship with Japan, where virtually all attempts by American officials and policy advocates to push for a tougher trade posture characterized by economic nationalism are denounced for jeopardizing security relations between the two countries. Even though the primacy of America's economic relations with Asia is widely recognized today, and extolled by many, American policy options vis-à-vis Japan remain constrained by Cold War-vintage attitudes about not offending an ally's sensibilities. Why not enjoy the competitive economic advantages likely to accrue for the United States as present-day allies are compelled to cope with the added costs of national defense created by American withdrawal of the strategic subsidy to which they have grown accustomed?

Dispensing with formal allies would not mean the United States would be embracing isolationism, as is routinely alleged. The United States could be as unilaterally engaged in world affairs as it chooses to be. This includes a full range of international economic engagement (trade, aid, and investment), participation in global and regional international organizations, unilateral military actions abroad that serve America's interests, humanitarian activities, and the freedom to participate in any temporary strategic coalitions that, again, serve American interests. The United States would not, however, be wedded to any other countries' national interests.

None of this would constitute "isola-

tionism." Clearly there are direct dangers to the United States posed by terrorism, nuclear proliferation, international crime, the drug trade, and other issues. It is also possible that some day a new external threat comparable to the former Soviet Union might materialize in Asia, Europe, or the Middle East. Americans require a strong unilateral defense capability, must possess solid intelligence capabilities, and need to prepare for such contingencies. The point is that the United States *today* does not need our existing allies to meet these challenges. Americans can cooperate with a diverse spectrum of countries on such issues without incurring the obligations of formal alliances. If at any point in the future it becomes desirable to ally formally with one or more countries against a major new threat, that option would remain open. In the meantime, however, it is far wiser to declare autonomy and seek strength through sovereignty without the encumbrance of entangling alliances.

It is clear that existing allies in Europe and Asia cannot be unceremoniously dumped. It would be prudent to phase in the new policy on an incremental basis so that existing allies are not left in the lurch. Both sides in existing alliances would require a period of transitional adjustment. Moreover, it is entirely possible, perhaps likely in a few instances, that the United States would want to replace existing alliances with coalitions—aimed at specific situations—in which the coalition partners would pursue explicit interests that overlap for a finite period. Such coalitions would not be alliances as we now know them and would represent a far more equitable approach to the post-Cold War world.

Edward A. Olsen is a professor of Asian Studies in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed are his alone.

Is War Unavoidable?

by Ernest van den Haag

Currently wars are being fought in the Balkans, in Russia, in Southeast Asia, and in various parts of Africa, but they involve relatively few people. De-

spite these wars, we live in reasonably peaceful times, and no threat of a major war appears on the horizon. Yet, although we don't know when war will break out next or where, we do know that war is unavoidable. Not because human nature requires it. Nature makes it possible, but it is the organization of the world that makes war unavoidable, and that in turn is not avoidable.

The world has always been and still is divided into countries of various size and power. Each has an independent (sovereign) government. Hugo Grotius defined sovereignty in the 16th century as *potesta legibus absoluta*—power independent of law. Sovereignty of course existed before the word did. Governments are powerholders and lawgivers. They cannot be bound by any law except what they choose themselves to create and (spottily) observe. If they disregard their own laws they cannot be compelled to obey them. Nor can governments be effectively bound by laws other than their own or even by treaties and rules they may choose to subscribe to at any moment.

The many independent governments that run the world have divergent interests, real or imagined, material or moral. They independently pursue these interests that may be in conflict with the interests of other governments. Usually such conflicts can be settled by negotiations; but not always. Whenever a government feels unable to pursue or protect through negotiations what it perceives as its vital interests, when it calculates that it can win a test of force, it will risk and bear the costs of war to achieve its goals. Governments do not go to war lightly; yet there is nothing to prevent them except their own calculations of costs, benefits, and risks. If the outcome is a foregone conclusion, wars won't occur: nobody fights if defeat is certain. But if each prospective belligerent believes that victory is in its grasp and that the benefits are worth the costs and risks, war is likely. Fortunately, most of the time conditions conducive to war can be avoided, mostly by making war unrewarding. Still, in the long run, conflicts and, ultimately, war are as certain as death is for individuals.

The ineluctability of war need not discourage us from trying to postpone it as we try to postpone death. Physicians and hospitals do their best to increase the lifespan of individuals. Reasonable persons are not angry at them for merely

postponing rather than altogether avoiding death; nor should we be angry at governments or diplomats for merely postponing war. The parallel may be extended: occasionally small wars are prophylactic and avert bigger ones, just as surgery may postpone life-threatening developments. World War II might have been avoided had the Allies intervened when Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland. Some argue that the Persian Gulf War prevented a bigger war that would have occurred had Iraq been permitted to conquer its neighbors.

Couldn't conflicts among sovereign nations be settled by adjudication when negotiations are unsuccessful? Not really. Conflicts among citizens of any nation are settled peacefully by adjudication. Violence is avoided because each country has laws and courts that settle conflicts, as well as police and military forces that enforce the verdicts of the courts. The legitimate use of violence is monopolized by the government. Individuals are not allowed to use force and are actually prevented from doing so by the threat of the overwhelming power of the government. A reasonably efficient government is stronger by far than any individuals or small groups and can, therefore, deter the use of force by most individuals most of the time as well as violent attempts to overthrow it.

The conditions that prevent non-governmental use of force domestically do not exist in international relations. International law is not effectively binding on sovereign nations. Each nation proclaims adherence to international law but interprets the law as it wishes. The international court of justice in the Hague has but nonbinding jurisdiction; parties appear voluntarily; verdicts not voluntarily complied with are unenforceable. There are other international organizations that attempt to banish war and sometimes are useful in postponing it. But this tends to obscure more than to change the essential situation: nations have the right—more importantly, they retain the power—to go to war, however much they subscribe to treaties renouncing it.

Organizations such as the United Nations are meant to outlaw and prevent war. They do the former but not the latter. Whether one looks back at the Korean War, the Persian Gulf War, or U.N. actions in Somalia (and the rest of Africa), the best that can be said is that the organization occasionally has been

helpful in preventing more violence than actually occurred. However, the U.N. cannot avoid war when the divergent interests of its members impel them to use force. The U.N. has no independent will, or judicial or police powers. It can enforce the will of some members only when it is lent military force by these members. And when the members themselves use force, they can do so with or without the U.N.'s blessing.

Optimists believe that a world government could avoid war. Not so. To begin with, it is unlikely that the Chinese, the Russians, the Japanese, or even the English and the French would be willing to surrender their sovereignty, i.e., their power to make war or to defend themselves. But let that go. Suppose they did. Experience is showing currently that territories united under one government but including different nationalities tend to fall apart as soon as they are no longer compelled to stay together. Furthermore, the American Civil War teaches that different nationalities are not necessary to bring about a civil war within a nation previously united. And as the former Yugoslavia shows, newly independent nations may engage in war with each other about the size of the respective national territories. After the Soviet Empire fell apart, there was and still is unrest and violence not only among the nationalities previously governed from Moscow but also within the Russian territory that remained. Many of the more than 100 nationalities included within Russia are striving for independence.

If there were a world government, international wars would be replaced by civil wars. The change of label would not reduce the frequency of war, or the suffering of peoples. On the contrary: civil wars tend to be particularly vicious, as those in Spain or the former Yugoslavia show.

One must conclude that the essential situation permits us to postpone, even to avoid, specific wars but not ultimately to avoid war. We should concentrate on avoiding specific wars as we avoid specific illnesses, without expecting to live forever, or wasting time and resources on attempts to banish war or death altogether.

Ernest van den Haag writes from New York City. New editions of his Punishing Criminals and The Jewish Mystique are forthcoming from the University Press of America.

POLITICS

Lessons From France

by E. Christian Kopff

On the French nightly news for Monday, June 12, the anchor's face was so grim that, at first, I thought the French forces in Bosnia had suffered serious losses. But, no, he was reporting on the French municipal elections, the first round of voting for mayors of cities with populations of 30,000 or more. The recent presidential victory of Gaullist Jacques Chirac had not led to the collapse of the Socialist Party. Instead, initial results showed that the National Front was now a permanent part of the political scene. That was the bad news.

Founded in 1972 by French nationalist Jean-Marie Le Pen, the National Front (FN) had taken off in the 80's, aided by its opposition to North African immigration, permanent mass unemployment resulting from France's commitment to global free trade, and the corruption of the Socialist regime of President François Mitterrand. Mitterrand gave the FN a boost when he halved the percentage of the vote needed to send representatives to the French Parliament from 20 percent to 10 percent, expecting to split the French right. Instead, the Communist Party went from its traditional 20 percent of the vote to about 10 percent, while the National Front rose to 10 percent. Political analysts assured us that it was hasty to assume that half the communist working-class vote went over to the National Front. That is, however, what happened.

Mitterrand continued to play the Le Pen card cynically against the traditional rightist coalition, but responsible conservatives and socialists were not concerned. France had seen periodical outbursts of nationalist "fever" before, such as the Poujadists of the 1950's, as America and England had seen the bright flares of Joe McCarthy and Enoch Powell rise, lighten the sky, and then sputter out and fall harmlessly to the ground. Such movements rarely attracted more than

10 percent of the vote in France, and the more fiercely the fever burned, the sooner the temperature returned to the levels favored by representatives of international cooperation and world trade. The National Front has now seen nearly 25 years of steady growth. This year's presidential vote (in two stages) followed in short order by the municipal elections (also in two stages) confirmed its appeal.

The presidential elections were supposed to be between two Gaullists, the mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, and Prime Minister Eduard Balladur. The Socialists, in despair, held a kind of American-style primary, out of which emerged Lionel Jospin, best known as the Minister of Education who approved the right of Islamic girls to wear their veils in France's secular public schools. The polls indicated that Le Pen would be lucky to get 10 percent of the vote. The first round was a shocker. Jospin won 22 percent, edging out Chirac, whose 20 percent beat Balladur's 18 percent. Le Pen's 15 percent was only a few million votes away from each of the Gaullist candidates. If the polls had not misled voters, Le Pen might well have won the several million votes he needed to make it into the second round, where Chirac ended up beating Jospin. There was an exceptionally high number of abstentions and wasted ballots.

The municipal elections were expected to confirm rightist control of the country, since the right held a large majority in the parliament. Instead, there were few clear-cut victories in the first round, and in many cities the National Front won from 25 to 40 percent of the vote. The Socialists called for a "democratic front," where they would yield to Gaullist candidates who were in the best position to beat the Front, if the traditional right would withdraw in cities where Socialists were ahead. Chirac preferred to leave the country for the G-7 meeting in Canada without approving any such agreement, which would have won a number of cities at the cost of proving Le Pen's point, that the major parties are a conspiracy against the French people. The Socialists joined forces with their old allies, the Communists, to defeat the Front and were successful in a number of northern cities, but the FN won outright in three southern cities, including the port of Toulon, and a Le Pen fellow traveler became mayor of Nice.

The precise details of the votes are less

important than their strategic significance. The attempts of the past two decades to demonize the National Front have been a resounding failure. "In Tourcoing, if you put an FN sign on an ass's neck, he'll take 30 percent of the vote." That wisecrack is true of many French cities, north and south. Between the presidential elections of 1988 and 1995, Le Pen's share of the working class vote rose from 18 to 27 percent, while the Socialist Party candidates' share declined from 43 to 20 percent. As the leftist *Nouvel Observateur* put it, "The National Front is the leading working class party in France." The FN has also changed the debate on immigration, for years dominated by the open-borders extremists of SOS *Racisme*. Responsible leftists no longer call for open borders. They are trying to keep current immigrants from being deported, and they are not succeeding. In the moments of leisure left him by organizing European resistance to the Serb Freedom Fighters and frustrating the attempts of Greenpeace's *Rainbow Warrior II* to disrupt France's renewed atomic testing (his Socialist predecessor, Mitterrand, planted a bomb on the original *Rainbow Warrior*, killing an environmentalist), Chirac is deporting immigrants at a furious rate.

Left and right now admit that the National Front is not going away because the issues are not going away. Islam is not a form of personal piety. It is a true culture that affects every part of a person's life, from the girl's veil to the man's quintuple daily genuflection. France's Islamic minority is not assimilating, *pace* random anecdotes to the contrary, and it is massively outreproducing the native French. What is more, Muslims can "under-live" the average Frenchman and so can survive on jobs, *petits boulots*, which the increasingly university educated French will not take. While immigration is crushing the French worker from the bottom, global free trade hand in hand with social democracy is crippling the French standard of living, though not the French economy. As Sir James Goldsmith points out in *The Trap*, in the last 20 years the French GNP has grown an amazing 80 percent, but, at the same time, unemployment has grown from 400,000 to over 5 million. Governmental intrusion and corruption are not going away, either. Aroused French voters stripped the corrupt Socialist Party of its control of parliament. Increasingly important decisions will be made by the

bureaucrats of the European Union in Brussels, and over them the French voter will have little or no control.

Are there lessons here for the United States? Are massive immigration, the flight of jobs to the Third World, and a corrupt and out-of-control government issues here? At one million immigrants a year, we let in more immigrants than the rest of the world combined. NAFTA has already had the effect that GATT will accentuate, a steady rise in the GNP accompanied by massive "downsizing," i.e., unemployment. This summer a South Korean firm purchased majority control of Zenith, the last American TV manufacturer. For Americans the change was largely symbolic, of course. Most Zenith TV sets are assembled in Mexico. As for murderous corruption (e.g., Waco, Ruby Ridge, Whitewater, the not very mysterious death of Vince Foster), three years of Clinton are already challenging 14 years of Mitterrand. (Those who were outraged at the promotion of Larry Potts after his handling of Waco and Ruby Ridge will be glad to know that the French secret agents who planted the bomb on the *Rainbow Warrior* were sentenced to years of exile . . . on Tahiti, not exactly Devil's Island.)

In France, Le Pen has said for years that left and right are meaningless concepts. France is ruled by *une social démocratie mondialiste*, a one-party globalist socialist regime. The same situation holds true for America. Naturally, the media are not silly enough to tell this to the American people, any more than they let on that Marcia Clark goes out drinking with Johnnie Cochran when the O.J. trial adjourns for the day.

French politics has lessons for us. One, the issues at the heart of a principled nationalism are not going away and can form the basis for an enduring political and cultural movement. Le Pen has a summer school for his young adherents (this summer's theme: *Ni droite ni gauche, Français!*). The majority of voters between 18 and 25 avoided leftist candidates. We need to think about the long term. Two, if Pat Buchanan is the Republican nominee, leftist and liberal nationalists need to swallow hard and support him. Conservative nationalists need to understand that if the GOP nominee is Pete Wilson, we have to support him. It is time for nationalists to unite against globalists if we expect to live in a world where our other ideological differences will even make sense.

Solon in the sixth century B.C. passed a law that those who abstained from major conflicts confronting the Athenian people were disenfranchised. If we hope to avoid the ethnic wars that are America's likely future, we need to act. We are not likely to be given the 25 years it took Le Pen to achieve his current position.

E. Christian Kopff is a professor of Greek and Latin at the University of Colorado in Boulder.

Mr. Manning Goes to Ottawa

by Greg Kaza

Imagine a political party that favors the withdrawal of troops from Bosnia and formal debate over whether to remain in NATO, yet in the next breath opposes government-imposed privileges for homosexuals and other politically correct groups, among them Sikhs demanding to wear turbans to work. This party not only supports cutting corporate welfare and abolishing taxpayer-subsidized benefits for wealthy senior citizens, but consistently supports a reduction of its own political pork, including lavish tax-free, federal pensions.

Americans should be so lucky. Of course, this is not the Republican Party of Newt Gingrich. Canadian Preston Manning and the Reform Party that he leads are unique in the democratic world: their platform is built around opposition to the obscene perquisites of political life. Last year, Reform Members of Parliament took Ottawa, Canada's capital, by storm, accepting voluntary salary cuts and opting out of the lucrative legislative retirement system. *Maclean's* magazine, the Canadian *Time*, attacked Reform as "Ottawa's New Puritans," whining that "the obsession with cutting perks has gone too far." Reform received attention of a different sort from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), an FBI-type police unit. According to media reports, CSIS paid an alleged neo-Nazi informant to infiltrate and gather intelligence on Reform and a Jewish group.

Taking on the Canadian ruling class, Manning has accomplished something that stateside antiestablishmentarians can only dream about: *electoral success*. In the last national election, held in 1993,

Reform destroyed the ruling Progressive Conservatives, Canada's version of American corporate-style Republicans. The Progressive Conservative government fell, and their strength in the 295-seat Canadian national parliament declined from 168 to only two. Reform won nearly 20 percent of the national vote, and increased its representation from one to 52 seats. Reform's strength is on a par with the Bloc Quebecois, an Eastern European-style separatist party, which controls 53 seats and serves as Her Majesty's Loyal Opposition to the ruling Liberal government. If Manning maneuvers adroitly, Reform could either emerge as the official opposition, if an independence referendum in Quebec fails later this year, or form a coalition government after the next national election in 1997. Otherwise, Reform would probably devolve into a regional protest party similar to Social Credit, a western Canadian populist movement that is now virtually defunct. Forty-six of Reform's 52 MPs hail from Canada's two westernmost provinces: Alberta and British Columbia. Only two MPs are from east of Saskatchewan.

Western Canada's alienation from the Progressive Conservatives' preoccupation with Quebec played a key role in the Reform Party's emergence. In June 1987, Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney negotiated the Meech Lake Accord with Quebec's political elite. Language recognizing francophone Quebec as "a distinct society" was viewed in parts of Canada as hostile to English; Meech Lake unraveled after Anglo parliaments in Manitoba and Newfoundland failed to ratify the accord. "Meech Lake really made the Reform Party," an Ottawa staffer explained. Those founding Reform in 1987 included ex-Progressive Conservatives unhappy with Mulroney, a George Bush clone who also imposed a hated General Services Tax during his tenure in Ottawa.

Reform leader Manning, 53, studied Western Canadian alienation firsthand while growing up on a farm near Edmonton. Canada is essentially ruled by politicians from the nation's two most populous provinces: Ontario and Quebec. The Canadian establishment has focused in recent decades on the demands of Quebec's francophone majority, largely to the exclusion of the nation's Western provinces. This has given rise to Western protest movements, among them Social Credit, whose plan to reform the banking

system found its greatest support among farmers. Manning's father, Ernest, was Alberta's Social Credit premier from 1943 to 1968. Renowned for his weekly radio show, "Back to the Bible Hour," Ernest Manning was no doctrinaire conservative. He used Alberta's growing oil revenues to build up the province's public school and welfare systems. He also moved to purge racist elements from Social Credit, including those who blamed the Great Depression on "Jewish financiers." In 1982, B'nai B'rith gave him a Humanitarian Award for his efforts.

The younger Manning has faced similar elements within the Reform Party. In October 1993, a Reform MP candidate in Ontario was dropped after he bashed immigrants in an interview. The candidate, John Beck, later told the *Toronto Star*, "It seems to be predominantly Jewish people who are running this country." According to the February 21, 1994, issue of *Maclean's*, a newsletter issued by the local office of British Columbia Reform MP Werner Schmidt contained a quotation from Adolf Hitler which Manning termed "regrettable."

Like other right-wing movements, Reform has attracted its share of crackpots, some of them perhaps drawn by the party's pledge to restrict immigration from 250,000 to between 100,000 and 150,000 annually. During the 1993 elections, Reform critics, including Progressive Conservatives, charged racism on more than one occasion. But Manning's moral leadership and a clever Reform TV advertisement that featured an Asian-Canadian talking about the importance of economic opportunity for all groups deflected much of the criticism. Since then, Canadian public opinion on the issue has moved in Reform's direction, forcing the ruling Liberals to propose a new policy that reflects a less charitable mood: immigrants would be limited to 190,000-215,000 per year.

Reform also opposes government-imposed privileges for politically correct groups. This has included so-called hate crimes legislation, which in Canada resembles thought crimes straight out of George Orwell's 1984. Reform MPs voted this year against a bill extending the hate crimes statute to homosexuals. In response, homosexuals have bashed Manning, an evangelical Christian, whose wife Sandra and he have been married for 29 years. The couple has five children. A parliamentary member of the socialist New Democrat Party, which

suffered heavy losses in the last election, described two male posteriors in a pro-homosexual movie as “those unforgettable speaking orifices, paralleled only by those Reform party members of Parliament who sit in front of me.” Reform has been fighting the cultural war on other fronts. The party’s first parliamentary filibuster was against a government appropriation for native Indians. When a Sikh sued the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, demanding to wear a turban while on duty, Alberta Reform members collected funds to launch their own legal action supporting RCMP policy. Nelson Eddy would have been proud.

Reform’s campaign for change has been its most successful. Manning has cleverly exploited the Canadian public’s resentment of the perks enjoyed by MPs, who like their counterparts in the United States Congress receive lavish, tax-free pensions for life. “Listening to him, he [Manning] sounds exactly like Jimmy Stewart in *Mr. Smith Goes to Washington*,” *Maclean’s* columnist Peter C. Newman complained. Reform literature blares, “So You Don’t Trust Politicians? Neither Do We!” The party’s platform is a cornucopia of ideas for standing a political establishment on its head. Reform advocates giving citizens the right to recall MPs and a greater voice through national referendums. The party also supports granting MPs more freedom from party discipline when casting votes in parliament. Critics charge that the latter idea is self-serving. Manning would undoubtedly benefit from dissident Liberal MPs voting against the ruling Liberal government. But would a *Prime Minister* Manning exercise such *laissez-faire* charity toward Reform MPs wishing to vote against his government?

After the 1993 election, Manning announced that Reform MPs would not accept a long list of parliamentary perks, including free haircuts, massages, and French lessons for spouses. Manning asked Reform MPs to give up ten percent of their salaries, or pay the tax on their \$21,300 annual tax-free allowance—if they could afford to do so. At a press conference, Manning returned the keys to his taxpayer-subsidized automobile and chose a former secretary’s office as his own. But Manning was embarrassed in March 1994 when it was revealed that Reform’s executive council provided him with a \$31,000 fund to pay for expenses, including clothing and dry cleaning. “He [Manning] wasn’t at all well dressed,” Re-

form spokesman Ron Wood said in defending the fund. The revelation set off a firestorm of controversy, largely within Reform. Calgary West MP Stephen Harper said the fund “undercuts our ability to forcefully and credibly articulate the positions we’ve taken on some of these pay and perks issues.” With Manning’s blessing, Reform’s executive publicly rebuked Harper, who is seen as a possible successor to Manning. After the incident, both men said they wanted to put personal differences behind them. “We’re growing up,” one Reform member observed.

To his credit, Manning has emphasized constituent relations. Reform MPs have been encouraged to spend more time in their ridings, meeting with constituents, than playing government in Ottawa. (A riding is a Canadian parliamentary district.) Reform prides itself on taking direction from the grass roots, rather than from a core group of party bosses. When a gun control bill surfaced in parliament this year, some Reform MPs initially expressed support for the measure. But after hearing from constituents, Reform MPs voted as a bloc against the legislation.

This strategy has allowed Reform to stay close to the Canadian public’s pulse. Nowhere is this clearer than on the legislative pension issue, a topic outside the parameters of debate for Newt Gingrich. Canadian MP pensions are payable after only six years of service; payments begin when the member retires, regardless of age, until recently, when Reform’s criticism forced the Liberals to set 55 as the minimum age for receiving benefits. Double-dipping was tolerated; payment had occurred even if the ex-MP held another government post such as ambassador. The Liberal bill was opposed by Reform, which supports MP pensions only if they “are no more generous than private sector norms.” In a principled rejection of Ottawa’s political culture, Reform MPs opted out of the system, creating a clear contrast with Liberals. One can visualize the Reform TV ads in the 1997 campaign: “Has Ottawa Got a Pension Plan for You!”

Yet there are limits to Reform’s antipolitics. The party has not, for example, been aggressive on MP pay raises. Reform advocates popular referendums. Why not a popular vote on politicians’ pay raises? Canada’s five-party system offers more of an electoral choice than the American two-party system, but a “None

Of The Above” ballot option would give Canadian voters yet another choice.

Manning has, however, been out front on foreign policy issues. Public opinion polls show the Canadian public opposed to military intervention in war-torn foreign locales like Somalia and Bosnia. A scandal involving the brutal murder of Somali civilians by Canadian troops, and the recent Bosnian hostage-taking of Canadians, have fueled public opposition. Unique among party leaders, Manning has called for the withdrawal of Canadian troops serving with United Nations missions. The contrast with the socialist NDP is ironic. Critical of NATO membership, the NDP have been cheerleaders for U.N. military adventurism.

One of Reform’s less-publicized proposals calls for formal debate on whether Canada should remain in NATO. In 1993, Manning said he favored Canadian withdrawal from NATO, which seemed to contradict Reform’s formal position. He later retreated, saying NATO membership should be reviewed. Reform is not strictly noninterventionist: the party supported extending a ten-year-old agreement allowing the United States to test cruise missiles over Canada and supports cutting, not abolishing, foreign aid. The party is strangely silent on Canada’s draconian Official Secrets Act, which allows the government to harass and prosecute journalists who report embarrassing facts about Ottawa’s foreign policy.

But the domestic issue of Quebec is likely to determine whether Reform emerges as the formal opposition. The party favors no special treatment for Quebec. They would abolish official bilingualism, but give all provinces, including Quebec, exclusive control over language and culture. If Quebec votes against separation from Canada, moderate Bloc Québécois MPs could leave the party, erasing the slim, one-seat deficit Reform faces in Ottawa. Reform could emerge in a stronger position if Quebec votes for separation and the Liberals mishandle the issue as the Mulroney government did. Both scenarios assume Reform does not compromise on its antipolitical agenda, a task that becomes more difficult the longer the party’s members are in public office.

Unsolicited advice to Mr. Manning: Don’t sign any book deals with a foreign publisher.

Greg Kaza is a Michigan state representative. His mother is a Canadian national.


The Hundredth Meridian

by Chilton Williamson, Jr.

Wyoming Peak

It is 145 road miles from Belen to Gallup, New Mexico, a railroad town immediately east of the Arizona border on old Highway 66 and adjacent to the Ramah and Big Navajo Indian Reservations where my grandmother Williamson taught school early in the century, returning to Ohio after a semester or two when an amorous Navajo could not be discouraged from dogging her footsteps around town. Ninety-some years later I had a similarly unpleasant encounter in an Indian bar on the wrong side of the tracks in Gallup with a hairy Navajo who carried a knife in his boot, invited me to go deer-hunting with him, then stroking my beard asked me to be his squaw. At least that is what Ernie Bulow, who is acquainted with the language, made out from his somewhat disordered communication—Ernie only a step or two behind me as we made a hurried exit by a side door. Ernie, the son of a teacher at a Navajo boarding school, was a teacher himself to Navajos before the federal bureaucrats, in their zeal to “Americanize” the students, forbade him to wear cowboy boots in the classroom. A critic, author, and book collector, he operates a bookstore from his old bungalow overlooking Gallup and the forested mesas surrounding the town. He makes a cameo appearance as the trader Don Williams in *The Fool’s Progress* by Edward Abbey, a longtime friend, and, after supplying Tony Hillerman for years with information pertaining to the Dineh, recently coauthored a book with him. I drove through town past the pawn shops and trading posts and stopped at a supermarket for a quart of orange juice. The Indian ahead of me on the checkout line was drunk enough to think he could fool the checkout girl into selling him a pint of blackberry brandy, which she confiscated instead.

Route 666—the Devil’s Highway—follows the Chuska Mountains north from Gallup until they begin to veer to the northwest: Tohatchi, Nachitti, Newcomb, Shiprock. Shiprock Peak, high-masted emblem of the European invaders who smashed up the Navajo way of life forever, was visible from 40 miles to the south; at the northern horizon the



Colorado Rockies like a chain of icebergs floated miraculously beyond the desert’s reach. West of Shiprock on Highway 504 a tourist in a speeding sports car nearly took out a couple of Indian ponies grazing on the shoulder of the road, and vice versa. From this road in the vicinity of Tecc Nos Pos the Four Corners area is viewed in its entirety, staked down by Ute Mountain at near center. At Bluff, Utah, I crossed the silt-laden San Juan River and had a 20-minute palaver, while I waited for the returning pilot car, with the Indian flagger who said it was the best job she had ever had. At Blanding again—all roads lead to Blanding—I stopped to fill both tanks before starting on the 125-mile run across the head of Lake Powell to Hanksville. Above the purple depths of Glen Canyon hazed with a golden light the Henry Mountains loomed across the river, backlit against the evening sun, their snows scarcely melted from the steep slopes above the dark precipitous forests; I watched them in the towing mirror as far as Hanksville, when they were finally obscured by the deepening dusk. Beyond Hanksville, a Mormon hamlet of not more than a few hundred souls, night came down at last and the grateful desert, bursting into the full bloom of spring, filled the darkness with a myriad of heavy perfumes like conflicting currents of air pouring through the open windows of the truck. The town of Green River when I reached it a few minutes before ten was sleepy with scent, and the office of the Motel 6 crowded with tourists wanting to know what the smell was.

I arrived home only a few hours after the five inches of snow that had fallen in Kemmerer that morning had melted. A cold wind blew, and the freshened snowpack on Sheep Mountain north of town

was monolithic. The latest storm front hit as they were beginning to sheep-shear on Thoman Ranch, and Bill Thoman was hustling now to contract the itinerant shearers before they moved up to Montana. Owing to the coldest and wettest spring in a decade, the Forest Service had warned ranchers in the Bridger Valley that they might not be permitted to put their animals this year onto summer range in the Uinta Mountains, where the snowpack varied from 250 percent of normal to 500 percent, and backpackers arriving from the East and West coasts were discovering the Wind River Range to be impassable above 9,000 feet. In Wyoming, the absence of that most lovely of natural phenomena called spring is one of the worthwhile sacrifices we make for the relative nondevelopment of the state by lotus eaters from somewhere else. I called Clyde Clark to make an appointment to have the horses shod, but two weeks passed before we had a day suitable for doing it. Several years before when we shod in wet weather, an unbroke gelding reared as I held his head, striking me in the chest with his knee as he went up and knocking me on my back in a couple of feet of mud and horse manure. Time arrested itself as he towered above me, a black Pegasus, and dropped back to earth in slow motion, his forelegs spreading in the final instant and his hooves planting themselves in the mud on either side of my rigid chest. Shoeing horses in mudtime, as T.S. Eliot said of writing poetry, is a mug’s game. I therefore waited patiently for clement weather, passing the time by sorting gear and loading the horse-packs for the season: tents, tent-stakes, groundcloths, bedrolls, woolen pants, sweaters, and socks, hatchets, nylon rope, knives, map cases, 41. magnum rounds, fly spray, cooking utensils, canned deviled ham, canned smoked oysters, biodegradable soap, Jim Beam in plastic bottles, beer, fine Italian wines, a tape deck, recordings of Scott Joplin, Maria Callas, and J.S. Bach, the complete works of P.G. Wodehouse, and a few good oil paintings to hang in camp—only Boy Scouts are never *really* prepared. When at last we got a fine day, I met Clyde at the ranch and he went around two horses while I held the clippers, handed him the nails, and

watched the fleecy clouds above and Truman Julian's sheep below moving in opposite directions across the rolling sagebrush hills.

Twelve hours before the Thomans' lease expired at midnight, June 30, Mary Thoman and I, accompanied by her niece Karen Thoman of Riverton, loaded three saddle horses into a stock trailer and drove south along the meandering Green River to look for 43 yearlings that needed to be gathered and pushed up to the corrals for transshipment to their summer range on Ferentchaks' ranch in the valley of the Hamsfork north of Kemmerer. Besides Karen we had with us Mary's sister Laurie—last year's Miss Rodeo Wyoming and this summer's Miss Wyoming Trucker, since she acquired a Class A motor vehicle license authorizing her to operate a semi-tractor-trailer rig—to take the truck back to the ranch. Always high-spirited, Laurie was particularly ebullient this afternoon in anticipation of a party 450 miles away in Greeley, Colorado, from which she was due home in 48 hours to haul cattle. We had a hard time spotting cows from the highway, but after half an hour's search we spied them bedded on a bluff downstream of a watertap in the bend of an oxbow in the river. Mary drove across a cattle guard and parked in the sagebrush, where we unloaded the horses and bridled them, tucked the water bottles into the saddlebags, and set off at an extended trot on a flanking maneuver to jump the cattle from their beds and start them moving up the wide valley toward home. We counted 11 cows in the bunch and Karen and I, leaving these to Mary, galloped away to the river, where 32 more head lay resting in the cool mud beside the shore. They heaved up at sight of us, as four heavy-bodied pelicans lifted off the water and flapped upstream several hundred yards. Then they scattered into the desert where we brought them together again and began pushing them in the direction of Mary and her animals. Being yearlings they moved along briskly, much faster than mature cattle. The horse did his work without much direction from me, but with a good deal of restraint on account of the obvious pleasure he took in charging at full speed into the herd and busting it up like a champion pool player taking his turn at the break so that I was soon eating all the dust I could get down, in spite of the lushness of the desert verdure. At gathering time the previous June the

Green River Basin had already been burned a brittle brown by the roaring sun and the hot wind; now it rippled in supple waves under a chilly breeze, shimmering green and spotted with vivid wildflowers. In the space between one roil of yellow dust and another, I squinted ahead at the chromium peaks of the distant mountains gleaming against a wine-blue sky: a promise, a mystery, an ache. When we arrived with the yearlings at the corrals Laurie had gone for the semi. I sat my horse watching her back up to the chute and came close to being caught between two bulls charging backward and forward with their hornless heads wrapped around each other's necks.

At dawn on the morning of the Fourth the temperature in town was just above freezing and a cold wind blew from the northwest under a mackerel sky. Snow filled in the high valleys between the peaks in the Wyoming Range and plugged the couloirs in the sheer rock faces, and across the basin snow clouds driven by the high-altitude winds ruptured themselves on the granitic superstructure of the Wind River Mountains, which the resulting blizzards obliterated. I pulled onto the rodeo grounds as the grand entry parade was beginning and parked behind the announcer's stand. At the center of the arena Old Glory and the Buffalo Flag of Wyoming blew into the riders' faces, and the girls held onto their hats with their left hands while "The Star Spangled Banner" was sung. I recognized Clyde Clark and his family standing 50 yards away, and recalled that his son Brett was scheduled to ride today. Casey, the younger boy, also had aspired to be a bull rider before he watched a friend get stomped by a bull at the Pinedale Rendezvous several years ago. The bull had stepped on the rider's face, caving in the one side and smashing the entire soft palate: a spectacle that recurred to Casey each time he settled himself on a bull until finally he gave up bull riding for good. Brett rode well this afternoon, sticking it until the buzzer sounded, but two rides later a cowboy made a face plant and before he could roll away was winged by a back hoof in the calf of his right leg. He lay groaning in the sand until the clowns supported him out of the arena and settled him on the bottom step of the stairs going up to the announcer's box, where he sat ashen-faced with his head thrown back while the medics were summoned. The

medics stretched him on his back on the hard ground, sawed away the point of the compound fracture where the splintered bone protruded from the skin, and encased the leg in a clear plastic form before they lifted him onto the gurney and stowed him in the back of the waiting ambulance.

I drove west out of town toward the mountains into the lowering sun, as the green hayfields gave way to pasture and the pasture yielded to the lavender sagebrush hills. In the parks that opened between the aspen stands and in the dark pine forests, isolated campers huddled about their supertime fires. The cold increased with the elevation, and for half a mile and some hundreds of vertical feet below the outlet from Middle Piney Lake the creek torrented among leafless willows. I left the truck at the water's edge, stuck a pair of binoculars in my coat pocket, and set out around the lake along its southeastern shore. It was deserted save for two men sitting with fishing rods in their hands and a stringer of mackinaw in the liquid green ice lapping near their feet. Ten years ago over the Fourth a pair of liquored teenagers, mooning their girlfriends from a boat, capsized into the lake and died of shock before they could swim the 75 yards to shore. Before I was halfway around the lake I had seen all that I needed to see. Wyoming Peak was a triangular massif of unbroken snow; Baldy Mountain was decorated by an impressive snow cornice extending 20 feet or more beyond the cliff edge; and the great bowl in which Middle Piney Creek heads below the circumambient trail was sheerly white, unbroken by patches of red talus. Seated on a piece of rock dampened by waves I glassed the wintry landscape far above with precision, searching for signs of hope. So near, and yet so far. Wyoming Peak is my Kilimanjaro: my hope, my promise, my dream, never to be fulfilled in this world though I have climbed it several times and gazed upon the world from its summit. I rose, tucked the glasses inside my shirt, and followed the trail back around the lake, overtaking the fishermen as they trudged slowly with their gear and catch, whose brilliant colors were already fading in the dry mountain air. "Which one is Wyoming Peak?" the shorter man asked, gesturing at the mountains behind us. "Can you see it from here?" "No," I told him, admiring the fish. "You can't see it from here."

c

God works through Saints. The Devil, Crats!

Crats! is an adventure novel in which all the villains are crats: *Democrats*, *bureaucrats*, *Baalocrats*. *Crats!* helps over-educated Christians and Jews recover from too much schooling so that they can believe the Testaments as they're written. They should. It insults God to replace what He said with what's merely believable. Limiting His Word to what we're able to understand easily is a violation of the First Commandment, and that entails serious consequences.

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
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